



*Please reply to:*

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Date: 7 January 2021

## Notice of meeting

### Overview and Scrutiny Committee

**Date:** Tuesday, 19 January 2021

**Time:** 6.00 pm

**Place:** Video conference call

#### **To: Members of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee**

Councillors:

V.J. Leighton (Chairman)  
O. Rybinski (Vice-Chairman)  
C.L. Barratt  
J.H.J. Doerfel  
J.T.F. Doran

R.D. Dunn  
T. Fidler  
M. Gibson  
A.C. Harman  
I.T.E. Harvey

N. Islam  
T. Lagden  
L. E. Nichols  
D. Saliagopoulos

*Councillors are reminded to notify Committee Services of any Gifts and Hospitality offered to you since the last Council meeting so that these may be entered in the Gifts and Hospitality Declaration book.*

**Spelthorne Borough Council, Council Offices, Knowle Green**

**Staines-upon-Thames TW18 1XB**

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## AGENDA

Description	Lead	Timings	Page Number.
<b>1. Apologies</b> To receive any apologies for non-attendance.	Chairman	6.00pm	
<b>2. Minutes</b> To confirm the minutes of the meeting held on 3 November 2020 as a correct record.	Chairman		5 - 10
<b>3. Disclosures of Interest</b> To receive any disclosures of interest from councillors in accordance with the Council's Code of Conduct for members.	Chairman		
<b>4. Call-in of Cabinet decisions</b> No Cabinet decisions have been called in.			
<b>5. Cabinet Forward Plan</b> A copy of the latest Forward Plan is attached.  If any members of the Committee have any issues they want to raise in relation to the Cabinet Forward Plan, please inform Terry Collier, Deputy Chief Executive, 24 hours in advance of the meeting with reasons for the request.	Chairman		11 - 16
<b>6. The Lower Sunbury Lendy Memorial Lion</b> To make a recommendation to Cabinet in relation to the Lower Sunbury Lendy memorial Lion.	Deborah Ashman/ Cllr Barratt	6.05pm	17 - 108
<b>7. Outline Budget 2021-2024</b> To consider the draft budget proposals for the outline budget 2021-2024.	Terry Collier/Cllr Buttar	6.35pm	To Follow
<b>8. Reserves Policy</b> To note the Council's Reserves Policy effective from March 2020.	Paul Taylor/Cllr Buttar	7.25pm	To Follow

Description	Lead	Timings	Page Number.
<p><b>9. Treasury Management Strategy – half yearly report</b></p> <p>To note the half-yearly report on the treasury management position.</p>	Anna Russell/Cllr Buttar	7.35pm	109 - 122
<p><b>10. Treasury Management Strategy Statement</b></p> <p>To note the Treasury Management Strategy Statement for 2021.</p>	Anna Russell/Cllr Buttar	7.45pm	To Follow
<p><b>11. Work Programme</b></p> <p>To consider the Committee’s work programme for the remainder of the Municipal year.</p>	Chairman	7.55pm	123 - 124
<p><b>12. Updates from Task Groups</b></p> <p>To receive updates from the following Task Groups:</p> <p>Climate Change – Cllr Noble End of Life Celebration Centre – Cllr Noble</p> <p>Clean Streets – Cllr Gething was previously the Lead member for this Task Group but is no longer a member of the Committee.</p> <p>The Committee is asked to consider whether:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. to appoint other members to the Clean Streets Task Group and</li> <li>2. to co-opt Cllr Gething to continue working on the Task Group</li> </ol>	Chairman/Cllr Noble	8.05pm	To Follow
<p><b>13. Exempt Business</b></p> <p>To move the exclusion of the Press/Public for the following item, in view of the likely disclosure of exempt information within the meaning of Part 1 of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972, as amended by the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 and by the Local Government (Access to information) (Variation) Order 2006.</p>			

Description	Lead	Timings	Page Number.
<b>14. Corporate Project Management</b> To note an update of the current status of Council projects.	Sandy Muirhead/Cllr Noble	8.20pm	To Follow

**Minutes of the Overview and Scrutiny Committee  
3 November 2020**

**Present:**

Councillor V.J. Leighton (Chairman)  
Councillor O. Rybinski (Vice-Chairman)

**Councillors:**

J.T.F. Doran	M. Gibson	T. Lagden
R.D. Dunn	A.C. Harman	L. E. Nichols
T. Fidler	I.T.E. Harvey	
N.J. Gething	N. Islam	

**Apologies:** Councillors C.L. Barratt, J.H.J. Doerfel and D. Saliagopoulos

**In attendance:** Councillors C. Bateson, S. Buttar, R.J. Noble and B.B. Spoor.

**251/20 Minutes**

The minutes of the extraordinary meeting held on 22 September 2020 and the meeting held on 29 September 2020 were approved as correct records.

**252/20 Disclosures of Interest**

Councillor T. Fidler declared an interest in Item 7 - Leisure centres update, in the interest of transparency. He advised that he had dealings with some people who were involved in this matter and as it relates to financial transactions he would not take part in the discussion on the item.

**253/20 Call-in of Cabinet decisions**

No Cabinet decisions had been called in by the Committee.

**254/20 Cabinet Forward Plan**

The Committee considered and noted the Cabinet Forward Plan.

**255/20 Review of Community Safety**

The Community Safety Officer presented the report on a review of Community Safety. He corrected some errors in Paragraph 2.1 of the report: the table giving the data on reported crimes over the previous 12 months should refer to 2018/19 not 2017/18 and the figure for the decrease in shoplifting should be in green font to indicate a reduction.

The Community Safety Officer outlined the priorities and statutory obligations for the Safer Stronger Partnership Board and the resources required to meet its responsibilities. He provided data on crimes in Spelthorne for the last two years and in comparison to the Surrey force area. Finally he gave an overview

of the activities the Partnership had delivered in response to community concerns.

He explained the actions used to address crime including: crime prevention strategies through use of social media, community protection warning systems to address potential offences before taking formal routes for prosecution, and referral of offenders to the crime prevention programme.

Borough Inspector Maxine Cilia provided an update on the latest crime figures which showed domestic burglary was down, drug offence statistics were up due to an increase in the number of people being caught during lockdown and domestic abuse had continued to increase, with lockdown a contributory factor. This was also the reason for more youth anti-social behaviour at many locations.

The Surrey Police and Crime Commissioner, Mr David Munro, gave a presentation highlighting his achievements and his priorities for 2020/21, the concerns raised by residents and what he was doing to tackle crime.

Cllr R.O. Barratt, the portfolio holder for compliance, reported that he had spent a night with the police to understand the issues they faced. He enquired about the use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras to help combat crime. The Borough Inspector advised that there were already ANPR cameras in the Borough on the M3 and M25 and also covering Staines town and Stanwell but more were needed on the border with the Metropolitan Police area between Feltham and Ashford. The Police and Crime Commissioner agreed to look at providing more cameras in the Borough.

Mr Munro and Inspector Cilia invited members to contact them about any local, or individual ward, issues they wanted to discuss.

The Chairman thanked Inspector Cilia and Mr Munro for attending the meeting.

The Committee noted the report on Community Safety.

### **256/20 Leisure Centres update**

The Chief Finance Officer presented an update on the operation of the Leisure Centres. He advised that the situation had changed since the report was circulated, with the Leisure Centres closing during a further period of lockdown from 5 November until 2 December. As schools would remain open, Sunbury Manor School was being given access to the hall at Sunbury Leisure Centre for PE classes and Sports and Leisure Management (SLM) staff would be available to facilitate this.

SLM had clarified they would take a soft hibernation approach during this new lockdown, including the continuation of maintenance and inspection routines using minimal staff to allow them to react quickly and smoothly when lockdown ended. They had only made one post redundant and hoped to avoid further. The majority of staff were on the extended national furlough scheme.

Prior to the current situation, the Chief Finance Officer advised that the use of the two Centres had been steadily improving. The Council had received regular reports on the level of activity usage and monthly accounts on expenditure which had given reassurance that the Leisure Centres were operating as the Council had anticipated when the support package was provided.

The Chief Finance Officer advised that the operator had achieved a small surplus compared to the information given in the report. However, they had requested flexibility from the Council in the event they required additional financial support as a result of the second lockdown. He advised that any request for additional funding would be discussed with the Council. Finally he commented that the government had ring fenced £100 million to help Local Authority leisure centres and details on the allocation of that funding was expected soon.

The Committee noted the update.

#### **257/20 Budget Issues 2021-2022**

The Chief Finance Officer gave a presentation (attached to these minutes) on the Budget Issues for 2021/22 to 2023/24. He outlined the challenges for bridging the significant 2021-22 Budget gap due to COVID-19 and the risks, pressures and uncertainties for future years.

The Committee noted that more detailed briefings on the draft Budget would be provided at its next meeting in January 2021 and at an extraordinary meeting in February 2021.

**Resolved** to note the presentation on Budget Issues for 2021/22 to 2023/24.

#### **258/20 Capital Monitoring Quarter 2**

Councillor I.T.E. Harvey left the meeting prior to the start of this item.

The Interim Chief Accountant presented the report on the Capital spend for the period ending September 2020.

He advised that since the report was written the Council had agreed further funding for the Leisure Centre project to make it Passivhaus. This funding was would be reflected in the next monitoring report.

**Resolved** to note the current level of capital spend.

#### **259/20 Revenue Monitoring Quarter 2**

The Interim Chief Accountant presented a report providing a summary of the forecast outturn position at the end of the 2020-21 financial year, based on income and expenditure up to the end of September 2020

The Chief Finance Officer confirmed that future reports would identify both of the Deputy Leaders in the breakdown of spend by portfolio.

During this item, the Committee having sat for three hours, Councillor T. Fidler proposed and Councillor N. Islam seconded and it was **agreed** to suspend Standing Order 5, in order to continue to the end of business.

**Resolved** to note the current level of revenue spend.

**260/20 Report from the Climate Change Working Group**

The Group Head for Commissioning and Transformation provided an update on the work of the task group and Councillor R. Noble provided a detailed supplementary report for the Committee on the meeting held on 28 October.

He advised that although the Council had declared a climate emergency it needed to clarify what was meant by that. He outlined the strategy to address climate change, including:

- identifying the Council's own carbon footprint
- establishment of smaller sub-groups of the Task Group to focus on specific issues, including the key areas of transport; Policies; assets and financial investments,
- partnering with other organisations
- communications
- personal 'Green audits' for councillors

The Committee noted the update.

**261/20 Work Programme**

The Committee noted the Work Programme for the remainder of the Municipal year, with the inclusion of the petition on the Lendy Lion memorial in January 2021 which had been referred to the Committee by Council on 22 October 2020.

**262/20 Exempt Business**

**Resolved** to move the exclusion of the Press and Public for the following item in view of the likely disclosure of exempt information within the meaning of Part 1 of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972, as amended by the Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985 and by the Local Government (Access to information) (Variation) Order 2006.

**263/20 Corporate Project Management**

The Group Heads for Commissioning and Transformation and Regeneration and Growth presented the update on Corporate Project Management and the confidential report on assets projects, respectively.

Officers agreed to address the following concerns/queries raised by Members, in future reports:



- The meaning of the red, amber, green (RAG) status of projects was not clear to the reader and needed clarification – a key will be restored to the report.
- The priority flagship Southern Light Railway (SLR) project was shown with a green status but no detail was provided of progress, or risk considerations.
- The change to a Committee system agreed by Council at its July 2020 meeting was not included in the list of projects.
- A missing column from the assets projects showing forecast spend to practical completion, which had been unintentionally removed.
- Projects identified in capital expenditure were not cross-referenced with Project Management. Assets and finance officers will co-ordinate better integration of the project reports with the financial monitoring reports.
- The project reports do not provide the information members need to facilitate scrutiny, in a clear and simple to understand format.
- That all projects have living business cases and project managers are reminded to do a refresh.

The Group Head for Commissioning and Transformation confirmed that projects marked as 'red' were reviewed by the Project Steering Group and if still not progressed referred to Management Team, where project updates were regularly on the agenda for discussion.

Members raised a concern that not all the assets projects they were aware of had been included in the report. Officers responded that the assets referred to were at a very early stage in their development and no decisions had been made as to what the projects would comprise. Once those projects were developed, they would be included in the list provided to the Committee. The expectation from the Committee was to be provided with a list of all projects on which any money had been spent, even if they were still at an early stage in their development. Members requested a top-level description of the project followed by fuller detail where this applied.

**Resolved** that:

1. a comprehensive list of projects with the appropriate and relevant level of detail is provided to the Committee; and
2. Cllr Noble is asked to work with officers on simplifying the reports to help members scrutinise them.

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## Spelthorne Borough Council Cabinet and Property and Investment Committee Forward Plan and Key Decisions

This Forward Plan sets out the decisions which the Cabinet expects to take over the forthcoming months, and identifies those which are **Key Decisions**.

A **Key Decision** is a decision to be taken by the Cabinet which is either likely to result in significant expenditure or savings or to have significant effects on those living or working in an area comprising two or more wards in the Borough.

The members of the Cabinet and their areas of responsibility are:

Cllr J. Boughtflower	Leader of the Council	<a href="mailto:Cllr.boughtflower@spelthorne.gov.uk">Cllr.boughtflower@spelthorne.gov.uk</a>
Cllr J. McIlroy	Deputy Leader	<a href="mailto:Cllr.McIlroy@spelthorne.gov.uk">Cllr.McIlroy@spelthorne.gov.uk</a>
Cllr M. Attewell	Deputy Leader and Community Wellbeing and Housing	<a href="mailto:Cllr.attewell@spelthorne.gov.uk">Cllr.attewell@spelthorne.gov.uk</a>
Cllr S. Buttar	Finance	<a href="mailto:Cllr.buttar@spelthorne.gov.uk">Cllr.buttar@spelthorne.gov.uk</a>
Cllr R. Barratt	Compliance, Waste and Risk	<a href="mailto:Cllr.barratt@spelthorne.gov.uk">Cllr.barratt@spelthorne.gov.uk</a>
Cllr R. Chandler	Leisure Services	<a href="mailto:Cllr.chandler@spelthorne.gov.uk">Cllr.chandler@spelthorne.gov.uk</a>
Cllr T. Mitchell	Planning and Economic Development	<a href="mailto:Cllr.mitchell@spelthorne.gov.uk">Cllr.mitchell@spelthorne.gov.uk</a>
Cllr R. Noble	Communications, Corporate Management and Environment	<a href="mailto:Cllr.noble@spelthorne.gov.uk">Cllr.noble@spelthorne.gov.uk</a>

Whilst the majority of the Cabinet's business at the meetings listed in this Plan will be open to the public and press, there will inevitably be some business to be considered which contains confidential, commercially sensitive or personal information. This is formal notice under the Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012 that part of any of the Cabinet meetings listed below may be held in private where exempt and / or confidential information is due to be considered.

Representations regarding this should be made to [committee.services@spelthorne.gov.uk](mailto:committee.services@spelthorne.gov.uk)

Please direct any enquiries about this Plan to the Principal Committee Manager, Michelle Beaumont, at the Council offices on 01784 446337 or e-mail [m.beaumont@spelthorne.gov.uk](mailto:m.beaumont@spelthorne.gov.uk)

## Spelthorne Borough Council

### Cabinet and Property and Investment Committee Forward Plan and Key Decisions for 1 January 2021 to 30 April 2021

Anticipated earliest (or next) date of decision and decision maker	Matter for consideration	Key or non-Key Decision	Decision to be taken in Public or Private	Lead Officer/ Cabinet Member
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Outline Budget 2021-2024	Key Decision It is likely to result in the Council incurring expenditure above or making savings of up to £164,000	Public	Paul Taylor, Chief Accountant Finance Portfolio Holder
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Treasury Management Strategy Statement	Non-Key Decision	Public	Anna Russell, Deputy Chief Accountant Finance Portfolio Holder
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Treasury Management Strategy - half yearly report	Non-Key Decision	Public	Anna Russell, Deputy Chief Accountant Finance Portfolio Holder
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Public Space Protection Orders - Unauthorised Mooring To consider a proposal to make new powers to prevent unauthorised Mooring – Proposed Public Space Protection Order, following the results of stakeholder consultation.	Non-Key Decision	Public	Jackie Taylor, Group Head - Neighbourhood Services Portfolio Holder for Compliance, Waste and Risk
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Reserves Policy	Non-Key Decision	Public	Paul Taylor, Chief Accountant Finance Portfolio Holder
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Determination of the 2021/22 Council Tax base for tax setting	Non-Key Decision	Public	Terry Collier, Deputy Chief Executive, Paul Taylor, Chief Accountant Finance Portfolio Holder

Date of decision and decision maker	Matter for consideration	Key or non-Key Decision	Decision to be taken in Public or Private	Lead Officer/ Cabinet Member
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Managed Service for the Incubator To consider the provision of a managed service for the Incubator	Non-Key Decision	Private	Keith McGroary, Economic Development Manager Deputy Leader
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Exempt Report - Planned and Reactive Repairs Managed Service Tender To consider an exempt report on the tenders received for the Planned and Reactive Repairs Managed Service contract.	Key Decision It is likely to result in the Council incurring expenditure above or making savings of up to £164,000	Private	Hilary Gillies, Interim Corporate Procurement Manager Deputy Leader
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Exempt Report - Property Letting 'L' To consider the letting of property 'L'.	Key Decision It is likely to result in the Council incurring expenditure above or making savings of up to £164,000	Private	Nick Cummings, Property and Development Manager Deputy Leader
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Exempt report - Property Letting 'M' To consider the letting of property 'M'	Key Decision It is likely to result in the Council incurring expenditure above or making savings of up to £164,000	Private	Nick Cummings, Property and Development Manager Deputy Leader
Cabinet 27 01 2021	Exempt report - Property Letting 'N' To consider the letting of property 'N'	Key Decision It is likely to result in the Council incurring expenditure above or making savings of up to £164,000	Private	Nick Cummings, Property and Development Manager Deputy Leader

Date of decision and decision maker	Matter for consideration	Key or non-Key Decision	Decision to be taken in Public or Private	Lead Officer/ Cabinet Member
Cabinet 24 02 2021	Revenue Monitoring Q3 (Oct - Dec) To note the level of revenue spend to the end of December 2020.	Non-Key Decision	Public	Paul Taylor, Chief Accountant Finance Portfolio Holder
Cabinet 24 02 2021	Capital Monitoring Q3 (Oct-Dec) To note the level of Capital spend to the end of December 2020.	Non-Key Decision	Public	Paul Taylor, Chief Accountant Finance Portfolio Holder
Cabinet 24 02 2021	Fees and Charges 2021/22 To consider the level of fees and charges for the period 2021/11	Non-Key Decision	Public	Paul Taylor, Chief Accountant Finance Portfolio Holder
Cabinet 24 02 2021	Public Space Protection Order - Injunction (Unlawful Encampments) To consider a proposal to make Public Space Protection Orders in the borough and to consult residents on the matter.	Non-Key Decision	Public	Karen Limmer, Temporary Principal Solicitor Portfolio Holder for Compliance, Waste and Risk
Cabinet 24 02 2021	Corporate Health and Safety Policy To adopt a Corporate Health and Safety Policy	Non-Key Decision	Public	Stuart Mann, Health & Safety Officer Portfolio Holder for Compliance, Waste and Risk
Cabinet 24 02 2021 Council 25 02 2021	Pay Policy Statement To consider the proposed Pay Policy Statement and make a recommendation to Council	Non-Key Decision	Public	Sandy Muirhead, Group Head - Commissioning and Transformation Portfolio Holder for Environment, Communications and Corporate Management

Date of decision and decision maker	Matter for consideration	Key or non-Key Decision	Decision to be taken in Public or Private	Lead Officer/ Cabinet Member
Cabinet 24 02 2021 Council 25 02 2021	Detailed Revenue Budget To consider the detailed revenue budget for 2021/22.	Non-Key Decision	Public	Terry Collier, Deputy Chief Executive, Paul Taylor, Chief Accountant Finance Portfolio Holder
Cabinet 24 02 2021 Council 25 02 2021	Capital programme 2021/22 To agree the Capital programme for 2021/22.	Non-Key Decision	Public	Paul Taylor, Chief Accountant Finance Portfolio Holder
Cabinet 24 02 2021 Council 25 02 2021	Draft Capital Strategy	Non-Key Decision	Public	Heather Morgan, Group Head - Regeneration and Growth Leader of the Council
Cabinet 24 02 2021 Council 25 02 2021	Annual Grants To agree the organisations to which grants will be made for 2021/22.	Non-Key Decision	Public	Tracy Reynolds, Community Development Manager Finance Portfolio Holder
Cabinet 24 02 2021	Exempt report - Property Letting 'O' To consider the letting of property 'O'	Key Decision It is likely to result in the Council incurring expenditure above or making savings of up to £164,000	Private	Nick Cummings, Property and Development Manager Deputy Leader
Cabinet 24 02 2021	Exempt report - Property Letting 'P' To consider the letting of Property 'P'	Key Decision It is likely to result in the Council incurring expenditure above or making savings of up to £164,000	Private	Nick Cummings, Property and Development Manager Deputy Leader
Cabinet 24 03 2021 Council 22 04 2021	Calendar of Meetings 2021-2022 To agree a calendar of meetings for 2021-2022	Non-Key Decision	Public	Gillian Scott, Committee Services Support Officer Leader of the Council

Date of decision and decision maker	Matter for consideration	Key or non-Key Decision	Decision to be taken in Public or Private	Lead Officer/ Cabinet Member
Cabinet 24 03 2021 Council 22 04 2021	Members' Allowance Scheme 2021-2022 To consider the report of the Independent Remuneration Panel on a review of the Members' Allowances Scheme for 2021-2022	Non-Key Decision	Public	Gillian Scott, Committee Services Support Officer Leader of the Council



# Overview and Scrutiny Committee



19 January 2021

<b>Title</b>	<b>The Lower Sunbury Lendy Memorial</b>
<b>Purpose of the report</b>	To make a recommendation to Cabinet.
<b>Report Author</b>	Deborah Ashman
<b>Cabinet Member</b>	Councillor Barratt
<b>Confidential</b>	No
<b>Corporate Priority</b>	Item is not in the current list of Corporate Priorities but still requires a Cabinet decision
<b>Recommendations</b>	<p><b>Committee is asked:</b></p> <p><b>To consider the report written about the Lendy memorial by Alan Doyle and to recommend to Cabinet a course of action based on the information currently available.</b></p> <p><b>To consider and accept the offer of supporting an application to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for a grant to undertake further research on the Lendy statue. Respected historians in African History, have approached the Council for a letter of support. If any further new information is received after this research is undertaken it can be further considered by Councillors.</b></p>
<b>Reason for Recommendation</b>	<p><b>Full Council has asked the Overview and Scrutiny Committee to consider the issues surrounding the Lendy Memorial, as highlighted by the 'Topple the Racist' organisation which supports Black Lives Matters. A petition containing the signatures of over 2000 residents in support of the memorial has been received by Spelthorne Council. Respected historians in African History, have approached the Council for a letter of support to apply for a grant to undertake further research on Lendy . If any new information is received after this research is undertaken it can be considered by Councillors.</b></p>

## 1. Key issues

- 1.1 The Lendy Memorial is to two brothers, Charles Lendy and Edward Lendy, who originated from Sunbury and who died within 3 weeks of each other in different parts of Africa. Allegations have been made against the characters of these two men. Specifically, they are both accused of “being responsible for murdering African tribes with machine gun fire “. This all happened in the nineteenth century.
- 1.2 In June 2020 a website was published by the Stop Trump coalition (Topple the Racists) in support of the Black Lives Matter protests. The website mapped out more than 100 statues across Britain, which they stated paid tribute to slave traders and "racists". The Lendy Memorial is one of these statues.
- 1.3 Topple the Racists state that they want debate and it's the responsibility of the local communities to decide what statues they want in their local area. They are not advocating statues should be destroyed
- 1.4 Once the Council became aware of the controversy, immediate action to protect the statue was organised. The statue remains covered whilst the situation is being considered.
- 1.5 The local Sunbury residents initiated an on-line petition in support of the statue. This continues to be a sensitive issue for the community and the petition now holds over 2000 signatures.
- 1.6 Alan Doyle is a local Sunbury resident. He is an investigative journalist by profession, who has been researching the Lendy family on and off for over 30 years. Topple the Racists based the allegations about the statue on a website article which makes partial references to a longer paper on the subject Mr Doyle had written 10 years ago.
- 1.7 The Council approached Mr Doyle after establishing his credentials and asked him to review the information and draft a report for consideration.
- 1.8 The issues are complex, and Mr Doyle has explained in his report how the brothers differed from one another. His findings reflect these differences. There are no recommendations as it is down to Councillors to decide what course of action may need to be taken.
- 1.9 On a separate issue Officers had previously approached 2 respected historians, who specialise in African history including Slavery and Colonialism and asked them if they would be prepared to research and draft a factual historical report on Lendy for Councillors to review . They responded by submitting a proposal to Officers but stated due to the complexity of the background to the history of the memorial they would have to charge £28,000 as it would take extensive research time to unravel this complex story. After discussing this charge with MAT, Officers looked for other solutions and Alan Doyle kindly assisted.
- 1.10 Spelthorne has now been approached by the historians who are applying for a grant from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) to conduct research into historical monuments and the legacies of Empire. They have identified five statues that had been highlighted by the Black Lives Matters Movement, of which Lendy is one.

- 1.11 They have specified what they will undertake in the research and have listed this in the proposal which replicates the specification that Officers had previously drafted.
- 1.12 The two historians state they intend to undertake the research anyway but would like support from the relevant Councils so they can evidence that they are working in partnership.
- 1.13 The project will be funded by the AHRC so no financial assistance is requested from Spelthorne Council. A letter of support from the Council is requested which will be included in their funding application. This letter will record a commitment to the proposed research project and an explanation of the benefits to the Council this project will give.
- 1.14 There is no timetable for the research to be started or concluded, therefore the detailed report submitted by Alan Doyle should be considered and actions recommended to Cabine .
- 1.15 It should be noted that there is also a housing development called Lendy Place, also in Lower Sunbury.

## **2. Options analysis and proposal**

- 2.1 Remove the statue. This could satisfy the Topple the Racist organisation, however the overriding local community view is in support of the statue.
- 2.2 Place a summary on a plaque identifying the controversy (perhaps with a QR code so that information can be read using a smart phone). This may satisfy some opponents of the statue as their demand has always been that of education.
- 2.3 Continue to keep the statue covered. This will not satisfy the people that have signed the petition.
- 2.4 Remove the covering and return the statue as was, however there is a risk of damage or destruction by those supporting the Topple the Racists and Black Lives Matters organisations.
- 2.5 Enhance the information about the statue to visitors of the Walled Garden through media such as written reports, books and website links. This could be done in conjunction with point 2.2.
- 2.6 In reference to the proposals from the research historians, by agreeing to become a partner it will demonstrate to the whole community the willingness to review all information available and an openness to ensuring all information is known about the Council's community assets and local history.
- 2.7 To refuse to support the additional research proposed. This may generate questions as to why the Council wishes to refuse obtaining further information free of charge which would enable them to make further informed decisions if required.

## **3. Financial implications**

- 3.1 If the Council decides to remove the statue, consideration will then have to be taken about the naming of the housing development in Sunbury ("Lendy Place"). If it was decided to change the name, the full cost to the residents would have to be paid by the Council. This cost would have to be researched but would amount to several thousand pounds.

- 3.2 The cost of enhancing the information is minimal and could be costed within existing budgets.
- 3.3 It should be noted that the Council has attempted to involve other specialists in this field to further ensure impartiality, however this proved difficult and very costly. A figure of £28,000 was asked for to research The Lendy Memorial alone.

#### **4. Other considerations**

- 4.1 It is evident that Topple the Racists and Black Lives Matter focus heavily on education and knowledge about injustices of the past and present. By ensuring that information is available by the Lendy memorial visitors would be informed about the issues.
- 4.2 Consideration has been given to the other 28 statues there are in Spelthorne, but none appear to carry the controversy of the Lendy Memorial.

#### **5. Sustainability/Climate Change Implications**

- 5.1 No sustainability or climate change implications have been identified.

#### **6. Timetable for implementation**

- 6.1 The timetable will depend on the decision of the Council.

**Background papers:** There are none.

**Appendices:**

#### **Appendix A**

**'The Lower Sunbury Lendy Memorial', by Alan Doyle**

## THE LOWER SUNBURY LENDY MEMORIAL

**Alan Doyle**

I have been asked by Deborah Ashman and Jackie Taylor, respectively Joint Group Head of Community Wellbeing, and Group Head Neighbourhood Services, at Spelthorne Council, to report on the historical background to the Lendy Memorial in the Walled Garden in Lower Sunbury.

The Memorial is to two brothers, Charles Frederick Lendy RA and Edward August William Lendy DSO, who died within three weeks of each other in different parts of Africa. Allegations have been made against the characters of these two men. Specifically, they are both accused of “being responsible for murdering African tribes with machine gun fire.”

I will deal with each brother in turn, setting out the historical facts as far as they can be established, using primary contemporaneous sources where it is possible, and separating out as far as I can the accusations and counter-accusations between political parties and factions at Westminster and in the press at the time, many of which were notable for being based on hearsay and exaggeration.

I will then discuss other memorials to these two men in other parts of the world, and attitudes to those memorials there. Judgement can then be made by the people of Lower Sunbury and the Council as to whether the allegations made against these two men are justified.



*The Lendy Memorial in the Sunbury Walled Garden*

### Summary

At the outset, I must deal with one issue. The evidence which has been used by the Topple the Racists website to justify their call for the Lendy Memorial to be taken down is a brief article on a website called The Rhodesian Soldier (<http://www.rhodesiansoldier.com>), which credits my name as a source of research. That brief website article is a very partial summary, written by the owner of that website, of a much longer paper that I wrote more than ten years ago. I did not write that website article myself.

I have been researching the Lendy family periodically for almost 30 years. The more I have dug back into the records, the more convinced I have become that Charles Frederick Lendy has been unfairly treated by history. Much contemporaneous evidence has come to my attention since I wrote that original piece more than ten years ago, and as the evidence has changed, a different light has been thrown, and my view has changed.

I have tried to contact the people behind the Topple the Racists website, to explain this and other matters, but have received no reply. I have been unable to establish the names of the individuals who run that website.

There is no evidence whatsoever that Edward Lendy was guilty of “murdering African tribes with machine gun fire”.

There are very good reasons, backed by evidence, to conclude that the same allegations made against Charles Lendy are unjustified.

## The Lendy Family

Charles and Edward Lendy were the two sons of Major Auguste Frederic Lendy and his wife Sophia, who married in Brighton in 1848. Charles and Edward were born in Lower Sunbury in January 1863 and February 1868 respectively. They had two older sisters – Violet and Alice – and a younger sister, Julia. The Lendys lived successively in two houses along the river road in Lower Sunbury.

Major Lendy ran a military college in Lower Sunbury, preparing students for the exams for entry into the army colleges at Sandhurst and Woolwich. Under their father’s tuition, both brothers passed these exams. Charles went to Woolwich, where he trained as an artillery officer and was commissioned into the Royal Artillery. Edward went to Sandhurst and was commissioned as an infantry officer into the Derbyshire Regiment (the Sherwood Foresters).

## Edward August William Lendy DSO

*War Office, February 25, 1890.*  
 THE Queen has been graciously pleased to give orders for the appointment of the under-mentioned Officers to be Companions of the Distinguished Service Order, viz. :—  
 For the Action at Toski—  
 Captain Hector Archibald MacDonald, the Gordon Highlanders (employed with the Egyptian Army), and  
 For the operations against the Slave Traders at Foulah Town, and its vicinity, on the West Coast of Africa :—  
 Lieutenant Edward Augustus William Lendy, the West India Regiment.

*London Gazette, 25 February 1890, p5*

Despite the Sherwood Foresters being his parent regiment, Edward Lendy was immediately seconded to the regular West India Regiment, whose ranks were composed of black Caribbean volunteers. The West India Regiment were often deployed to West Africa, and they were in Sierra Leone when Lendy joined them.

In August 1890 he was invested with the Distinguished Service Order – a decoration for gallantry second only to the VC - by Queen Victoria herself at Osborne House on the Isle of Wight - “for services at Foulah Town and its

vicinity on the West Coast of Africa, in breaking up a combination of slave dealers and rescuing upwards of 250 slaves.”<sup>1</sup>

#### REWARDS FOR BRAVERY.

Last evening a meeting of the Royal Humane Society was held at the offices, Trafalgar-square, Charing-cross, to consider, with a view to suitable reward, the cases of a number of persons who have distinguished themselves, by signal acts of gallantry, in saving life in the United Kingdom and her Majesty's Indian and colonial possessions. Captain Hawes presided, and among those present were Admiral Sir E. Ommanney, C.B., Colonel Horace Montagu, Captain S. Eardley-Wilmot, R.N., Captain Lambton Young, Captain W. Neal, and the secretary, Captain Home. Most of the cases were notified through the War Office, the Admiralty, and the India and Colonial Offices. After due investigation the society's medals and other rewards were conferred as follows :—

The medal to Captain E. A. Lendy, Inspector-General of Police in Sierra Leone, who was one of the officers killed in the recent unfortunate collision between British and French forces in West Africa, Sergeant Marcus Smith, Corporal Amados Sambach, and Corporal E. Parkins, for saving Constable M. Bangurah, at Seli, Rokelle river, Sierra Leone. The report, forwarded through the Colonial Office, showed that a police force, under the command of the Inspector-General, was sent on November 4 last to open a road to Koinadugu, which had been shut up owing to the Sofa hostilities. After getting through some dense jungle, on the third day the force arrived on the banks of the river, which was 80 yards wide, very much swollen owing to heavy rains, with a strong current, and well known to be infested with alligators. There being no boats and only a creeper rope tied from bank to bank, the natives refused to cross owing to the presence of alligators. As provisions were exhausted, it was found necessary for some of the party to risk the danger and swim across. Corporals Sambach and Parkins stripped and got across safely. Sergeant Smith followed with Bangurah. The latter became exhausted and sank twice before the other men could assist him. As they were all more or less in distress, Captain Lendy dived in and swam to the rescue of Bangurah, whom, with the utmost difficulty, he got safely to shore. The case was strongly recommended by the Governor of Sierra Leone. Medals were also awarded to George

*The Times, 16 Jan 1894*

By September 1893 Edward Lendy was with the Sierra Leone Border Police, involved in an ongoing war with the Sofas<sup>2</sup>, slave-soldiers of the Wassoulou or Mandinka empire of Samori Ture which was based in Mali and Guinea, and tasked with patrolling Sierra Leone's borders with the neighbouring French and German colonies of Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea.

On 4 November 1893, Edward Lendy and forty Police were at the Sell River on their way to open a road which had been closed by the war with the Sofas. There was no bridge – only a rope made from creepers tied from bank to bank. The river had to be traversed, the force's rations were on the opposite bank – and the men began to cross. Four men ended up in distress, in imminent risk of drowning. Lendy dived into the water to save them. He and three of his soldiers were awarded Bronze medals by the Royal Humane Society for their courage. (see left, from *The Times*, 16 Jan 1894, and Appendix A.)

Less than two months later, on 23 December, Lendy was at Waiima near the eastern border of Sierra Leone (alternative

<sup>1</sup> London Gazette, 25 February 1890, Issue 26026, p 1044 (above) and the Morning Post, August 21 1890 p5.

<sup>2</sup> **TURE, SAMORI** (c. 1830-1900). Samori Ture was a state builder in late 19th century Guinea and the most effective opponent of colonial conquest in West Africa. Born in a trader family, he early took military service in order to free his mother, who had been taken as a slave. He proved himself a brilliant military leader and in the 1870s began building his own state, tying together many small Mandinka polities. He first clashed with the French in 1883 and realised from the first the importance of French weapons. He was able to use trade routes and commercial contacts to acquire modern rifles from Sierra Leone traders and horses from areas further north. He was operating in an area where there were few commodities he could exchange for his military purchases. Though he had a vision of an economically dynamic state, slaving provided him the guns he needed, many of his soldiers, and the farmers who produced the food his army and court needed. As a result, he was forced to increase his slaving activities. This in turn limited the areas that were loyal to him. He was nevertheless able to

spellings Waima and Warina). Early that morning, in thick mist, they were attacked by a French force of more than 1200 men under a Lieutenant Maritz. The French had mistaken the British for Sofas, and by the time the shooting stopped, the British had lost seventeen officers and men killed and fifteen wounded. Lendy and two of his Police were among those killed. Maritz died later of his wounds.

Edward Lendy was elected as a member of the Royal Geographical Society in February 1893. The RGS records, however, show that he “never qualified” as a member, the phrase referring to his not having paid his annual subscription, almost certainly because he had been killed before he could pay it

There is no evidence whatsoever that Edward August William Lendy was ever involved in “murdering African tribes with machine gun fire”.

### **Charles Frederick Lendy RA**

Charles Lendy spent seven years with the Royal Artillery in various postings in Gibraltar, Bermuda and Shoeburyness, before he was seconded to the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1890.

The BSAC, established by Cecil Rhodes, had been granted a Royal Charter in 1889 to colonise and exploit the land and resources of south-central Africa. Further to that aim the BSAC had secured, in controversial circumstances, the Rudd Concession from Lobengula, the second King of the Matabele, which granted the Company mining and other rights in Mashonaland. In return, Lobengula was paid a lump sum of money, monthly payments of smaller sums, and, crucially for this story, 1000 Martini-Henry rifles, of the same model issued to the British Army at the time, and 100 000 rounds of ammunition. It was the offer of these rifles which clinched the Rudd Concession deal, as Lobengula and his impis had only between 600 and 800 rifles amongst them, without sufficient ammunition.<sup>3</sup>


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fend off the French for 15 years but was finally defeated and captured in 1898. From Klein, Martin A. and Woronoff, Jon (2002). Historical Dictionary of Slavery and Abolition. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 9780 8 108410 2 4

<sup>3</sup> “Part of the purchase price given by the BSA Company to Lobengula for the [Rudd] mineral concession was one thousand Martini rifles and one hundred thousand rounds of ammunition. As Lobengula repudiated the concession almost immediately after signing it, he refused to take delivery of these guns and ammunition and on my arrival in the country they were lying at Dawson’s store. Just before the outbreak of the war in 1893 I happened to be alone at the store for a few days. One morning I was awakened very early by the head Induna of Bulawayo, Magwekwe, [Magwekwe Fuyana] who said he was sent by the King to fetch the guns. He had a small army with him. I set to work and opened up the cases and found that there was a bayonet for each gun. I had to show them how to fix these...one warrior got a pretty severe stab from one of his pals who was a bit clumsy. Not long after the guns had been taken I got a message from the King to say that the number [of rifles] was not correct. This was a rather serious matter for me, so I rode over to Umutjwa [Umutcha] where the King then was. I told the King that I had counted the guns myself and that the number was correct. He replied that they were not all there; they have been counted and some are short. I then asked where they were, and he replied in the cattle kraal. I went there and found the rifles strewed



Mashonaland lay to the north and east of the Matabele kingdom, and Lobengula and the Matabele claimed it as a vassal territory. The Matabele kingdom – like the Zulu kingdom of which had once been a part - was a highly militarised society. All young Matabele men served as soldiers of the King in age-based regiments, “dependent on him for food, weapons and even for permission to marry.”<sup>4</sup> The Matabele impi, or regiments, ranged into the territories surrounding them, looting and pillaging on a regular basis.



***Approximate areas of Ndebele settlement and of regular raiding and tribute collections c. 1830 - c. 1890 (from Ransford, p21).***

about all over the place. I got hold of some of the Indunas and had the rifles placed in piles of ten and again reported to the King that they were correct. He then sent Mtjan [Mjaan] Induna of his Imbezu regiment to count them and I was very much relieved when I heard him report to the King that the number was correct.” From the hand-written reminiscences of Percy Durban Crewe, Bulawayo Public Library.

<sup>4</sup> Bulawayo: Historic Battleground of Rhodesia Oliver Ransford, 1968 p14 .

Below I discuss the incidents which formed the basis of the allegations against Charles Lendy in Parliament and the press.

### **Ngomo's Kraal**

In March 1892, Lendy was in command at an action at Ngomo's kraal (village), in Chief Mangwende's district to the east of Salisbury (now Harare). Lendy went with his patrol to where Ngomo (also known as Gonwe), a minor Chief, had established himself, and in the ensuing shoot-out 21 tribesmen were killed, including Ngomo.

The incident sparked a furore in London. Lendy was accused of murder. The incident was again raised at the end of 1893 when the Matabele War began.

Mr H.W. Lee, in an editorial<sup>5</sup> in the periodical "Justice" (which described itself as "The Organ of the Social Democracy Federation", a precursor to the Labour Party) said:

"This Captain Lendy is the same officer who attacked Ngomo's kraal, and killed the Chief and twenty-five of his followers because a few of the tribe had lifted two or three head of cattle."

Henry Labouchere, MP for Northampton, in an adjournment debate in the House of Commons a few days later, said:

"Everybody would remember the action of Captain Lendy, one of the officers of the Company, who for some small theft committed in some particular district, went there, fired into a kraal, and killed 20 men."<sup>6</sup>

He had made similar statements previously in his own periodical "Truth", and in Parliament, as part of his more general campaign against the BSAC.

There was much more to it than the theft of "two or three head of cattle" or "some small theft". James Bennett, a farmer and trader, had suffered a number of intrusions into his store located near Ngomo's kraal. When he finally remonstrated with Ngomo's son, who was leading the intrusions, Ngomo's son called upon his people to "kill the white man". Bennett "laid about himself with some vigour"<sup>7</sup> and managed to escape. That is attempted murder. In addition, there was an unsolved case of the murder of a wagon driver in Ngomo's area, and many other cases of theft and violence.

Lendy had previously tried to enlist the help of Mangwende, the paramount Chief of the district, with no success, although Mangwende did provide two guides to lead Lendy's patrol to Ngomo's kraal. It was built on a massive kopje, and feeling locally (including by Mangwende) was that Ngomo was prepared to violently resist. Ngomo had successfully resisted Chief Mangwende's own attempts to curb his criminalities.

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<sup>5</sup> Justice, 4 November 1893, p4.

<sup>6</sup> Hansard, 9 November 1893.

<sup>7</sup> Own Goals, Roger Marston p 18.

Lendy's patrol was met with a fusillade of bullets, pot legs and stones fired from home-made firearms. Lendy's patrol replied with rifles and a small muzzle-loading field gun. Machine guns were not used at Ngomo's kraal.

If the incident cause furore in London, it was welcomed by Mangwende. "Mangwendi expressed himself delighted with what had been done"<sup>8</sup>, as Ngomo had been causing trouble for some time, not least as a pretender to his Chieftaincy.

The BSAC strongly refuted the claims made in London and the affair petered out, until it was resurrected at the end of 1893. Few of the commentators – certainly not the opponents of the BSAC in London - report a subsequent episode later in 1892 where Lendy allowed a thief his patrol was trying to apprehend to escape "owing to their desire not to shoot Mashonas amongst whom he ran."<sup>9</sup>

### **The Victoria Incident**

By July 1883, Charles Lendy was resident magistrate at Fort Victoria in Mashonaland, 172 miles south of Salisbury and the same distance east of Bulawayo. The post was then an administrative rather than just a judicial position. The magistrates were responsible for keeping the peace as well as presiding over local judicial matters. There were growing tensions between the BSAC and Lobengula as to who exercised what powers in Mashonaland.

The men of a local Shona Chief living near Fort Victoria had stolen cattle from other Shona, who were tributaries of Lobengula and holding cattle on Lobengula's behalf. On 11 June 1893, Lobengula sent a "small impi" – some 70 men – from Bulawayo to recover these cattle. This impi was reported to be raiding about ten miles from the town. Lendy rode out to meet them, allowed the cattle to be taken back to Bulawayo, and sent a letter with the impi for Lobengula, warning in polite language about sending his impis into Mashonaland.

Some weeks later a local newspaper reported that Lobengula was intent on sending a much larger impi to punish the Shona cattle thieves. The cattle rustlers, however, continued to rustle cattle. On 9 July, two men from Fort Victoria were out riding when they came across, a few miles from the town, a number of panicked Shona heading for the town. The two riders saw 3500 Matabele warriors advancing behind this crowd of frightened Shona. The Matabele eventually entered the town, and 20 Shona were murdered in the streets.<sup>10</sup> Extreme violence was perpetrated in the outlying areas over weeks.

Manyao, the Induna in charge of the impi (Indunas were military commanders and the most senior advisors to King Lobengula) approached the Fort bearing a letter to Lendy from Lobengula. He and his twelve bodyguards saw Shona sheltering inside the Fort and demanded they be handed over. Lendy refused. The impi retired from the town but remained in the

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<sup>8</sup> "Chimurenga 1896 - 1897: A Revisionist Study", Mark Horn. Master's Thesis, Rhodes University, January 1986.

<sup>9</sup> Own Goals, Roger Marston, p 28.

<sup>10</sup> A full description of the behaviour of the Matabele in the weeks leading up to the confrontation with Lendy's men can be read in Appendix B at p4 and following.

district pillaging and murdering at will. On 18 July a meeting took place between Manyao and his subordinates, and Leander Starr Jameson of the BSAC and others, which was marked by intransigence on both sides, and ended in stalemate. Jameson gave Manyao an ultimatum: to have his impi begin to move back to Bulawayo within one hour. That afternoon Lendy assembled a party of 40 men who rode out with the purpose of encouraging the impi to return to Matabeleland.

They came across some 300 Matabele who were part of the much larger Matabele force. The Matabele were moving north – not west towards Bulawayo. Immediately Lendy's force were seen, the Matabele opened fire. Or Lendy's men opened fire on the Matabele. This was a point of contention in Newton's Inquiry and Report (see Appendix B). Lendy's men were under orders not to fire unless fired upon, so Jameson told the Inquiry. Lendy apparently reported to Jameson after the incident that his patrol had been fired on first. Jameson forwarded Lendy's account to the BSAC, and then gave a different account in other correspondence saying that Lendy's men had fired the first shot.

No Maxims were present at this incident.

### **Newton's Report**

Newton's Report is included in Appendix B. It rewards reading in full. (Some of the language, used by a small minority of witnesses in the Report, is of the time - including the language used by the Mashona Chief and one of the Matabele Indunas in their sworn evidence, which was highly offensive, in their own languages, even then. However, it should be born in mind that there had just been a war when Newton conducted his Inquiry. Emotions were running high on all sides.)

There had been controversy in the national and regional press after news of the incident at Victoria reached Britain. Several transcriptions of letters and editorials from newspapers were sent to Sir Henry Loch, Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner for Southern Africa, by Lord Ripon, then Liberal Secretary of State for the Colonies.<sup>11</sup> These articles and letters made all sorts of allegations against the BSAC and Captain Lendy, and Lord Ripon ordered Loch to investigate the incident. Mr Francis James Newton, Colonial Secretary of Bechuanaland (at the time a British Protectorate), was chosen to undertake the investigation.

The following are important points regarding Newton's Report:

1. The events in and near Fort Victoria took place between 9 July and 18 July 1893. Newton took evidence in Bulawayo on the 21, 22, 23 and 25 May, and in Fort Victoria on the 11, 12 and 13 June, in the following year, 1894. Newton's Report was published in August 1894. Newton took evidence from 25 witnesses appearing in person, and two witnesses who sent affidavits. The witnesses in person included Dr Jameson, two senior Matabele Indunas, and one Shona Chief.

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<sup>11</sup> See p49 of Appendix B, The Newton Report.

The one person from whom evidence was not taken was Charles Lendy. He had died on 13 January 1894 – more than four months before the enquiry began. This was an important issue for Sir Henry Loch. On December 15 1893, he wrote to Lord Ripon.

“The charges made in this letter will be investigated as soon as the present hostilities are over, and it has occurred to me that either Mr. Newton, the Colonial Secretary of Bechuanaland, or Major Sawyer, my military secretary, might be entrusted with the inquiry. In the meanwhile, and until the investigation takes place, I think it only right that charges against officers and men who are not in a position to defend themselves should be received with some reserve.”<sup>12</sup>

Loch wrote before Lendy had died, but the same principle applies to Lendy.

Two months later, after Lendy’s death, Lord Ripon replied to Loch:

“If the sole object of the proposed inquiry had been merely to inquire into the personal conduct of Captain Lendy, as the officer in command on that occasion, I should, on receiving the sad intelligence of his death, have considered it only proper to direct that the inquiry should not be proceeded with. But Dr. Jameson and the Directors of the British South Africa Company have taken upon themselves the full responsibility for the proceedings in this matter, and, consequently, the orders given by Dr. Jameson on the occasion, and the action of the Company generally, would have formed principal subjects of investigation, and as, moreover, a promise has been given to Parliament that the inquiry would be held, I have, upon full consideration, come to the conclusion that it should still take place.”<sup>13</sup>

So, Charles Lendy, having died, was not able to give answer to the Inquiry to the allegation that he had instructed his patrol to open fire on the Matabele warriors, contrary to what he had reported to Jameson when he returned to Fort Victoria, and contrary to what Jameson later told the Inquiry he had ordered Lendy to do when he appeared as a witness in person.

2. Later commentators have said that the Inquiry found that Lendy had lied about who had fired the first shot. The Inquiry made no such finding of lying.

Newton says the following about the activities of the Matabele prior to the Lendy patrol:

“As to the proceedings of this Matabele impi in the neighbourhood of Victoria up to the 18th July there is and can be no question.” (See page 4 of his Report.)

“The details set forth in the evidence of the events between the 9th and the 18th July can hardly be disputed.” (See page 5 of his Report.)

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<sup>12</sup> Newton Report p 57 (Appendix B)

<sup>13</sup> Newton Report p 57 (Appendix B)

There was similar unanimous agreement as to the behaviour of one of the Indunas at the Indaba with Jameson.

However, as to who fired first, Newton says:

“As to how the firing actually began, there is some conflict of evidence, which is dealt with later on.” (See page 6 of the Report.)

“The question as to who fired the first shot thus arises; and it is necessary to examine the evidence, which is very conflicting, before stating any conclusion on the point.” (See page 7 of his Report.)

Newton came to this conclusion on this question of who had fired the first shot:

“...that the first shots seen and heard by them and everyone were the shots fired by the advance guard [of Lendy's patrol]. The weight of evidence appears to me to favour this view.” (My comment in brackets. See page 9 of his Report.)

Lendy was not with the advance guard. (Tactically, that would have been exactly the wrong place for him to be.) Men who were with Lendy, with the main body of the patrol - Napier, Brabant, Fitzgerald and Weale, the bugler - gave the same evidence as Lendy apparently told Jameson: that the first shot was by the Matabele. It is entirely possible that men with the main body had a better overall understanding of what happened than men with the advance guard.

So, even though the evidence as to the behaviour of the Matabele warriors leading up to the incident was incontrovertible, the beginning of the incident itself was the subject of “some conflict of evidence”. Perhaps that is why Newton made no allegation of Lendy having lied – the evidence against Lendy was not overwhelming or incontrovertible. Perhaps he was also mindful that Lendy could not defend himself against an allegation of lying. Who knows what conclusion Newton might have come to had Lendy been able to give evidence in person in his own defence? The “weight of evidence” may well have been more balanced.

3. Newton set out his findings on page 12 of his Report: They can be read in full in Appendix B. However, notwithstanding the question of who had fired first, one of Newton’s conclusions bears repeating here:

“8. That in the pursuit of the Matabele there was no wholesale slaughter of natives nor deliberate shooting of men already shot.”

Sir Henry Loch went further:

“The young [Matabele] men having only gone some three miles in three hours, and having stolen cattle belonging to the white residents (in itself an act of war), was ample justification for the action taken by Captain Lendy to enforce obedience to an order deliberately given, and upon the enforcement of which, as it would appeal to Native intelligence, depended in a great measure a stop being put to the raiding on the Mashonas, and, to the Europeans, exemption from the danger of being attacked in their laager at Victoria. (My emphasis. See page 3 of Newton’s Report.)

And Lord Ripon, writing to Sir W.G. Cameron, Acting High Commissioner of the Cape Colony, went a little further still:

“I enclose printed copies of Mr. Newton’s Report. It should be communicated to the Managing Director of the British South Africa Company at Cape Town, and in doing so he should be informed that it has given me sincere satisfaction to find that the result of an inquiry so exhaustive and impartial has been clearly to exonerate Dr. Jameson and the officers of the British South Africa Company generally from the serious charges which had been made against them in connexion with these occurrences. (My emphasis. See p1 of Newton’s Report.)

### **The Battle of Bembesi**

Two months later, in October that year, the BSAC invaded Matabeleland. Two columns set out, one each from Forts Salisbury and Victoria, towards Bulawayo. They joined together, with a combined strength of 690 mounted men, about 400 Shona tribesmen on foot, two seven-pounder field guns and eight machine guns, of which five were Maxims. The Fort Victoria column was commanded by Major Allan Wilson. The Fort Salisbury contingent was commanded by Major Patrick Forbes, who was also in overall command of the combined force once they merged.

Lendy would have been one of very few professional soldiers in this combined column. The vast majority of the mounted men were prospectors, shopkeepers and farmers, riding their own horses and carrying their own hunting rifles. The Salisbury column was mockingly described when it mustered as comprising “one commander-in-chief, three other commanders-in chief, forty-seven Major Generals (in gaiters), fifty-three Lieutenant Colonels (in spats), eighteen Captains, twenty-two Lieutenants and six full privates”.<sup>14</sup>

Such was the reputation of Lobengula’s impis, the columns were not expected to be seen again. A Matabele impi, like that of its Zulu cousins, was a formidable body of shock troops, who had completely dominated and subdued the entire region of Matabeleland and Mashonaland for the previous fifty years using very successful military tactics, as the British Army in Zululand found out to its cost when of its 1800 troops at Ishlandwana were overwhelmed and 1300 killed, and a smaller body just survived at Rorke’s Drift, in 1879. And the Matabele had 1000 modern Martini Henry rifles and much ammunition at their disposal.

On 1 November the combined force was laagered at Bembesi in two small encampments separated by a small kraal of eight huts which restricted their fields of fire. There was also thick thorn bush and dead ground nearby, which enabled two of the Matabele impis to get very close, undetected. The oxen and horses of the columns were nearly two kilometres away where there were pools of water in the Ncema River headstream. The troopers were scattered making lunch and the thorn fences to join the two laagers were not completed.

At midday eight impis of riflemen and warriors totalling 6000 men mounted a surprise attack on the laager, after overwhelming a mounted picket. Those in the combined columns armed


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<sup>14</sup> Bulawayo: Historic Battleground of Rhodesia, Oliver Ransford p54.

with firearms were thus outnumbered almost nine to one. The Matabele riflemen fired with concentrated accuracy.

“The Salisbury and Victoria Columns (British South Africa Company’s forces) formed laager about midday on 1st November 1893. During the halt they were heavily attacked by a large force of Matabele ... The battle was hard and the Matabele charged with the greatest courage three times in the face of machine gun fire, but after suffering very many casualties were compelled to withdraw.”<sup>15</sup>

“The Im'Bizo Regiment set fire to their big kraal then retreated quite out of sight and in no particular hurry. They gathered up a number of Martini Henry rifles, part of Rhodes payment to Lobengula for the concession.”<sup>16</sup> 500 Matabele were killed or wounded.



Lendy, as an artillery officer, was involved with the artillery at the Battle of Bembesi. However, it is incorrect to blame Lendy on his own, as many do, for the use of the Maxims and other guns in the battle there. Lendy had been due to command the whole Victoria Column, but deferred to Allan Wilson, who took charge. However, there was a change in the command structure when the artillery troop joined the two columns. In practice the tactical command of the weapons was passed to Major Wilson<sup>17</sup>, and above him, Major Forbes.

<sup>15</sup> From the inscription on the cairn on the site of the Battle of Bembesi.

<sup>16</sup> From the notebooks of Jack Carruthers, present at the Battle of Bembesi. In the possession of Carruthers’ descendants.

<sup>17</sup> “Lendy had been appointed senior artillery officer to the force and had general superintendence over the guns, their maintenance and the training of the crews; the deployment and firing of the individual artillery pieces was left to individual commanders. There was, once the gunners had met



There is another important consideration: war is deeply unpleasant, but it is not murder.

The Battle of Bembesi, or Egodade as it is known to the Matabele, was the turning point in the Matabele War. Within a week, Lobengula's capital at what is now called Old Bulawayo, south of the modern city (since reconstructed as a museum), had been razed to the ground, and the Matabele impis put to flight. Another patrol under Major Wilson set out after the King and his army, and were wiped out by the Matabele at Shangani in the final action of the Matabele War. But that Matabele victory was to no avail. Their military power had, for the time being, been defeated, although the Matabele and the Shona rose again in 1896. A large stone cairn with a bronze plaque inscribed in both English and SiNdebele still marks the place of the battle.

Lendy died in Bulawayo on 13 January 1894, it is thought from an internal injury he suffered throwing the heavy shot in an athletic competition.

Lendy is often accused of being part of a colonial expedition which seized a country from the hands of those who fought to keep it as theirs. However, it should be remembered that the Matabele themselves, under King Mzilikazi<sup>18</sup>, had invaded the area from the south in the 1820s, displacing the Shona who had previously occupied the area, and treating the Shona in the surrounding areas of Mashonaland as vassals, forced to give tribute to the Matabele at the point of a rifle or assegai.

The Shona themselves were part of an earlier migration from the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, who invaded the land between the Zambezi and the Limpopo (present day Zimbabwe) from the north, pushing its previous inhabitants to the periphery, including the San people who were forced into the Kalahari desert. The Matabele completed the job the Shona left unfinished.

### **The Sunbury Memorial**

Some weeks after the deaths of both brothers, the wars they fought in were still in the news. On 24 February 1894, in the Leeds Mercury, there were two separate articles in a single column on the fate of Allan Wilson's Patrol at the Shangani River, and Anglo-French tensions in West Africa in the wake of the Waiima incident in which Edward had died. The two deaths were felt very keenly locally in Sunbury. There was an appeal for funds, and the memorial to the two brothers at Sunbury was constructed in 1895.

As the fundraising letter to The Standard newspaper (see overleaf) published on 12 February 1894 makes clear, the memorial was not a celebration of colonialism. The "deaths, within a few days of one another, have cast a gloom over the village in which they were born and

---

the Salisbury and Victoria Columns at Iron Mine Hill, some difficulty over the command structure. The gunners owed allegiance to Lendy rather than Wilson because he had formed them as an individual troop. Forbes gave them a simple choice: serve under Wilson or return to Fort Victoria. They decided to stay and fight." [i.e. under Wilson's command; my comment] *Own Goals*, p 66.

<sup>18</sup> Oral History Statement of Ntabeni Khumalo, son of Mhwebi, who was a son of Mzilikazi, National Archives of Zimbabwe.

### THE LENDY MEMORIAL.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE STANDARD

SIR,—It is proposed to erect in Sunbury-on-Thames a drinking fountain in memory of the two young Lendys, whose deaths, within a few days of one another, have cast a gloom over the village in which they were born and educated. The suggestion has received the approval of their widowed mother, who has the sympathy of all in her terribly sudden affliction.

We have managed to raise about ninety pounds, and, with your help, we hope to increase it. There are a large number of officers in the Service who were formerly pupils of the late Major Lendy, the father of these young men; they will, I feel sure, gladly assist our efforts. Subscriptions can be sent to Messrs. Ashby's, bankers, Sunbury; or to Dr. Kingsford, Melrose, Sunbury.

These two officers, the one in the Royal Artillery and the other in the Derbyshire Regiment, have rendered signal and gallant services to the State in West and South Africa, one having gained the Distinguished Service Order. They have deserved well of their country, and I trust that through your help we may be able to raise a memorial that may be a record of appreciation of their services.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

J. H. MATTHEWS.

Rippledene, Sunbury-on-Thames, February 9.

educated. The suggestion has received the approval of their widowed mother, who has the sympathy of all in her terribly sudden affliction."

The memorial originally stood on the side of the road along the river, almost in front of the Lendys' residence at Riverside House. It incorporated a drinking trough in its base for passing cattle and horses. It was damaged by bombs in the Second World War, and then spent some time in the grounds of the District Council offices until it was placed at the centre of the much loved Walled Garden in Lower Sunbury.

*The Lendy Memorial in its original position on the riverside*



## Memorials in Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe

### Sierra Leone



*Edward Lendy's grave and the Memorial at Waiima in Sierra Leone*

Edward Lendy was buried where he died at Waiima in Sierra Leone, his grave marked with a stone cross. This cross was later incorporated into a larger memorial together with a stone cairn commemorating the deaths of the men of the Sierra Leone Frontier Police, the West India Regiment, and the French soldiers, who died in the same incident. The monument and graves are well maintained, I understand.<sup>19</sup>

### Zimbabwe

An increasingly bitter war was fought over the period 1960 to 1980, which resulted in the end of white government in Zimbabwe. After Independence, some street names (by no means all) were changed, but there has been no attempt to remove other commemorative memorials from the colonial period.

There is – still - a very large memorial to Charles Lendy on Leopold Takawira Avenue, the main boulevard leading out of central Bulawayo to the Johannesburg Road. It was erected on that spot in 1894. It lies in Centenary Park, between the Bulawayo Theatre and the Natural History Museum of Zimbabwe.

Charles Lendy is buried in the municipal cemetery in Sauerstown in Bulawayo, his grave marked by a simple stone cross, much like his brother's. Neither his grave nor his memorial has ever been moved, desecrated or harmed in any way in the forty years since Independence in 1980.

Cecil Rhodes is, of course, buried on a very imposing granite hill in the Matopos Hills just outside Bulawayo. His grave is marked with a large bronze slab set into the rock. The graves of the first white prime minister, Charles Coghlan; Rhodes' friend and business associate

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.sierraleoneheritage.org/sites/monuments/captainlendy>

Leander Starr Jameson; and the memorial to Allan Wilson and the Shangani Patrol share the site. Despite Rhodes being the architect of British expansion into Mashonaland and Matabeleland in present day Zimbabwe, and being the arch-villain, alongside Ian Smith, in the eyes of the post-Independence government, neither that slab, nor any of the other memorials and graves on the same site have ever been desecrated or harmed.



***The Lendy Memorial in Centenary Park, Bulawayo***

Indeed, there is a visitors' centre at the foot of the hill explaining, at some length on a number of large mounted posters, the background to the site and the memorials there. Neither the ex-President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, nor the current President Emmerson Mnangagwa, nor the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe, have ever argued for the removal of his, or other graves.

A statue of Rhodes used to stand in the centre of one of the major intersections in central Bulawayo. After Independence it was moved a few hundred metres down the Avenue to a spot in the gardens outside the Natural History Museum in Centenary Park, not far from the Lendy Memorial, where it can be easily seen by people enjoying the tranquillity of the park. A statue of Charles Coghlan, the first prime minister of colony of Southern Rhodesia, stands next to it.

In the Bulawayo City Hall, on the walls of the grand staircase leading to the Mayor's Office and Council Chamber, are lined the portraits of Mayors of Bulawayo from the first one in 1893 right through to the present incumbent. A bas relief in bronze of the Great Indaba (meeting) in 1896 between Rhodes and the Matabele Indunas stands prominently above the main entrance to the City Hall.

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## Appendix A

Extract from the Case Book of the Royal Humane Society, 15 January 1894:

*Committee Meeting 15<sup>th</sup> January 1894*

Number.	Name, Address and Occupation of the Person who saved or attempted to save Life.	SUBJECT.		ACCIDENT.		Exhortions of the Chairman.	State where
		Name, Address and Occupation.	Age.	Time and Place.	Particulars.		
26902	Capt E.A.W. Lendy - Inspector General of Police Marcus Smith - Sergt. Corporals Amadoo Zambal and Edward Parkins	Morris Bangarah - Constable, Sierra Leone Frontier Police Force		11. a.m. 15 <sup>th</sup> November 1893 Seli or Rochelle River Sierra Leone	A force of police (40 men) under Capt Lendy were sent to open up a road shut owing to the war when they came to the river 80 yards broad and swollen very much, the Sergt, two Corporals and the Constable endeavoured to swim across, but Bangarah got exhausted when some distance from shore. Alligators are plentiful.	Sergt Smith swam the man and held him until the Corporals came, but they were all so exhausted that they could not bare the man and only managed to swim ashore. Capt Lendy seems the ablest swimmer in the state. The Corporals swam in, some under the man's feet and brought him to the bank.	
26903	George Hickley A. B. H.M.S. "Howe"	Mt. Amherst O.S. H.M.S. "Howe"	18 1/2	3. 15 P.M. 16 <sup>th</sup> November 1893 Spillhead Portsmouth	The "Howe" was lying about 2 miles from shore and was in one of the boats which got capsized, and he was in danger of drowning.	Hickley sprang on board and held him up until a rope was brought to him from the ship.	
26904	Capt W. Harwood 24 <sup>th</sup> Co. Royal Engineers	Private McKenna 17 <sup>th</sup> South Walsford Street	22	3. 30 P.M. 17 <sup>th</sup> November 1893 River Nile Cairo	McKenna was bathing when he got exhausted and was unable to steer the current and was carried down stream 50 yards from bank, 50 feet deep, river in flood.	Capt Harwood jumped from a verandah (12 feet high) swam out to McKenna and held him above water until a boat went to his assistance.	
26905	George Lawrey Seaman	a man name unknown		between 5 & 6 P.M. 22 <sup>nd</sup> November 1893 Harbour from Newfoundland	It is not stated how the man got into the water, but on hearing the cry of "Man overboard"	Lawrey jumped from the ship with all his clothes on swam 150 yards and held the man up until a boat came.	
26906	George Lawrey Seaman	a man name unknown		7 P.M. 20 <sup>th</sup> November 1893 Harbour from Newfoundland	The man fell from the wharf into the harbour dark and stormy night.	Lawrey with all his clothes jumped overboard and held the man up until a rope was thrown and they were hauled on board.	

Transcribed as:

26902

**Name, address and occupation of the person who saved or attempted save a life:** Capt E.A.W. Lendy, Inspector General of Police; Marcus Smith, Sergt and Corporals Amadoo Zambal and Edward Parkins

**Subject: Name, address and occupation:** Morris Bangarah, Constable, Sierra Leone Frontier Police Force

**Time and Place:** 11. a.m. 4 November 189, Seli or Rochelle River, Sierra Leone

**Particulars:** A force of police (40 men) under Capt Lendy were sent to open up a road shut owing to the war when they came to the river 80 yards broad and swollen very much, the Sergt, two Corporals and the Constable endeavoured to swim across, but Bangarah got exhausted when some distance from shore. Alligators are plentiful.

Exertions of the Claimant: Sergeant Smith seized the man and held him until the corporals came but they were all so exhausted that they could not save the man and only managed to swim ashore. Captain Lendy, seeing the state of things, dived in, swam to Bangarah, seized him under the armpits (sic) and brought him to the bank.

State of the Body and where removed to.	MEDICAL MAN. Name and Address.	Particulars of Treatment.	Witness to the Accident. Name and Address.	Successful. Unsuccessful.	PECUNIARY REWARDS.		Honorary Rewards.	Number.
					Amount.	Date when paid.		
			The Case is sent by the Colonial Office	S		27 January 1894 Sent per Colonel G. The Under Secy of State Colonial Office	(4) Bronze's as to disposal of medals in case either of the Salvors have been killed in action.	26902
			The Case is sent by the Admiralty	S		27 February 1894 Sent per Colonel G. The Secretary, Vellum. The Admiralty Whitehall		26903
			The Major General Cunningham in Egypt sends the case	S		27 February 1894 Sent per Colonel G. The Under Secy of State War Office Cathedral St.	Vellum cancelled 16.4.94 Bronze	26904
			The Case is sent by the Governor of Newfoundland	S		29 January 1894 Sent per Colonel G. The Under Secy of State Colonial Office 115 W.		26905
			as above			29 January 1894 Sent per Colonel G. The Under Secy of State Colonial Office	Bronze Clasp.	26906

**Witness to the Accident, Name and Address:** The case is sent by the Colonial Office.

**Date When Paid:** 27 January 1894 Sent by (illegible name of courier) to the Under Sec'y of State. Bronze to each (4) Bronze's. Colonial Office Sec memorialised as to disposal of accolade in case either of the Salvors have been killed in action.

**Appendix B**





MATABELELAND.

REPORT

BY

MR. F. J. NEWTON, C.M.G.,

UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE

COLLISION BETWEEN THE MATABELE AND THE FORCES OF THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY

AT


FORT VICTORIA

IN JULY 1893,

AND CORRESPONDENCE CONNECTED THEREWITH.

(A Map will be found at page 39.)

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. August 23, 1894.



LONDON: PRINTED FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, BY EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE, PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

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1894.

[C.—7555.] Price 8d.



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	To Sir H. B. Loch -	Nov. 2	Transmits newspaper extracts bearing upon the affray between the Matabele impi and the Company's police near Victoria, points out that these accounts differ materially from that furnished by the Administrator, and requests that the matter may be investigated.	49
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Serial No.	From or to whom.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
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THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

TO

SIR W. G. CAMERON (ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER).

SIR,

Downing Street, August 23, 1894.

I HAVE received and considered Sir H. Loch's Despatch of the 18th ultimo, forwarding Mr. Newton's report of his inquiry into the occurrences at Fort Victoria in July 1893.

I request that you will express to Mr. Newton my appreciation of the manner in which he has carried out his instructions. He appears to have conducted the inquiry carefully and thoroughly, and his examination of the evidence collected by him is clear and impartial. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to do more than state that I concur in the conclusions at which he has arrived.

I enclose printed copies of Mr. Newton's Report. It should be communicated to the Managing Director of the British South Africa Company at Cape Town, and in doing so he should be informed that it has given me sincere satisfaction to find that the result of an inquiry so exhaustive and impartial has been clearly to exonerate Dr. Jameson and the officers of the British South Africa Company generally, from the serious charges which had been made against them in connexion with these occurrences.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) RIPON.



MATABELELAND.

PART I.

REPORT

BY

MR. F. J. NEWTON, C.M.G.,

UPON THE

CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION BETWEEN THE MATABELE AND THE FORCES OF THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY AT FORT VICTORIA IN JULY 1893.

SIR H. B. LOCH to the MARQUESS OF RIPON.  
(Received August 6, 1894.)

Government House, Cape Town,  
July 18, 1894.

MY LORD MARQUESS,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, the report from Mr. Newton, dated the 7th instant, giving the result of the inquiry held by him at Buluwayo and Victoria into the events that took place at Victoria in July last.

The report is accompanied by the evidence of a considerable number of witnesses, taken on oath before him, as well as the evidence embodied in affidavits of persons who were unable to be present.

Other documents, either of an explanatory character or bearing on the case, are likewise forwarded.

Mr. Newton's report has been prepared with much care and ability, and the general conclusions at which he arrives appear to be based on a careful analysis of the evidence and of all the circumstances connected with the incident.

The evidence shows beyond all doubt that Doctor Jameson's order was for the Matebele to withdraw within one hour—not across, but towards, the border; that it was a wise and proper order to give, and was fully understood by the Matebele.

The young men having only gone some three miles in three hours, and having stolen cattle belonging to the white residents (in itself an act of war), was ample justification for the action taken by Captain Lendy to enforce obedience to an order deliberately given, and upon the enforcement of which, as it would appeal to Native intelligence, depended in a great measure a stop being put to the raiding on the Mashonas, and, to the Europeans, exemption from the danger of being attacked in their laager at Victoria.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HENRY B. LOCH.

Enclosure 1.

SIR, Vryburg, July 7, 1894.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in Sir W. Cameron's Despatch of the 1st May last, I have the honour to report to your Excellency the result of the inquiry, held by me at Buluwayo and Victoria, into the events which took place at Victoria in July last.

2. Sir W. Cameron's Despatch reached me at Buluwayo on the 18th May, and Dr. Jameson and Mr. Caldecott, Crown Prosecutor of Mashonaland, the officer appointed to appear on the Company's behalf, arrived on the 20th. On the 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 25th I took evidence at Buluwayo, and on Tuesday the 29th, immediately after finishing other business there, I left for Victoria by waggon. The journey took 13 days, but was a shorter way of reaching that place than by waiting several days to go round either by the Charter or Tuli roads. I arrived at Victoria on Monday morning the 11th June

and examined witnesses on that and the two following days. I also went over the country where Captain Lendy's force came in contact with the Matebele.

On returning through Palapye I met the Rev. W. C. Willoughby, whose letter to the "Daily Chronicle" was forwarded to me for the purposes of this inquiry. His evidence, with that of Mr. Moffat on one point, is attached.

3. I have now the honour to enclose :—

- (1.) Schedule and Index of Evidence taken, setting forth the names of the witnesses and their callings.
- (2.) (3.) (4.) Minutes of the Evidence, taken down by myself, of twenty-five sworn witnesses, at Buluwayo, Victoria, and Palapye respectively.
- (5.) Affidavit by J. S. Bastard. (*See* Schedule and Minutes.)
- (6.) Affidavit by M. E. Weale, trumpeter. (*See* Schedule and Minutes.)
- (7.) A list of the mounted patrol which went out, by Dr. Jameson's instructions, under Captain Lendy's command, to drive off the Matebele. I made a point of calling as witnesses every man of this patrol that could be found. The evidence of eighteen of them has been secured.
- (8.) Sketch of the country where Captain Lendy's patrol met the Matebele.
- (9.) Copy of the "Mashonaland Times" of the 20th July, referred to in this report, and in Mr. Willoughby's letter.

4. I will now proceed to give Your Excellency a narrative of what is known as "the Victoria Incident," *generally*, from the time of the arrival of the Matebele in the neighbourhood of Fort Victoria on the 9th July last, and *particularly* of the events of the 18th July, up to the return of Captain Lendy's patrol on the evening of that day. In doing so I shall, when necessary, refer, in the margin, to the evidence of witnesses according to the numbered pages of their evidence.

I propose afterwards to deal with specific points which have been raised in the Secretary of State's despatch and its enclosures, where the official accounts of the incident are alleged to differ from accounts furnished by other persons, or where other persons have made allegations which do not appear in the official accounts.

### 5. Narrative.

On the afternoon of Sunday the 9th July, that part of Mashonaland surrounding Victoria was overrun by a large force of Matebeles. I am in a position to give what I believe to be a fairly accurate estimate of the numbers of that force from the evidence supplied by Manyow, the Matebele Induna in command of it, who appeared before me at Buluwayo on the 23rd May. It consisted of three Matebele regiments, the Mhlahlanhlela, the N'Suka, and the N'Sima, and the fighting forces of eight towns—N'Sinda, Euxa, Oyinga, Mobanbeni, N'Singo, N'Swananyé, Sizinda, and N'Gwetiwe, besides a lot of stragglers from the Magholes (serfs) belonging to those towns. About 2,500 Majakas (young warriors-soldiers) left Buluwayo, and the Magholis picked up on the way were about 1,000 in number.

As to the proceedings of this Matebele impi in the neighbourhood of Victoria up to the 18th July there is and can be no question. The whole country swarmed with them. The Mashonas had fled—some to their kopjes, where they were besieged, some into Victoria, and others far away westward. Many of the men were barbarously murdered—stabbed and mutilated. It is unnecessary for me to discuss to what extent these barbarities were defensible from the Matebele point of view, but it is impossible to ignore the feeling of indignation and disgust which was felt by the inhabitants of Victoria and the district at the indiscriminate slaughter by the Matebele of the Mashona men and the abduction of the Mashona women and girls. It may be perhaps urged that Lobengulu's impi was acting technically within Lobengulu's rights; as the facts cannot be gainsaid, it appears to me the only point that can be urged on behalf of the Matebele. But there can be no doubt the Matebele exceeded any so-called right of Lobengulu to harry the Mashonas. The impi was directed to proceed against Zimuntu and Bere (Mashona Chiefs), who were known to have assisted white settlers of the district by furnishing them with grain and labour. But the Chief Manyow had little or no control over the younger and headstrong Majakas or over the troops of Magholes (serfs), who had followed promiscuously from the towns on the road from Buluwayo to join in the raid. The whole country north-east and south of Victoria was scoured by them. Mr. Willoughby, in his letter of the 16th October \* to the "Daily

\* Enclosure in No. 5 (Part II.), page 53.

Manyow, p. 25.

Lord H. Paulet, p. 15.  
Mr. Vigers, p. 16.  
" Napier, p. 18.  
" Weir, p. 20.  
" Chalk, p. 23.  
Tr. Forrestall, p. 30.  
Mr. Brabant, p. 32.  
Makoombi, p. 36.

Makoombi, p. 36.



Chronicle," throws some doubt on a statement that one English farmstead was raided, as no report had reached him to that effect other than the official report quoted by him. I gather from the evidence, and am quite satisfied, that *several* English farmsteads were raided. By "raiding" I mean that the Matebele came upon these farms, stayed there, chased the herds, killed all the Mashona servants they could catch, and appropriated all the cattle they could find, without inquiring whether they were the property of Mashonas or English. Many of the cattle so captured they must have known to be the property of white men. Some branded cattle were found in their possession on the day when the patrol went out from Fort Victoria, others were returned by the more reasonable Indunas, after pressure by Captain Lendy, previous to the arrival of Dr. Jameson at Victoria. Many of the cattle captured and carried off were the property of the Company or of private individuals; and it was pointed out, with some force, by more than one witness, that among Natives the capture and carrying off of cattle is an act of war, and it is in fact one of the principal methods of carrying on warfare among Native tribes. The Matebele, therefore, who captured white men's cattle, and retained possession of them, must have known they were liable for the consequences.

Mr. Napier, p. 18.  
 " Neal, p. 24.  
 " Brook, p. 31.  
 " Brabant, p. 32.  
 " Eksteen, p. 34.

Mr. Napier, p. 15.  
 " Weir, p. 20.  
 " Neal, p. 24.  
 Manyow, p. 25.  
 Mr. Gloss, p. 25.  
 " Slater, p. 27.  
 " Forrestall, p. 30.  
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 " Brabant, p. 32.  
 " Bastard, p. 33.

Mr. Neal, p. 24.  
 " Colenbrander, p. 24.  
 " Moffat, p. 37.

The details set forth in the evidence of the events between the 9th and the 18th July can hardly be disputed. I take it as proved and accepted that the Matebele were in possession of the whole country side, that they entered the precincts of the town of Fort Victoria, not merely according to map as alleged by Mr. Willoughby, but close to the hospital and church, as deposed by the Civil Commissioner, Mr. Vigers, and others; that they squatted on the "commonage" (which I may here inform Mr. Willoughby is a tract of grazing ground set apart and adjoining every South African township, for the common use of its inhabitants), and that mining, agricultural, and pastoral pursuits were at a standstill owing to their presence. The Chief Manyow entered the town prior to the arrival of Dr. Jameson, and called upon Captain Lendy, who was magistrate, to hand over to him the Mashona refugees—men, women, and children—whom he saw had obtained a sanctuary in the fort. Captain Lendy gave the only reply which it was possible for an officer in his position to give, but he couched it in terms of extreme fairness. He did not exonerate the Mashonas from any charges made against them, but in reply to the grim undertaking by Manyow that he would not kill the prisoners in the river and dirty the water, but would take them into the bush and kill them there, he said that as magistrate he would not surrender them untried, but if Manyow would make a charge against them he would try them.

Mr. Vigers, p. 16.  
 " Weir, p. 20.  
 " Chalk, p. 28.  
 " Brabant, p. 32.  
 " Drew, p. 35.  
 " Willoughby, p. 36.

Lord H. Paulet, p. 15.  
 Mr. Napier, p. 18.  
 " Chalk, p. 28.

Dr. Jameson arrived at Victoria on Monday the 17th July, passing troops of raiding Matebele close to the town. Immediately on his arrival he sent word to Manyow that he must come in on the following day to speak with him. The Indunas, armed, and accompanied by armed men, duly arrived within 300 yards of the fort. Here Sergeant Fitzgerald with four men was sent out to tell them they must lay down their arms, with which order they complied. An indaba was then held about mid-day at the gates of the fort, of which a full account can be gathered from the evidence of various witnesses who were present. Captain Napier acted as interpreter, and Mr. Brabant, who also understands Setebele, was also in attendance. Besides Dr. Jameson, Captain Napier, and Mr. Brabant there were present Mr. Vigers, Lord Henry Paulet, Mr. Drew, and others. It would appear that Dr. Jameson took a strong line in speaking to Manyow, told him he was lying to him, and asked him why he had permitted all these proceedings in the neighbourhood. Were they, by the King's orders, interfering with whites? Why had they killed servants and carried off cattle? He then proceeded to ask Manyow whether it was true that he had lost control over his young men, and on Manyow admitting this Dr. Jameson told him, "You, Manyow, and those who obey the King's orders, must go across the border. I give you an hour to go." (In interpreting "one hour," Mr. Napier pointed to the sun as it was then and as it would be in about an hour.) "Leave your young men, and I will deal with them." In saying this, or words to this effect, Dr. Jameson pointed at the guns in the fort, thereby giving the chief to understand that force would be used should the young men decline to retire. He then walked away. The chief sent a message after him by Lord Henry Paulet to ask where the border was, to which Dr. Jameson replied, "Tell him he knows." The meeting then broke up. All witnesses agree in their description of the conduct of the young Induna Umgandan at this meeting; he was insolent in voice and manner, constantly interrupting the speakers and endeavouring to assert himself. At the end of the indaba he made use of some such expression as "We will be driven across,"

Mr. Chalk, p. 28.  
 " Forrestall, p. 30.  
 " Eksteen, p. 34.  
 " Drew, p. 35.

Lord H. Paulet, p. 15.  
 Mr. Vigers, p. 16.  
 " Napier, p. 19.  
 Dr. Jameson, p. 19.  
 Manyow, p. 25.  
 Mr. Chalk, p. 28.  
 " Forrestall, p. 30.  
 " Brabant, p. 32.  
 " Drew, p. 35.  
 " Bastard, p. 33.

Lord H. Paulet, p. 15.  
 Mr. Vigers, p. 16.  
 " Napier, p. 18.  
 Dr. Jameson, p. 19.  
 Mr. Chalk, p. 28.  
 " Forrestall, p. 30.  
 " Brook, p. 31.  
 " Brabant, p. 32.  
 " Eksteen, p. 34.  
 " Stroyan, p. 35.  
 " Drew, p. 35.  
 " Willoughby, p. 36.  
 " Bastard, p. 33.

Lord H. Paulet, p. 15.  
 Mr. Napier, p. 18.

Dr. Jameson, p. 19.  
Manyow, p. 25.  
Mr. Brabant, p. 32.

or "Let us drive them." The evidence is slightly conflicting as to what he did actually say, but he certainly said something, which created the impression in the minds of those present that he meant to disregard the Doctor's warning. The evidence of Dr. Jameson and Messrs. Napier and Brabant leaves little room for doubt as to this.

H. Paulet, p. 15.

Jameson p. 19.

On the departure of the Matebele, the Europeans went to lunch, and orders were given to Lord Henry Paulet (the officer commanding the Victoria Rangers), by Captain Lendy, to select as many men as he could find horses for, to parade at 2 o'clock for mounted patrol. The parade fell in at two and it was some time after this before Captain Lendy took over the command. After the men had fallen in, Dr. Jameson deposes that he gave Captain Lendy verbal instructions to the following effect, "You have heard what I have told the Matebele; I want you to carry this out. I don't want them to think it is merely a threat; they have had a week of threats already, with very bad results. Ride out in the direction they have gone, towards Magomoli's kraal. If you find they are not moving off, drive them, as you heard me tell Manyow I would, and if they resist and attack you, shoot them." Dr. Jameson cannot guarantee that these words were his orders verbatim, but he states that they are probably very nearly so, as the orders were given verbally in the same way as he then repeated them before me.

Enclosure 5.

Enclosure 8.

Serg. Kennelly, p. 22.  
Corp. Gloag, p. 26.  
Tr. Brook, p. 31.

It was about an hour and three-quarters after the close of the indaba when the patrol left the fort in column of half-sections. It consisted of about 40 men. I could get no accurate list of those who formed it, but 35 men were warned, and it is probable that 38 men fell in in the fort, and perhaps some five or six who had horses to ride afterwards joined. A list of the names and ranks of those known to have been present is attached. The volunteers rode first out of the fort, the police being in the rear. The columns cantered a few yards away from the fort, and then settled down to a walk (which pace they maintained till the Matebele were sighted), and proceeded in a direction slightly west of north, according to the accompanying sketch. After proceeding a short distance from the town an advance guard of a sergeant and four men was sent forward, and flanking parties thrown out on either side. Sergeant Kennelly, of the Victoria Rangers, was in charge of the advance guard, which consisted of himself, and Troopers Bezuidenhout, Brook, Campbell, and Gloag. The course taken by the advance guard and column is shown, I believe, fairly accurately on the sketch, which is drawn from information given me on the ground by Messrs. Brabant and Brook. About three and a half miles from Victoria, while the column, which had been at a *walk* the whole time, was making its way across some fallow ground, the Matebele were first seen, moving slowly, in disjointed lots and groups, from the south-west to the north-east, in the direction of Magomoli's kraal, where it was known that Manyow had his head-quarters. It appears from the evidence that at the end of the indaba, Manyow and the chief Indunas went straight off to their camp near Magomoli's kraal, which they were investing; that Manyow and the older section of the impi had a strong difference of opinion with Umgandan and the young warriors, who deliberately announced their intention of staying to continue their raid. It is also clear that on that same afternoon Makoombi's and Mazibili's kraals were respectively attacked and raided; the latter was empty, the inhabitants having fled, but there is every reason to believe that the party of Matebele and Magholi, overtaken by the patrol, was not a regular rearguard of Manyow's impi retreating in accordance with Dr. Jameson's orders, but simply a lot of Matabele and Magholi, with stolen cattle and grain in their possession, hurrying back from a raid at Magibili's, to join the main body, when they saw the body of white men mounted and armed. The direction they were taking and from which they were coming, and the fact that some were carrying grain and driving stolen cattle leads me to this assumption; and I may here mention that in the course of the pursuit which followed, several men of the patrol observed cattle which had evidently been in the possession of the attacked and flying Matebele. The cattle were not recovered at the time, but were identified by colour and brand as the property of a resident in the district.

Lord H. Paulet, p. 15.

Manyow, p. 25.

Makoombi, p. 33.

Mr. Brabant, p. 32.

Mr. Napier, p. 18.  
" Weir, p. 20.  
" Posselt, p. 23.  
" Neal, p. 24.  
Manyow, p. 25.  
Mr. Slater, p. 27.  
" Gloag, p. 26.  
" Bastard, p. 33.

The Matebele were probably first seen by the advance guard, but small lots of two or three were soon visible to the whole column.

As to how the firing actually began, there is some conflict of evidence, which is dealt with later on. It is enough for the present to say that some single shots were fired by the advance guard on receipt of orders from the commanding officer. The general order to commence firing having then been given by Captain Lendy, the column advanced and extended at a canter. The skirmishing order taken at once became a mere chase.

Mr. Stokes, p. 13.

The Matebele beat a retreat, their point evidently being Magomoli's kraal, where the Induna Manyow and the head-quarters of the Matebele impi were known to be. Beyond the incident of the man who fired at Fitzgerald, referred to later on, a statement by one witness that the Matebele threw an assegai or two, and by another that a Matebele shook his spear at him, there is nothing to show that any organised or individual resistance was offered. As a witness said: "They got on the run, and we kept them on the run." Those with good horses got to the front, and the badly mounted fell behind. The ground was, however, very bad for horsemen, being in places unrideable at any pace, from the deep ridges and furrows of the cultivated land. This fact, and the kopjes close by on the right, saved the lives of many Matebele. After the pursuit, for it can hardly be called anything else, had been going on for about ten minutes, Captain Lendy gave orders to cease firing.

Mr. Slater, p. 27.  
 Mr. Stokes, p. 13.  
 Mr. Kennelly, p. 22.  
 " Fosselt, p. 23.  
 " Slater, p. 27.  
 " Forrestall, p. 30.  
 " Brook, p. 31.  
 " Weir, p. 29.

Some of the patrol had pursued a much greater distance than others; some went on so far as Makoombi's kraal, which they found being invested by Matebele. A message was sent back to Captain Lendy to that effect, and a few shots were fired at long range at the besiegers, who immediately retired, leaving the fortunate Makoombi and his people free to descend from their kopje. It was from Makoombi that I ascertained that Mazibili's kraal had been raided on that afternoon. He had been watching the proceedings, and the attack of the whites, from his hill-top.

Mr. Forrestall, p. 30.  
 Brabant, p. 32.  
 Makoombi, p. 36.

On the arrival of Captain Lendy and the main party at Makoombi's, the patrol halted for a few minutes, and then rode straight back to Fort Victoria, which they reached about sundown.

Makoombi, p. 36.

The number killed during the brief period of the pursuit has been variously estimated. The Induna Manyow and his colleague Umyengwane say—and they should know best—that 11 men were missing, of whom nine are believed to have been killed, and two to have run away. Makoombi states that of the whole number killed only three were Matebele, the rest were "dogs" (Magholes). The Induna Umgandan, who had so distinguished himself by his insolent behaviour at the indaba, was one of the first shot.

Dr. Jameson, p. 19.  
 Mr. Fosselt, p. 23.  
 " Brook, p. 31.

Makoombi, p. 36.

6. I now propose to deal with the points referred to in the fourth paragraph of this report; and for convenience of reference I here insert, *in extenso*, the official account of the affair sent by Dr. Jameson to the High Commissioner on the evening of the 18th.

See [C. 7171], p. 53.

Dr. JAMESON, Victoria, to HIGH COMMISSIONER, Cape Town.

18th July. . . . The Indunas arrived after my last telegram. After some conversation, during which they would not consent to return beyond the border, I told them I would give them an hour to retire, and if they did not I would send my men to drive them out as I had informed the King. At the stated time Captain Lendy, with 38 mounted men, rode out, and found about 300 still on the commonage: these fired at Lendy's party. Lendy then fired and pursued for about nine miles; a few men were killed, including two head-men. Lendy has now returned: no casualties. I believe the whole lot will now return to Matebeleland and further raiding cease. We are taking all due precautions in case of any returns, which I do not anticipate.

7. The Secretary of State's Despatch to your Excellency of the 2nd November points out a material difference between the foregoing account and certain statements forming enclosures to that Despatch, from which it would appear that the Matebele had not fired or attempted resistance when the police opened fire upon them.

The question as to who fired the first shot thus arises; and it is necessary to examine the evidence, which is very conflicting, before stating any conclusion on the point.

As an instance of the conflict of evidence, I may point out that several witnesses on either side on this question depose to having heard the trumpeter sound the "commence firing." The trumpeter says he never sounded it at all. After the time that has elapsed since the incident occurred, discrepancies between the evidence of individuals must be expected. I have attached most weight to points on which several witnesses are agreed.

Mr. Kennelly, p. 22.  
 " Chink, p. 28.  
 " Drew, p. 35.  
 " Bastard, p. 39.  
 " Wenle, 39.

The testimony of those who say the Matebele fired first may be divided into three groups, each of which differs from the other two.

1. Dr. Jameson states that Captain Lendy, on his return, reported that they came across the Matebele on the commonage, "that Sergeant Fitzgerald had been fired upon by them, but not hit, that then he ordered his men to charge them and fire."

p. 16. Mr. Wigers, the Civil Commissioner of Victoria, states that on the return of the patrol, Captain, then Sergeant, Fitzgerald, told him "that the first shot fired was by a Matebele in the rocks by Makoombi's kraal, when they first came up with the Matebele, and the bullet struck in between him and the man who was riding with him; that he had always understood that to have been the first shot fired on either side."

p. 15. 2. Captain Napier deposes that "someone of the four men who were riding in front shouted out 'they are firing at us.' I heard the shot. It seemed to come from the left front. Fitzgerald was one of the four. We asked Captain Lendy, what are we to do? When he felt satisfied that we had been fired upon, he told us to extend in skirmishing order and fire. We extended at a gallop and commenced firing."

p. 32. Mr. Brabant deposes: "I heard a shot fired from the Matabele. I saw it fired. It was on our right front. It was just about the time the advance guard sent the message back."

These two witnesses both agree that the shot was fired from the front.

p. 35. 3. The Trumpeter Weale says: "About three miles from camp he heard shots fired ahead, and immediately two or three of the advance guard returned and reported having seen a number of Matebele and having been fired upon. The patrol at once cantered up to the advance guard, and firing then commenced on both sides."

The three foregoing witnesses all depose that the firing was from the front. The evidence of the men of the advance guard must therefore be very nearly decisive.

The advance guard consisted of Sergeant Kennelly and four men, Bezuidenhout, Brook, Campbell, and Gloag. (Sergeant Fitzgerald was not of the advance guard.) The evidence of Bezuidenhout and Campbell could not be obtained, but that of Kennelly, Brook, and Gloag is clear. They agree with each other but are entirely at variance with that already given.

p. 22. Sergeant Kennelly, in charge of the advance guard, states that Trooper Gloag, whom he had sent to Captain Lendy to say the Matebele were in sight, brought back a message to say he was to open fire, and he also heard the bugler sounding to commence fire. He fired a shot in the air, and that was the first shot that he heard, and he fired it after receiving the order. Cross-examined he says that he could not say, but not to his knowledge, there was not a shot fired before Captain Lendy gave the order.

p. 26. Trooper Gloag deposes that he took Kennelly's message and rode along at Captain Lendy's left side while that officer had some conversation with Lieutenant Fitzgerald. Captain Lendy then told him to return to his post. When he had gone about 250 yards he heard Captain Lendy shout out to him to "Halt," and he then heard Captain Lendy say distinctly as an order to him (Gloag) "Commence firing." He waited to have the order repeated and heard it repeated by several voices; he then went off to Kennelly and gave the order. Kennelly then fired a shot and Gloag followed suit. Kennelly's was the first shot he heard. He also tells the story of Fitzgerald having been *afterwards* fired at by a native, who missed him. This incident clearly was not the occasion of the first shot being fired.

p. 31. Trooper Brook, also of the advance guard, states even more explicitly that by the time the order, through Gloag, had been received, the Matebele had rounded a small kopje in front, so "we had to go some distance to sight them again. This was after the order was received to commence firing, but before the first shot was fired—Kennelly fired the first shot." The evidence of the men of the advance guard is of importance on the question of who fired the first shot, and I regret that I was unable to procure the attendance of Troopers Campbell and Bezuidenhout. The three men quoted, however, gave their evidence clearly and well, and it is difficult to imagine, considering the position they were in, how a shot could have been fired from the front, as alleged by Messrs. Weale, Napier, and Brabant without these three men hearing or seeing it. At such a moment everyone would have been on the alert, and I cannot but think that if the Matabele really did fire first, the evidence on the point would be overwhelming, and the men of the advance guard would have been the first to know of it.

p. 21. Another witness, Mr. Lloyd, corporal in the Victoria Rangers, says he was ordered in to the main body from a flanking party and "immediately afterwards heard firing—

“ the advance guard was firing. Kennelly was one of the advance guard. We all “ raced forward and commenced firing ourselves on the word being given by Captain “ Lendy to fire.” Later on he relates the somewhat familiar incident of the native firing at and missing Fitzgerald. Many men saw this—and nearly every witness mentioned it—but it was clearly not the first shot fired in the day.

Mr. Posselt also states :—“ The men ahead of us fired the first shot—the advance “ guard. I could not see who fired first. I heard the shot. The advance guard was “ close. We could see the men shooting, but I could not say who it was. I did not “ see any Matebele shooting. I did not see them fire a shot at all,” and later, “ I “ could not say positively whether the Matebele fired the first shot or no, but I do not “ think they did.”

p. 23.

Mr. Bastard says in his affidavit, “ Immediately they were sighted, Captain Lendy “ gave the order to commence firing, which was sounded on the bugle. The main “ body commenced to charge, and the advance party commenced firing ”; he then tells the story of the man who fired at Fitzgerald as distinctly occurring after the firing had become general.

p. 35.

A Matebele Chief, Umgengwane, who was one of the party pursued by the patrol, gave evidence before me, and stated without hesitation : “ the white men fired the “ first shot.”

p. 26.

One or two witnesses said they heard it said that a shot was fired by the Matebele on the left flank, but this was not confirmed in any way.

Messrs. Brabant and Drew, two witnesses at Victoria, said they believed, or had heard, that Umyandan fired the first shot, but this was not confirmed.

Dr. Jameson and Mr. Vigers say they were told the first shot was fired at Fitzgerald. Mr. Brabant says it was fired just about the time the advance guard sent the message back.

If the first shot was fired by the Matebele at this time nearly everyone would have seen and heard it. Napier only says he *heard* a shot fired, but he also says that one of the four men in front shouted out, “ they are firing at us,” and that Fitzgerald was one of the four, but Gloag, who had been sent back, says that Fitzgerald was riding and conversing with Captain Lendy. (Fitzgerald was certainly not one of the advance guard, and was no doubt with the main body at this particular moment.)

I think that Dr. Jameson and Mr. Vigers are mistaken in attributing the well-known incident of the native shooting at Fitzgerald as the occasion of the first shot, while the recollections of Messrs. Napier and Brabant do not agree with each other or anyone else’s. On the other hand, the three men of the advance guard told a clear and distinct story, which is supported by the evidence of Lloyd, Posselt, Bastard, and the Induna Umgengwan.

See pp. 21, 23, 26, 38.

I am further influenced by the consideration that if the Matebele had really fired first, there would have been plenty of witnesses, not only to say so, but also to give a clear and compact account of the matter. For these reasons I believe that Messrs. Napier and Brabant were mistaken, and that the first shots seen and heard by them and everyone were the shots fired by the advance guard. The weight of evidence appears to me to favour this view.

8. *Dr. Jameson’s Ultimatum at the Indaba.*

The first enclosure to the Secretary of State’s Despatch of the 2nd November\* is an extract from “ Truth ” of the 19th October, and is referred to herein-after and in the evidence as Statement A. It contains the following passage :—

“ Last Tuesday the Matebele came into camp . . . Dr. Jameson held an indaba and gave them one hour to get out of Mashonaland (30 miles).”

The second enclosure is an extract from the “ Times ” of the 16th October, in which it was published as “ an extract from a private letter just received by a Swansea “ gentleman from his brother who has a farm about three miles from Fort Victoria.” It is referred to herein-after and in the evidence as Statement B. It contains the following passage :—

“ The end of it was, Jameson told him (the head Induna, Manyow) he gave him (Manyow) an hour to give up the cattle and get over the border, and if they were not across by then, we should help them.”

\* Enclosure 3 in No. 4 (Part II.), page 51.

A sub-enclosure to a despatch from the Secretary of State of the 20th November is a letter from the Rev. W. C. Willoughby at Palapye. It contains the following passage:—

“ Since then I have been favoured with the sight of a private letter from a gentleman at Fort Victoria, and the letter, while giving an ampler account of what transpired, is in strict accord with the non-official accounts to which I have referred. The letter says, Dr. Jameson ordered the Induna across the frontier, which was thirty miles away, within two hours. The doctor must have had a high opinion of the physical powers of the Matebele.”

The allegation, in each of these statements, is to the effect that Dr. Jameson knowingly called upon the Matabele to do what he knew to be impossible, and it leaves it to be inferred that he sent Captain Lendy to punish them for not doing it.

p. 29.

The charge is repudiated by Dr. Jameson emphatically, and his repudiation is supported by every witness who could give evidence on the subject. Dr. Jameson's order to Manyow neither was, nor was it intended to be, nor was it construed as, an ultimatum impossible of performance.

The writer of the letter referred to as Statement B. appeared before me and admitted that he was on his horse in the fort square while the indaba was going on at the fort gates and that he could not hear what passed; when examined on the point he stated, “ That is only what I heard from others. I was not present at the indaba and do not “ adhere to that statement ”; and he stated further, in reply to a question from myself, that he did *not* consider that the Matebele were making a bonâ fide attempt to leave the country as instructed previously by Dr. Jameson when the patrol came up with them.

Enclosure 2.

The point does not call for much remark. The witnesses are almost unanimous that the Doctor ordered the Matebele to clear, or be on the move, or to start, or words to that effect, within one hour, and that the space of an hour was indicated by Mr. Napier, the interpreter, by the position of the sun. Mr. Willoughby himself quotes the correct story in his letter, viz., that given briefly in the Victoria newspaper, which says that the Doctor “ simply tells them to clear within an hour, or he will make them.”

#### 9. *Remainder of Statement A.*

It is not necessary for me to do more than correct some minor mistakes in this statement, a copy of which is attached:—

- i. The Matebele were met about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles and not 7 miles from the camp.
- ii. The number of killed was not between 25 and 30. Ten or 11 is the probable number.
- iii. The statement “ It was like buck-shooting, for the poor devils took to their heels “ and we galloped up and almost shot them point blank. I don't suppose any “ of them got less than four or five bullets in him,” is highly coloured. One or two men were shot at close range, but the evidence is incontestable that most of the firing was at a range of over 100 yards. The expression, “ It was like “ buck-shooting,” seems intended to convey the idea of horsemen riding, as it were, into a troop of springbuck. Nothing of the kind occurred, and every witness examined on the point has denounced the statement as misleading or untruthful. The supposition that none of the killed got less than four or five bullets in him is probably exaggerated from the fact that the chief Umgandan, who was conspicuous from the feathers he wore, was fired at and hit by two if not three men.
- iv. The concluding paragraph of the statement is also incorrect. A mounted patrol did go out under Captain Napier, it is true, but they had no “ brush,” and killed no one.

#### 10. *Remarks on Statement B.*

“ The brother of a Swansea gentleman ” gave evidence before me clearly and well. He admits now that he cannot adhere to his statement as to the terms in which Dr. Jameson conveyed his ultimatum. He states that the first shot was fired by Serjeant Kennelly, which I believe, and does not now think that his original estimate of 40 and 50 killed is a correct one. The statement calls for no further remark.

Mr. Brock, p. 31.

See sketch, p. 32.  
Manyow and Ungangwane.Mr. Stokes, p. 15.  
“ Napier, p. 18.  
“ Weir, p. 20.  
“ Kennelly, p. 22.  
“ Poesell, p. 23.  
“ Forrestall, p. 30.  
“ Brabant, p. 32.Mr. Weir, p. 20.  
“ Brabant, p. 32.

Mr. Napier, p. 18.

11. Statement C. contains no specific allegation furnishing grounds for inquiry. The writer shares in the general opinion that Captain Lendy's party fired first. This point has already been dealt with. I am unaware of the identity of the writer, but he appears to have gauged the intentions of the Matebele impi with sagacity. I agree with him, from all I have heard, that it was the intention of the chief of the impi in entering the district to harry the Mashonas and irritate the Europeans, without infringing the King's instructions, only they went too far.

Statement D.

Mr. Wardlaw Thompson has not formulated anything into a charge which can be made the subject of inquiry and makes no direct allusion to the facts of the Victoria Incident.

Mr. Willoughby, whom he introduces to the Editor of the "Daily Chronicle," has, however, contributed a letter, which has been the principal indictment, so to speak, in this inquiry. It contains, to begin with, a sweeping insinuation, in the shape of a general exhortation to British subjects, that they should at least "abstain from copying the treachery and cruelty of the savages that they may have to chastise." Further on, he repeats a complaint made by Lobengula to a friend of his that the white men had fired on his soldiers when they were retiring. I will only pause to remark that the evident reason why the Matebele were fired on was because they were not retiring. Matebeleland lay due west, and the men fired upon were moving from south-west to north-east, and were making no genuine attempt to retire when the patrol came upon them. He next states that he heard from Matebeleland that the Matebele who were attacked were the rear guard of the impi. I think he has been misinformed on this point. It is true that Sergeant Kennelly and Trooper Forrestal state that they thought they were the rearguard of the impi, but the evidence of Manyow and Makoombi, and several men of the patrol, confirms me in the belief that the men attacked were a handful of Matebele, with a following of Magholes, who had been raiding the Mazibili kraal and joining in the attack on Makoombi's kraal, and were scurrying back to rejoin head-quarters round Magomole's, when they saw the armed force coming out from Victoria.

Mr. Kennelly, p. 22.  
" Brook, p. 31.  
" Brabant, p. 32.  
" Bastard, p. 33.

pp. 22, 23.

He then mentions a report that this rearguard were carrying a sick Induna, and that the sick Induna, and the Induna in charge of the party, were shot.

I have inquired of nearly every witness, of Manyow himself, and Umgengwane, who was an Induna present when the Matebele met the patrol. (These two witnesses were examined in each other's presence, and it is difficult to separate their evidence. What they had to say on this point is found only under Manyow, but Umgengwane corroborated him). The only possible sick induna was Umgandan, the same man who had made himself conspicuous by insolent behaviour at the indaba earlier in the day. He had had an attack of colic that morning, so Manyow said. He was not incapable of walking. He was not being carried. He was strong enough to carry a gun. No one saw a really sick Induna, or an Induna being carried. Umgandan was the Induna in charge of the party, and was conspicuous by the white feathers in his head-dress. He was shot at by several men and killed, but he was deserving of no sympathy on the score of sickness, or of being in charge of this party.

Mr. Stokes, p. 13.  
" Napier, p. 18.  
Dr. Jameson, p. 19.  
Mr. Weir, p. 20.  
" Kennelly, p. 22.  
" Neal, p. 24.  
Manyow, p. 25.  
Mr. Gleag, p. 26.  
" Chalk, p. 28.  
" Brook, p. 31.  
" Bastard, p. 33  
and others.

Mr. Willoughby then proceeds to quote from a letter, a portion of which he had been permitted to read. I have already dealt with the statement of his informant as to Dr. Jameson's ultimatum to the Indunas, and with the question of who fired first.

Also see Mr. Willoughby's evidence, p. 26.

I now give a remarkable extract:—" Captain Lendy then ordered his men to charge and fire, which they did. The impi took no notice, but quietly went on. Lendy's horsemen pursued them, each picking out his own man and firing at him, sometimes when not more than five or six yards away. The Matebele hid and tried to escape; but they uttered no sound and showed no fight. Not even a groan was heard. When a Matebele warrior found that he could not escape he turned towards his pursuer, fell on one knee, and held up his little shield in token of submission. But no quarter seems to have been given."

I think it is true that the Natives (they were not an impi, but a parcel of young Majakas accompanied by some Magholis) took no notice, in that they showed little or no resistance, and it is very natural to suppose that horsemen would get within close range of men on foot, and that they should fire on them when ordered to do so, but I have already stated that there was no wholesale slaughter at close quarters, as alleged, so far

as I have been able to ascertain from the evidence of 17 witnesses. The idea has been generally scouted, and the number of the killed was only nine, ten, or eleven.

But the whole passage is a highly-coloured piece of composition, and reads and sounds as if the author were straining at effect. Mr. Willoughby has not marked it by inverted commas, but stated before me that the words used are as nearly as possible those of the writer. The pathetic description of the "Matebele warrior kneeling on one knee and holding up his little shield in token of submission," has certainly been very faithfully reproduced from memory. But I do not believe that the attitude described was ever adopted by a suppliant Native, nor does it appear that such an attitude is that generally accepted among Zulus and Matabele as the posture of a man asking for quarter. Messrs. Napier and Colenbrander know Zulu and Matebele customs as well as any white man. So do Messrs. Moffat and Brabant. They agree in saying that a Native asking for quarter would lay down his arms and hold up his hands. To hold up a shield is, moreover, no token of submission—but might possibly be a sign of intended resistance. Even assuming the attitude to be typical of submission, I have found no evidence whatever of any Matebele having adopted it on this occasion.

It is, I think, to be regretted that Mr. Willoughby should have given currency to such a story, when he is not in a position to substantiate it by facts or evidence beyond his quotation from the letter of a correspondent whose name he is not permitted to divulge.

In conclusion, I have the honour to submit to your Excellency the following conclusions at which I have arrived on the principal points calling for inquiry:—

1. That the Matebele did raid European farms as well as Mashona kraals and carried off the cattle of white men.
2. That the Matebele committed wholesale horrors in the Victoria district. This is not disputed.
3. That at the indaba, Dr. Jameson gave them a fair ultimatum and that there are no grounds for saying that he called upon them to perform the impossible.
4. That the instructions Dr. Jameson gave to Captain Lendy were not only justifiable but politic.
5. That Dr. Jameson was misinformed when he reported officially that the Matebele fired first on the whites.
6. That the sergeant of the advance guard fired the first shot.
7. That the Matebele practically offered no resistance.
8. That in the pursuit of the Matebele there was no wholesale slaughter of natives nor deliberate shooting of men already shot.
9. That the Matebele, when attacked, had only gone three miles in three hours, and were then caught in possession of cattle stolen from Europeans.
10. That the story of the sick Induna being shot, without being absolutely and entirely untrue, is, at least, an embellishment of an immaterial fact.
11. That the story of the Matebele warriors asking for, and being refused, quarter, is unsupported and highly improbable.

His Excellency the High Commissioner,  
Cape Town.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) F. J. NEWTON.

P.S.—The enclosures to your Excellency's Despatch of the 1st May last, with schedule, are herewith returned. It will be seen that four of the sub-enclosures are referred to in the Report and the Minutes of Evidence as Statements A., B., C., and D., and they have been marked accordingly.



## Enclosure 1.

## SCHEDULE AND INDEX TO MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Date.	Name of Witness.	Occupation.	Page.
<b>Bulawayo.</b>			
May 21	- Herbert Lester Stokes - - -	- General Manager, Mashonaland Agency -	13
"	- Henry Paulet - - -	- Syndicate Manager - - -	15
"	- Charles Robert Vigers - - -	- Mining Commissioner - - -	16
May 22	- William Napier - - -	- Merchant - - -	18
"	- Leander Starr Jameson - - -	- Administrator, Mashonaland - - -	19
"	- Percy Vipond Weir - - -	- Merchant - - -	20
May 23	- Henry Llewellyn Lloyd - - -	- Hotel-keeper - - -	21
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"	- Harry Posselt - - -	- Farmer - - -	23
"	- William George Neal - - -	- Prospector - - -	24
"	- Johann William Colenbrander - - -	- Native Agent, B.S.A.Co. - - -	24
"	- Manyow - - -	- Matabele Induna - - -	25
"	- Umgengwane - - -	- Matabele Induna - - -	26
May 25	- Kenneth Gloag - - -	- Assistant, Bechuanaland Trading Association. - - -	26
"	- Edwin Amalric Slater - - -	- Auctioneer and hotel-keeper - - -	27
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<b>Victoria.</b>			
June 11	- Peter Forrestall - - -	- Trooper B.S.A.Co.'s Police - - -	30
June 12	- Arthur Woodford Brook - - -	- Farmer - - -	31
"	- John Somerset Brabant - - -	- Native Commissioner, Victoria - - -	32
"	- John William Eksteen - - -	- Trooper B.S.A.Co.'s Police - - -	34
June 13	- Robert McCormick Stroyan - - -	- Sergeant B.S.A.Co.'s Police - - -	35
"	- Alfred Drew - - -	- Clerk to R.M. Victoria - - -	35
"	- Makoombi - - -	- Mashena Chief - - -	36
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June 2	- William Charles Willoughby - - -	- Missionary - - -	36
"	- John Smith Moffat - - -	- Assistant Commissioner, Bechuanaland Protectorate. - - -	37
<i>By Affidavit before a Magistrate in Cape Colony.</i>			
"	- William S. Bastard - - -	- Farmer - - -	38
<i>By Affidavit before a Magistrate at Victoria, Mashonaland.</i>			
June 30	- Mansel Edge Weale - - -	- Employé, Victoria District Gold Mining Agency. - - -	38

## Enclosure 2.

## BULUWAYO.

## FIRST DAY.

Monday, 21st May 1894.

First Witness.—HERBERT LESTER STOKES, General Manager, Mashonaland Agency.

Was at Victoria in July last. Arrived at my camp, Fernspruit near Lundy River, on the 10th July. Began to hear rumours of Matabele impi round Victoria raiding and marching. Great alarm amongst whites. Messages exchanged in camps, great apprehension; Dr. Jameson arrived on the 14th, patrols sent out on 11th. On that night the huts of our servants near the stables were fired. Went into Victoria Fort on the 14th. Was in the fort while the indaba was held at the gate. Was there as volunteer on duty. The natives left the indaba on foot. The Chief's party was 18 or 20. A larger party in the background. Heard nothing of what was said. About 2 hours and 40 minutes after we left. We went to lunch in the town and returned to fort for the horses. The officers then had lunch, and we started. That is my impression of the time that elapsed. We started in half sections cantering about 100 yards and then slowly. That part of the country was new to me. I should think we

went about 5 or 6 miles. We spied some Matabele, four or five of them. Afterwards I saw about 50. They were gazing at us apparently, and then proceeding across our line from left to right. I was some way back, but my impression was that they were not going in the direction of the boundary. It was said that a shot was fired by the Matabele on the left of our flank. I cannot state that of my own knowledge. It was possible that a shot could be fired without my knowing it. The distance from the Matabele was about 500 yards. The ground was open with kopjes around. In about five minutes we formed into line. We advanced in open order without much formation, at a canter. When we began rushing forward amidst some excitement and hesitation, I heard Captain Lendy give the order to fire. The skirmish became a chase. The Matabeles fled in a panic. We got into more open ground and came up with them scattered about. The pursuit lasted an hour, not firing all the time. I saw nothing of the Matabele carrying a sick Induna.

(*Mr. Willoughby's statement read.*)—The firing was too hot for the Matabele to show fight. I got separated. I was pursuing a man who shook his spear at someone. I shot at him. I am positive I saw no quarter asked for in the manner described by Mr. Willoughby's correspondent (*extract read*). No quarter was given as none was asked as far as my knowledge goes.

Personally I should give a man a wide berth who asked for quarter, as I should be afraid of treachery.

The result of the patrol gave gratification and general satisfaction to everyone in the neighbourhood. Not a dissentient voice on the subject was heard at the time. It never occurred to me that I had been engaged in an action which would be the subject of anything but favourable remark.

By *Mr. Caldicott.*—I consider now I acted perfectly justifiably, and would do the same to-morrow. I arrived in Salisbury in July 1891, and have been here practically ever since.

There were seven white men in my camp at Fern Spruit. The surrounding mining camps (about four) contained each about two white men. They were within about 2 miles radius of our camp. I understood there were three or four thousand Matabele raiding in the neighbourhood. On the night of the 11th I abandoned my camp on information from private patrol.

When the shot was fired I was about the seventh or eighth file from the rear. There might have been some resistance by the Matabele without my being aware of it. The extent of our front covered about a mile when we were in chase. There were kopjes in front and around, and it is difficult to say; at times there were only about three other white men in sight. Quarter might have been asked for and given without my knowing it. The hottest firing was away from me, as I got separated. I saw two Matabele killed.

(*Statement A. read.*)—The statement is slack and loose. The observation about four or five bullets in each man is, in my opinion, ridiculous. About having to clear across the border in an hour was not the impression I received. My impression was they were given an hour's start to make a bonâ fide start to retreat in the direction of their own country. That we were to follow them in an hour, and if that bonâ fide effort were not being made we should meet them under different circumstances. In offering no other remark I do not accept the statement read as a correct one.

(*Extract from Statement B. as to indaba and pursuit by patrol read.*)—That is the first I heard about cattle being given up as well as retreat being insisted on. The point as to the border line is also incorrect. The estimate of the number killed is exaggerated. By offering no further remark I do not accept the rest of the statement as substantially correct.

(*Extract marked 11 from Statement D. read.*)—I have nothing further to add to the points raised there on which I have already given evidence, except that I do not believe we ever rode them down so as to get within five or six yards.

(Signed) H. L. STOKES.

Second Witness.—LORD HENRY PAULET, Syndicate Manager.

Was at Victoria July last; arrived there Saturday, 15th July. Was in command of Victoria Rangers, and had selection of men for patrol, taking orders from Captain Lendy. I know of two men who lost cattle by raiding on the impi. All work was suspended in the neighbourhood. Everyone was in camp. Several kraals of the Mashonas had been burned, to my knowledge, within sight of Victoria. Fires were constantly seen at night. I was present at the indaba on Tuesday, 18th. The doctor took a high hand. Asked natives why they had interfered with the whites. Manyow said they had not interfered. Doctor said they had taken cattle and killed servants, and were not obeying the King's commands. Manyow asked doctor if he would hear what the man who brought the last letter from the King had to say. This man was Umgandan. The letter was to Captain Lendy. Dr. Jameson refused to talk with anyone but Manyow. Umgandan was most insolent, constantly interrupting the indaba. The doctor then asked Manyow if he had lost control over his young men. Manyow admitted that he had. The doctor then said, "You, Manyow, and the people who obey the King's commands, go back over the border. I give you an hour to go. Leave me your young men, and I will deal with them." Manyow then asked where border was. I took the message to the doctor, who replied, "Tell him he knows." The Indunas then rose to go. Umgandan made some remark in a loud voice, and Sergeant Brabant said to me, "They mean fighting." I asked him what Umgandan had said, and he translated Umgandan's speech as being,—that they would sooner be driven than go back to the King of their own accord. The indaba took place somewhere between 12 and half past. I then received orders from Captain Lendy to select as many men as I could find good horses for, to parade at 2 o'clock for mounted patrol. The parade fell in at 2, and it was some time after this before Captain Lendy took over the command of the parade. When Dr. Jameson gave the order to Manyow I did not conceive that he meant him to cross the border in an hour, because it was an impossibility. We knew they were investing Magomole's, a Mashuna kraal, about 7 miles distant from Victoria. It was merely to stop this and to (? make them) leave off the burning of the kraals. I understood the doctor's orders were in consequence of a letter written by Lobengula the year before in reply to a complaint that his people had been raiding the country. I heard nothing about their being given a certain time to clear off the commonage. I am perfectly certain the expression was not used. If it had been used I should have heard it.

(*Mr. Willoughby's Letter, Extract read.*)—The statement by Mr. Willoughby's correspondent that Dr. Jameson ordered the Indunas across the frontier (30 miles away) within two hours is incorrect. No mention was made of two hours. It was, moreover, at least an hour and 40 minutes before Captain Lendy rode out. It might have been more. It could not have been less. Manyow was mounted, and from information from the Mashunas there is no doubt he left straight for the invested kraal, and broke up his camp at once. They must have left very speedily, as lots of grain and meat were left behind. Manyow and Umgandan were certainly not in accord at the indaba. Umgandan was one of the men killed. He was a young Induna. He was the only one insolent, the others were simply sullen. He was insolent by interruption, gesticulating, and trying to make himself heard. Manyow seemed somewhat afraid of him.

The order was merely given by Captain Lendy for mounted patrol to fall in at 2. Each man had bandolier of 50 rounds usual, just like every man in the fort. I do not know what Captain Lendy's instructions or intentions were. I received instructions from him to keep all the men at their posts in the fort until he returned.

By *Mr. Caldicott.*—I could not say how many kraals there were burned, they were burning all over the place. I only visited two myself. At one there were five bodies, all with their right hands cut off. The labour and mining business was entirely demoralised by the advent of the impi and the raiding. The boys all deserted the mines. The Mashuna refugees asked for protection from the white men. Captain Lendy told me before the arrival of the doctor all that had taken place, viz., that the Matabele had asked him to give up the Mashuna refugees, and that they said they would not kill them in the township, but they must die as they had stolen the King's cattle. The refugees were men, women, and children. I saw about 15 to 20 from Bera's kraal. He offered to the Indunas to hold trial as magistrate, as to whether the Mashunas had stolen the King's cattle. If they (the Matabele)

would make a charge against them, and if guilty, he would punish them, but not surrender them without trial. The offer was refused, and the Indunas referred to previous case when prisoners in Buluwayo had been given up to white men. The kraals raided were those from which the native labour of the district was supplied. The Matabele had raided the Victoria District the year previous, destroying grain, &c. A prospector named Jackson had two boys killed on the occasion of this last raid. They also threatened him.

The sending out of the patrol and the acts of that patrol were, in my opinion, necessary and justifiable, not only for the protection of the Mashunas, but to restore confidence in the country. In my opinion any less stringent measures would have been regarded by the natives as a sign of weakness and source of danger to the whole community.

I have never heard anything from anyone that the acts of the patrol and the officer commanding it were not justifiable or for the public benefit.

(Signed) HENRY PAULET.

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Third Witness.—CHARLES ROBERT VIGERS, Mining Commissioner, Buluwayo.

In July last was Mining Commissioner and Acting Civil Commissioner, Victoria District. Was there the whole month of July when Matabele first appeared. On Sunday, the 9th July, I was riding with Weir, turned towards Matabele kraals, 3 miles from Victoria. When we got close to them we met a mob of Mashunas, men principally, some women and children. They told us that the Matabele were close at hand, and advised us to ride into the camp. We did not think much about it, and rode on. When we got up to the kraals we saw the whole of the granite kopjes covered with armed Kaffirs, and we also saw on looking right and left across the flat large numbers of Kaffirs with shields and guns already between us and the town. We rode up to a large party of them, in charge of an Induna, and asked them what they were doing. He said they were hunting Mashunas to kill them for stealing the King's cattle. He also told us that there was a letter from the King with the main body. We rode back, and when we had got as far as the hospital, Brabant, who was a patient, shouted out of the window that there was a very large body coming down the road from the direction of Magomole's kraal. He told me to hunt them back. I looked up the road and saw probably about 200. I rode up to them and told them they must not come into the camp. They were within the township, within 100 yards of the hospital. They were armed, they were cheeky, and shouted out insulting things, but came no further in that direction, but went down towards the Umshagashe River and so round the town. From there I rode by the church, when I saw another large mob. I rode up to them and got off my horse and went up to a young majaka, who had a rifle. I snatched it out of his hand, asking him where he got it from. He said the King had given it to him. I then told them that if they came any further they would be fired on. This party, I was told afterwards by Mr. Sylvester, took his houseboy down into the bush and stabbed him. A skeleton I saw myself lying at the spot he indicated a week or ten days afterwards. Captain Lendy with police and mounted inhabitants in the meantime were hunting small parties of the Matabeles round about the town, rescuing white men's cattle that were being driven off. The country at that time was completely covered by large parties of Matabele in pursuit of the Makalakas who had taken refuge in the hills. This state of things continued till Dr. Jameson's arrival. The inhabitants proceeded to fortify the camp. Surrounding miners and farmers came in. The public buildings and police yard were placed in a state of defence.

On the 14th Captain Lendy (then R.M.) started away with a patrol to try and see the Induna in charge of the impis, and to see if he could not get the letter that was addressed to him from Lobengula, of which I had been told on the Sunday, and which had not yet been delivered. After he had gone, about 11 o'clock in the day, the Induna Manyow, with about 12 more, came to the outskirts of the town, bringing with them the boy who had the letter. They came with me to my room, and I spoke to them and kept them waiting till 4 o'clock, when Lendy returned. We then asked them why they had not delivered the letter sooner, but had left it till all the damage was done. They said because the boy with the letter had got a thorn in his foot. They said that all they wanted now was that the King's Mashunas should be given up to them, and they would go away and not trouble us any more. Manyow added, "I will not kill them in your town and dirty the place, but I will take them into the bush lower down and then have them killed." We discussed the matter, and

agreed that it was utterly impossible to give them up, and therefore refused to comply. Manyow and the rest then left. During the conversation Lendy said, "If you have any charge to make against these people I will hear it as a magistrate, and if I find your charges correct I will hand them over to you to be dealt with, but you must point out to me the men you charge. I will not give up the women and children, as they could not have committed any crimes." Manyow then said, "All these Mashunas are the King's, and he wishes to punish them. When you wanted Kaffirs who had committed crimes, the King at once handed those men over to you. Why should not you do the same for the King?" Manyow was told the Mashunas would not be given up to him, and he left the place and was very angry. Nothing more happened till the doctor arrived on the 17th, when messages were sent out to Manyow, who was round Magomoli's kraal. Manyow and the rest of the Indunas came in and an indaba was held at the gate of the police yard. The doctor said, "What do you mean by coming here and doing what you have done?" Manyow said, "I was sent by the King to punish the Mashunas for stealing the King's cattle." The doctor then said, "You had no right to come over the border. You know where the border is." Manyow replied he did not know of any border. The doctor said he was not speaking the truth. After some conversation, in which several of the Kaffirs were very insulting, especially Umgandan, the doctor said to Manyow, "Is it not true that you have no control over your young men?" Manyow said, "Yes." The doctor said, "Very well, you and the older men may go, and I will deal with your young men if they do not go." He added, "Now you start for the border. I give you an hour and a half (*indicating by the sun with his hand*) to do so. If you have not started within that time I shall send my young men who will make you do so." The indaba then ended, and the doctor went into the police yard. The indaba took place, I should say, about 1.30, and the patrol left, I should say, about 3.30, but I did not take particular notice of the time. It got back about dusk. I did not think that Manyow had any intention of retiring; I think they meant to stop until further orders from the King, which would have meant a further stay on their part of about at least 12 days. When the doctor gave the order for Manyow and his people to leave it did not give me the idea that he meant him to cross the border within that time. I knew it was an impossibility. It is from 27 to 30 miles. It was never said, to my knowledge, that Dr. Jameson had given an order such as that, which everyone knew was an impossibility.

By Mr. Caldicott.—I have been 10 years in South Africa, and in Mashonaland three years since the opening of the country. I was head of the district as Civil Commissioner. I knew that the advent of the Matabele stopped all mining enterprise and labour in the district. I knew it as Mining Commissioner. The continual raids so frightened the mining labourers that they would not stop. The inhabitants were very uneasy, and most of them came into the town. Nearly all of them; some fortified themselves by the mines.

When the patrol returned Captain, then Sergeant, Fitzgerald (now dead) told me that the first shot fired was by a Matabele in the rocks by Mahoombi's kraal, when they first came up to them, and the bullet struck in between him and the man who was riding with him. That I have always understood to have been the first shot fired on either side.

The white population of Victoria at that time was about 400 men and probably 90 women and children, all told. The total number of the impi, from native sources, I gather to have been from 5,000 to 7,000 men.

Mr. Vigers (continued).—There was a large Mashuna population in the district. The number of huts burned during the raid was about from 150 to 200, and a corresponding number of granaries. I saw bodies of murdered Mashunas. One at Brooks's farm, the one in the bush I have mentioned, and at the old camp, the Shangaan pulled off the waggon and assegaied, but the grass was long. I heard of many more.

By Mr. Newton.—In general talk on the pursuit by the patrol I never heard the question of quarter being asked or given mentioned.

I am quite clear on the point that the doctor's orders to Manyow were neither intended to be or construed as an ultimatum impossible of performance.

(Signed) CHARLES R. VIGERS.

## SECOND DAY.

22nd May 1894.

Fourth Witness.—WILLIAM NAPIER, Merchant.

Was in Victoria in July 1893, merchant and senior captain in Major Wilson's Victoria column. The first raid in which I was concerned was that at Chibi's, and there had been several before the arrival of the impi on 9th July. In all these the Matabeles have come down and raided all the Makalaka Stadts on the line of march, taking women and children and cattle, and destroying kraals, and taking, burning, or scattering grain. When I went down to Chibi's at the doctor's request, as I knew the language, I took Lord H. Paulet with me. We were sent because Mashunas complained that the Matabeles were robbing and destroying, as stated above. We followed the impi for 4 or 5 miles, and found most of them in their scherms, the other side of Zimbabwe. I saw one of the Indunas, Mufula, in charge; the other Indunas had gone ahead. I asked why they were raiding there. They said they were collecting taxes. I asked why they took women and children from the kraals. They said they had not; that was untrue. I heard afterwards they had liberated some on payment of cattle. They still had a girl there. I asked why they had crossed the border without the King's leave. They said they had the King's leave, the border being the hills this side the Shashe. I told them what the doctor had said to me about killing men and taking women and children, and informed them this would be represented to Lobengula. We then returned and reported the matter to Dr. Jameson. All the Mashunas were on the rocks, none on their own grounds, being in fear of the Matabeles.

At the time of the Victoria raid I was in Salisbury, and came down with the doctor. The day we arrived there a message was sent to the Indunas, 15 miles outside Victoria. We had outspanned our cart, and saw a rush of Mashunas to the kopjes. They had previously been talking to us. They shouted that the Matabeles were coming. The Mashunas saw the Matabeles coming on 1½ miles off, and took refuge in the rocks. They were in hopes that the Matabeles would not attack them, as they had left one of their prettiest girls on the rocks with a calabash of food. The Matabeles passed on without attacking the kraal, and never noticed the girl. Nearer Victoria, 5 or 6 miles off, we saw lines of Matabeles carrying grain away from burning kraals. On reaching Victoria the chief Induna, Manyow, was sent for. The next day I interpreted for the doctor at the indaba. The account given by Manyow to-day was really what actually happened. At the end of the indaba the doctor distinctly told them, "I give you an hour to prepare." Manyow had said he could not control his young men. The doctor said, "Then leave them for me to deal with; you go along with the old men." The impression I got was, they had an hour to make their preparations to clear. It could never have occurred to anyone that they were meant to be over the border in an hour. That is about 25 miles off, and it would have been an impossibility. The indaba took place from about midday to shortly after 1, after which we hurried down to lunch. I was then lieutenant in the Victoria Rangers. The orders given were to saddle up after lunch and follow slowly on, to see if the Matabeles had moved. We fell in about three, and we probably left about half-past, Captain Lendy in command. We walked out in the direction of the kopje, the boundary of the town commonage, 3 miles from the town. We went at a walk the whole way till we came to the Matabeles at about 4 o'clock. I was then riding on the left flank. Captain Lendy was riding to the right of me, about a length ahead, a little nearer than in the centre of the troop. When we got into the nek the Matabeles were seen running about among the rocks, and someone of the four men who were riding in front shouted out, "They are firing at us." I heard the shot. It seemed to come from the left front. Fitzgerald was one of the four. We asked Captain Lendy "What are we to do?" When he felt satisfied that we had been fired upon, he told us to extend in skirmishing order and fire. We extended at a gallop and commenced firing. We went on firing and galloping for fully a mile, when Lendy sounded the retire. It could not have lasted more than a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes.

By this time the Matabeles were retiring in all directions. The men we met were all young men. After the retire we rode straight away to the fore, and got back about sundown. We saw a few cattle with them, to our left front some distance away. They were certainly in possession of the cattle. We recovered a few of Dunlop's cattle and brought them back with us. I remember them well, eight or nine red oxen. I was at the head of the line, about the centre. The line was very much extended. We

got to about an average of 100 or 150 yards of them. It was certainly not like "shooting them down like bucks." It is hard to estimate their numbers. They were all over the place. I should think more than 250 or 300.

(Extract from Mr. Willoughby's correspondent read.)—I should not say that was a correct statement of what took place. It is not reasonably probable. It is not true they took no notice. After they fired we fired. They then began to clear. They were all separated, and in disorder. It is not true that the Matabeles were on occasions not more than 5 or 6 yards away. Our men were perfectly under control, and were under orders to dismount and fire, which they did. When a Matabele is showing submission he does not hold up his shield. He would drop his shield and hold up his hands, or he would fall on both knees and throw up his hands. I never saw a Matabele ask for quarter that day. They do ask for quarter sometimes, but not in the way described here. Holding up a shield is not submission. Most of the men against us had guns. No quarter was given as none was asked. There was no running in amongst the Matabeles. It would have been risky to do so. It is hard to say how many were killed.

I had no doubt about it at the time that the shot was fired at us from the Matabeles first. I have no reason to doubt it now.

I saw nothing of a sick Induna being carried. I do not believe there was a man being carried.

By Mr. Caldicott.—At the indaba the doctor, when Manyow claimed some refugees, said that white men would not give up Mashuna women and children to be slaughtered when once they had claimed protection; but if they had done wrong they would be tried before the magistrate, and if found guilty punished. Manyow objected to that, and said they wanted to take them away unconditionally.

I know several instances of European farms having been raided. The doctor sent me on a patrol round the district after the affair of the 18th to see if the Matabeles had really crossed the border. I took 10 mounted men. We saw no Matabeles; they had gone across the border. I crossed the border myself to make certain. As we saw none we could not have killed any. The last sentence of Statement A. is utterly untrue. There was no other patrol sent out except mine. That sentence must refer to my patrol. We had no "brush," and we killed no one. In passing our own farm I found the place had been looted of everything—cattle, goods, furniture, grain, &c. Arnold's farm was burnt; Clarke's and Eksteen's looted of a lot of things. Gloag's was also looted. I believe Parker's too. I saw three dead bodies (Mashunas) in one place, several in all, all close to the town. The Makalékas suffered greatly. The Matabeles surrounded several kraals, and stopped the way to the wells. One girl gave herself up, she could not stand the thirst. They took her away as a slave. At another kraal 70 head of cattle died from thirst.

At the indaba the Matabelé Indunas were insolent and overbearing in manner to the doctor. Umgandan was conspicuous in that respect. I had repeatedly to check them at doctor's request. Umgandan, on going away, said to the other Indunas "Let us drive them." Brabant heard this and drew my attention to it. It certainly applied to us. He could not have meant it to apply to the Mashunas. I gathered from that that they meant fighting. He said it out loud.

(Signed) W. NAPIER.

Fifth Witness.—LEANDER STARR JAMESON, Administrator of Mashonaland.

I arrived in Victoria on Monday, 17th July—afternoon. For the last few miles driving into Victoria I saw Mashuna kraals burning on both sides. Matabeles with shields and assegais crossing the road in front of mules, loaded up with plunder. I sent out at once police from Victoria to request the Induna in charge of the Matabeles to come and interview me the next morning. Manyow with several of the Indunas arrived the next day—the 18th. What occurred has been described fairly correctly by Manyow this morning. I told Manyow what the Matabeles had been doing on the commonage of Victoria. Told him this could not continue. That the Mashuna women and children in the fort would not be given up. That I was in communication with the King, and that he and his people must cross the border at once. He stated his people would not obey him. I told him to take those who would obey him with him, and leave me to deal with the rest, and I pointed at the guns, and the men round them or the wall. I then finished the interview, telling Manyow that I would only give him a short time to start going, this being interpreted by Mr. Napier, with reference to the position of the sun. And that if I found they were not going I should drive them

across the border. Umgandan, the Induna of Euxa kraal, sitting next to Manyow, jumped up and said "Then we will be driven."

Manyow and his followers then left. The whole indaba lasted about 20 minutes, somewhere about midday. I then told Captain Lendy to get 50 mounted men, or as many up to that number as horses were fit for, and to have them saddled up in about a couple of hours for patrol duty. I then went to lunch, and the men also. When Captain Lendy had paraded his men about two hours afterwards, I gave him orders as follows: "You have heard what I have told the Matabele; I want you to carry this out. I do not want them to think it is merely a threat. They have had a week of threats already, with very bad results. Ride out in the direction they have gone towards Magomoli's kraal. If you find they are not moving off, drive them as you heard me tell Manyow I would, and if they resist and attack you shoot them."

Captain Lendy returned with his patrol of 35 men at sundown and reported to me, then and there, that on the edge of the commonage he had come across about 300 of the Matabele, with Umgandan amongst them, that they were not moving away, but were remaining on the commonage; that Sergeant Fitzgerald had been fired upon by them, but had not been hit; that then he ordered his men to charge and then fire; that about 30 natives were killed; and that he had then ordered the retire, as it was getting towards sundown. I asked him if he was sure about his numbers 300 and 30 respectively. He said "No," but somewhere about that number, he should think. That night I had a long conversation by telegraph with the High Commissioner and Mr. Rhodes. Described everything which had occurred, and discussed future proceedings.

(*Extract Statement A., "Dr. Jameson, . . . , 30 miles"*).—That is absolutely false. Whatever time was stated was expressed by movements of the sun, through Mr. Napier, the interpreter. And Manyow distinctly understood that they were to start going within that time, showing their intention to obey my order. Any such order, apart from the truth of the story, would have been ridiculous. This statement answers itself as being impossible, and therefore untrue. I entirely repudiate the charge that I ordered them to do what I knew to be impossible. That reply applies also to Mr. Willoughby's observation on the point. The account I have given of my orders to Captain Lendy I cannot guarantee as verbatim, but they are probably very nearly so, as they were given verbally, as I am now giving my evidence.

When Captain Lendy made his report on the doings of the patrol I was quite satisfied, and told him he had done well. I considered that the fact of his finding them where they were, making no attempt to move, even if the shot had not been fired, was quite enough to justify him in charging on them. From Manyow's statement, and the attitude and words of Umgandan at the close of the interview, I thought it probable that they would attempt resistance; therefore I made the party as strong as the horses at my disposal would provide for.

The first I ever heard of the incident of the sick Induna, who was being carried having been shot, was on reading this yesterday here in Mr. Willoughby's letter.

Nor had I ever heard of the fact of any Matabele having asked for quarter, and its being refused. I do not know myself what happened there at Victoria, but in the subsequent engagements with the Matabele I do not know of any instance of asking for quarter; perhaps this is that no Matabele, so far as I know, was ever shot at, unless resisting to the danger of the white men attacking him.

(*Extract from Willoughby's letter re quarter: "The Matabele—have been given" is read.*)—My comment on that is, that it is nonsense. The attitude would not be familiar to a trooper as one indicating submission.

I have no recollections of any statement having been made to me on this matter by Captain Lendy or anyone else since dead. Beyond the report made to me by Captain Lendy, to which I have alluded, the substance of which I immediately wired to the High Commissioner and Mr. Rhodes the same evening.

By *Mr. Caldicott*.—I was satisfied then and still am that the action of Captain Lendy under my instructions was absolutely necessary for the safety of the community, and that the instructions were properly carried out.

(Signed) L. S. JAMESON.

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Sixth Witness.—PERCY VIPOND WEIR, Merchant at Buluwayo and Victoria.

Was at Victoria last July at the time of the arrival of the Matabele. Was with Mr. Vigers when he first met them. We were going to some farms westward of Victoria when we met Mashunas who said the Matabeles were chasing them. We went on and



met the Matabeles and asked them what they meant. They said they were after the Mashunas. We told them to come into camp with us, to which they were not inclined. We tried to take two prisoners, but they slipped away. I rode back to the fort, and told the people there the Matabeles were rushing in. Ten minutes afterwards they were right inside the town. That was on Sunday, the 9th July. The following day Captain Lendy and 15 of us went out to interview the Chief Induna, who we found had come into Victoria. On our way there we found natives stabbed along the road, some of them our own boys. The Matabele were very cheeky; they were not violent, simply threatening. At all the Mashuna kraals the inhabitants had taken refuge in the rocks. The kraals were burning. The burning went on the whole time that week, until the arrival of Dr. Jameson. I was not at the indaba. I was inside the fort. I was on duty as burgher. I only know from hearsay what occurred then. Everybody who had a horse was ready. We fell in after lunch, and rode out about 2.30., but I did not take particular notice of the time. I was a sergeant and riding near the rear. We rode at a walk about 3 to 4 miles. Captain Lendy sent out flanking parties when we were about 2 miles out. I first heard that the Matabele were shooting on the left. I did not hear any shooting myself. We received the order to extend and advance at a gallop. The line spread out a great deal, and the country was broken, and we were going over rice fields. I was at the right centre of the line. I first saw them when I was galloping, but when they were first seen I was behind. When I saw them they were dodging among stones and bushes about 400 or 500 yards away; when the fire became too hot they retreated. I did not see any Matabele firing. Some of them appeared to be trying to rally the others. At the time I got up most of them were well on the run. I was near Umgandan when he was shot; I suppose about 60 yards off. He was identified by the feathers on his head. Captain Lendy came up soon after, and retreat was sounded. We had gone about a mile and then we went round some Mashuna kraals; one party was sent off under Napier. We got back just about sundown; some men got nearer to the Matabele than I did. Coming back we saw some cattle which had been in possession of the Matabele. They were white men's cattle; I saw nothing of a sick Induna being carried. I saw no Matabele in an attitude suggesting he was asking for quarter. I never saw anyone so near as 5 or 6 yards. I never got a shot less than 200 yards.

(*Extract from Willoughby's letter, re quarter: "The Matabele—been given" read.*)—I saw nothing like that. That is not a sign of submission. I should not have understood it as such. As long as a Matabele has his shield it is a sign he is guarding himself.

(*Statement A.—"Captain Lendy—bullets in him," read.*)—There is no doubt they ran when we began to gallop, as they are unused to horses; they got "on the run," and we kept them on the run. I saw no case of point-blank shooting. It is possible some may have had more than one bullet.

I cannot state anything as to who fired the first shot, except that I heard the news come up the line that the left flank had been shot at.

By *Mr. Caldicott.*—I have been 14 years in South Africa, and about three years in Mashonaland. I consider that if decided steps had not been taken the white people would have had to leave the country. The action on that day was necessary. Until then we had to live on the defensive. After that we could go out to our farms and keep boys there. The Matabele had looted our stock, and destroyed what they could not carry away. As it is, there are two of my herd-boys missing now, who have never been seen since. The Matabeles looted both our cattle posts.

(Signed) PERCY V. WEIR.

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### THIRD DAY.

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Seventh Witness.—HENRY LLEWELLYN LLOYD, Hotel-keeper.

Was at Victoria last July, also there as hotel-keeper. Was corporal in the Victoria Rangers. I was a sufferer from the raids. My farm is west of Victoria, on the commonage. On the 9th the boys on my farm with my stock told me they had brought me my cattle; they were running off towards Zimbabue, they would not remain at Victoria. They left my cattle with me in Victoria. I found they had only brought on a part of the cattle. The rest were still outside with the oxen I had been working. That was

before sunrise. I went out and reported to Sergeant Fitzgerald that the Matabele were there, and I was going out to get my cattle in. I went out and could not find cattle or herd. I lost them, and have never seen them since. There were seven. I believe the herd was killed. I saw two dead Mashunas recently killed by the Matabele. I was in the fort at the time of the indaba and could not hear what was said. It was sometime after breakfast. I was told to be ready for a mounted patrol. We fell in about 3, and left half an hour afterwards. We went out at a walk. I was on the right flanking party, quite parallel with the column. We had gone about 6 miles. The bugles sounded us to fall into the main party. We did so, and then marched along as before. Immediately afterwards I heard firing. The advance guard was firing. Kennelly was one of the advance. We all raced forward and commenced firing ourselves, on the word being given by Captain Lendy to fire. We pursued them about a mile. When I first saw them some were running away to the kopjes. On my right, after having had a shot at one or two of them, I saw one of them firing at Sergeant Fitzgerald in the kopje. Those in the hills certainly showed resistance. The man who fired at Fitzgerald was shot, probably, before he pulled the trigger, but he did fire. I got within 10 yards of a Matabele in the open. I was running him down. He was shot by another man. Most of the men got right up to the Matabele.

When called in by the bugle I took my place in the middle of the column. I cannot say with any certainty who fired the first shot. I should say that the statement that "they had not fired or attempted resistance when the police opened fire upon them" is not an accurate statement.

(Read: "*I do not suppose—bullets in him.*")—That is nonsense. One man may have got more than one bullet in him. I saw nothing resembling any shooting at men already dead or wounded.

(Read Willoughby's letter: "*The Matabele hid—quarter given.*")—I saw no case of that kind, nor heard of such.

I think the idea of the Matabele was to draw us in to the main body. Their retreat was intended to draw us on into a nest.

I know that country very well, and knew where the Matabele's main body was, as I had been trying to get my cattle back from them.

(Signed) H. L. LLOYD.

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Eighth Witness.—WILLIAM PATRICK KENNELLY, Contractor.

Was at Victoria last July. Contractor there. Was sergeant in Victoria Rangers at outbreak of hostilities. Was also troop-sergeant-major in the Bechuanaland Border Police; till April last was in G troop. Was on duty in the fort at the time of the indaba. It was over about noon. I got orders to warn men to get saddled up, and to start away two hours after. There were 35 men warned, and others squeezed in. We left about 2. We rode out slowly for half the way. I was in charge of the advance guard. There were four of us—Gloag, E. V. Campbell, Bezindhout, and myself. We were 600 or 700 yards ahead of the main column. After riding about 4 miles I came on what I took to be the Matabele rear-guard. They were making for a point due north from Victoria. They were moving all on foot, and armed. They were about half a mile off when first I saw them, about 60 or 70. We could see them quite distinctly, with their shields prominent. I saw no man being carried. I got to within 200 or 300 yards, and then sent Gloag back with a message (verbal) to Captain Lendy reporting the Matabele, their number, and the direction they were taking. Gloag brought message back from Captain Lendy to say I was to open fire, and I also heard the bugle sounding to commence fire. I fired a shot in the air. That was the first shot I heard, and I fired it after receiving order from Captain Lendy. I closed in my advance guard, and by that time the main body had closed up, and the firing became general. They had been coming up in half sections. I cannot say exactly what formation they were in behind me, as I was watching the Matabele. After I fired a shot Gloag fired a shot. I dismounted and fired another myself at them. By that time the firing became general. We did not see any cattle amongst them just then. Later on we saw the cattle. I took my place in the line about the centre. We were then all advancing at a canter or gallop. We seemed to be under no orders, but each man for himself, after the firing became general. We did not get right in among them, but as they got scattered we got close up to them. I was within 3 yards when one man was shot. Most of the Matabeles were shot at 150 yards interval. We rode

after them about 3 miles, dismounting and shooting, and then Captain Lendy sounded the recall.

(*Statements from paragraphs 2 and 3 of despatch, Secretary of State to Sir Henry Loch, 2nd November 1893,\* read.*)—The latter is the correct statement as far as I know. One man did fire a shot after we had opened fire on them. He fired at Fitzgerald.

(*Paragraph 5 of the same despatch is read.*)—They were going along at a steady jog trot towards their main camp. No, they had not attempted any resistance when the police opened fire so far as I know.

(*Statement A. read.*)—That about the four or five bullets is not true. The account of the pursuit so far as chasing them is concerned is true.

It is possible the Matabele may have been trying to draw us on to the main body. There were 5,000 waiting at the main camp.

(*Willoughby's extract: "The number of the Matabele—been given" read.*)—No, that is not a correct account. I never saw a Matabele in that attitude, I never heard of a Matabele asking for quarter, either on that day or on any other day. I served throughout the rest of the campaign.

As far as my own knowledge goes I fired the first shot, and I fired it on receipt of the order from Captain Lendy. The only resistance I saw was the one shot at Fitzgerald. I saw no quarter asked. I saw no sick Induna shot.

By *Mr. Caldicott.*—When we first saw the Matabele they were going parallel to the border, but were making for their main camp. Sixty would be about the total number attacked. Of that about half were killed. Had we gone another three-quarters of a mile we should have come on the main body, but we did not know that at the time.

(*Q.*) There has been some evidence given as to a shot having been fired at on left flank?—(*A.*) I would not say there was not a shot fired before Captain Lendy gave the order.

I know Gloag. He is very excitable. He was excited when the firing began. I heard Captain Fitzgerald shout to him then to keep quiet. He was shouting loudly. I saw him fire two shots. He may have fired more. His horse fell, and he was left behind. He closed up with the skirmishers just when the recall sounded. Personally, I have suffered no loss from the Matabele, but many of my friends have.

By *Mr. Newton.*—I sent Gloag with a message to Captain Lendy. He brought a message back, on receipt of which I fired a shot. I also heard a bugle sound "commence firing"; that was before I had fired. The bugle confirmed the message. I have no reason to doubt that the message to and from Captain Lendy was correctly given.

By *Mr. Caldicott.*—There were about 60 or 70. We did not count them. We had no time to count them. I sent him (Gloag) back with a message immediately, and before he could have had time to count them.

(Signed) W. P. KENNELLY.

Ninth Witness.—HENRY POSSELT, Farmer, in Mashonaland.

Have been here two years. A German, born in Natal, South Africa. Was at Victoria in July last. Had a farm near there. Was on the patrol when it rode out after the indaba. We started in the afternoon about 2, perhaps later. We went out at a walk, not very far, about 3 or 4 miles. Mr. Brabant, Mr. Lloyd, and myself were a flanking party on the right. We were called into the main body. I was on the left of the line when we advanced and saw the Kaffirs. I was not in front. We all spread out. We came over a little rise and saw the Kaffirs. I saw Gloag come in from the advance guard before we saw the Kaffirs. He rode up to Captain Lendy. We went on all together. The firing began after we had come up to the Kaffirs. We galloped up. The men ahead of us fired the first shot—the advance guard. I could not see who fired first. I heard the shot, the advance guard was close. We could see the men shooting, but I could not say who it was. I did not see any Matabele shooting. I did not see them fire a shot at all. We got close. The first shot was about 200 or 300 yards, and then we got close, but at all sorts of distances. I did not see any Matabele on our side (the left) shoot back. They were all running away on the flat. I fired about four shots, the others must have fired more.

(*Account in Statement A. read.*)—Of course some got more bullets than one. I do not think more than 10 or 15 were shot. I never saw any kneel down and ask for quarter. I fought the rest of the war. I never saw any Matabele afterwards ask for quarter.

\* No. 10 in [C.—7290], February 1894.

By *Mr. Caldicott*.—I think what was done that day was justifiable and very necessary under the circumstances. I could not say positively whether the Matabele fired the first shot or not, but I do not think they did. When we first saw them there were about 30 Matabele; afterwards I should think there were about 200 spread about.

By *Mr. Newton*.—I saw some cattle belonging to white men in possession of the Matabele. We did not recover the cattle.

(Signed) H. POSSELT.

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Tenth Witness.—WILLIAM GEORGE NEAL, Prospector.

Was in Victoria in July last. Was out prospecting at the outbreak of hostilities on 9th, west of Victoria 30 miles, close on the border. We were called in by the police. We lost 18 head of oxen and over 70*l.* worth of goods. I have seen the oxen since, but I cannot get them. I saw them on the day of the fight in possession of the Matabele. We were in Victoria about a week before the indaba. I was a volunteer for the patrol that day. I rode out with the column. I was about eight from the rear, about midway. We went about 6 miles. We met the natives and the shooting started almost simultaneously. I saw them before the shooting began. They were going along at a jog trot. The shooting began with single shots, and then we all started. I was on Fitzgerald's left, when a Matabele fired at him. Fitzgerald fired and shot the native. We advanced at a gallop, and they were running in all directions. I got close to one, about 3 yards off; only that one. There were between 300 to 500 at the time the firing was going on. I saw nothing of a sick Induna being carried. I saw no native ask for quarter. The cattle already alluded to were recognised by me after the fight. They were in the native gardens. Captain Lendy would not let us take them. At the time we were searching for more Matabeles, and he said we had come out to find natives and not to get cattle. The Matabele, when they attacked our waggon on the 9th, and took our oxen,—the oxen were outspanned and feeding with the boy. The boy escaped into Victoria. They said to my partner, "We have come for you, we have come for you." My partner's name is Dunsterville. He replied, "I will have some of you first." Anyone who knows native laws knows that the seizing of cattle is a declaration of war. That act was a declaration of war against the whites.

By *Mr. Caldicott*.—When Captain Lendy stopped us taking the cattle he did not want to hamper his force. I think he was right, as it might have endangered the lives of the men in charge of them. We did not know what was going to happen, as firing was still going on.

(Signed) W. G. NEAL.

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Eleventh Witness.—JOHANN WILLIAM COLENBRANDER, Native Agent for the British South Africa Company.

First came here in 1888, and have been here off and on ever since. I accompanied Baviaan and Mushette to England. I was born in Natal. I have been amongst natives all my life. I lived on the borders of Natal and was always in Zululand. The customs of Zulu and Matabele are very much the same, in fact exactly. Their language is exactly the same, and also their practice and method in warfare. The Matabele are more cowardly however, and bigger thieves.

(*Extract read from Willoughby's letter: "The Matabele—been given.*)—I was through the whole of the Zulu war and afterwards with Usibepu in Zululand. Through' the whole of my experience I have only once come across a native that asked for quarter. They give none, and expect none. If they never ask for it then there can be no typical attitude of asking. As long as a native kept arms in his [hands], I should never consider such an attitude as that described in extract as one of submission. I gave a native quarter once, and he hit me on the head with a battle-axe (*showing scar*); had I not just guarded the blow he would have killed me. He said "baba" (father), and when I turned my head hit at me with his battle-axe. When saying "baba" he did not adopt the attitude described. I have never seen a native go on one knee as described yet. I should only consider he meant submission if he throw down his arms, but I have never seen them do that even,

By Mr. Caldicott.—I should consider the forcible taking of cattle by natives as an act of war on their part (see Neal's evidence), in fact a declaration of war; and they would consider it as such, and if after having committed such an act they had met with no retaliation they would have considered it a sign of weakness. And having captured cattle in their possession, they would be on the look-out, and consider themselves liable to be attacked at any time.

(Signed) J. W. COLLENBRANDER.

Twelfth Witness —MANYOW, sworn according to Matabele custom.

All that I said yesterday is true. (*Report of interview put in.*)

*Further Examination.*

The sun was still early in the day, and the doctor then told us that should we still be anywhere near when the sun was there (*pointing to about 4 o'clock*) he would talk to them in a different manner. The doctor said nothing about any rivers or border. After the doctor warned us at the indaba, some of our people went and killed some of the white men's servants. That is why the doctor's people shot at us. I could do nothing with the young men. I had with me the

Mhlahlanklela Regiment.		Mobawbeni Towns.
No Seika	do.	No Swananzi do.
No Lima	do.	No Lingo do.
No Linda	Towns.	Lizinda do.
Euxa	do.	Nogwetine do.
Ozinga	do.	

And we picked up a lot of stragglers—all the Amahoies belonging to these towns. In numbers about 2,500 warriors left Buluwayo, and I picked up about 1,000 Maholes.

EVIDENCE given by the Chief MANYOW before F. J. NEWTON, Esq., C.M.G., at Buluwayo, on the 22nd May 1894.

Manyow stated that he remembered the doctor at Victoria, and also Mr. Vigers. Manyow he is very sick, having lately had small-pox, with fever on him now. He is a coward, and had been afraid to come in before. He recognised Mr. Newton as the Queen's representative, and was willing to tell all he knew about the occurrences in Victoria last year. He was the head of the Matabele impi sent to the Victoria district, and was in command of the party who had an indaba with Dr. Jameson at Victoria. Umgandan was also there, second in command. He had brought one letter from the King, but the last one was brought by Umgandan. He gave his letter to Mr. Vigers, and remembered well what took place on the occasion. Dr. Jameson had told them that their men (Matabele) had killed Mashuna servants, and it would not be allowed. Dr. Jameson refused to give up the native women and children who had taken refuge in the fort, and ordered back the impi over the border, stating that he (Dr. Jameson) was in communication with the King direct.

He (Manyow) replied that he could not make his young people recross the border, and remembered that Dr. Jameson then told him and the older men who understood the thing to go back, leaving Dr. Jameson to settle with the young men. When Dr. Jameson had finished he said, "Now go, or I will drive you across," and he (Manyow) got up and left.

Then Umgandan said, "Very well, we will be driven across." Dr. Jameson told them distinctly that they had exceeded their orders by crossing the Shashi River, and that he was in communication with the King. When Manyow went back towards Magomoli's kraal the young Majakas went and looted a lot of trained cattle out of Mr. Vigers's kraal, including those belonging to the Company and to private individuals. Those cattle had never been returned. Some had also been captured before. Manyow tried to get the cattle given up, but the young men declined, and drove them back at the point of their spears.

" 83160.

...Umgandau also remained behind to drink water at a spring, and while resting under a shady tree got mixed up with the Majakas, with the other Indunas also resting with him. This was when the Majakas were driving the cattle off, and were being chased by the horsemen. Manyow then returned straight to the King, and told him all that had occurred. They all understood distinctly what Dr. Jameson had told to their faces, that he would drive them back beyond the Shashi. But although the matter was discussed between them all, the young men would not do so. Even afterwards on returning the young men raided more cattle, and left their Indunas behind.

The Majakas were in possession of the stolen cattle in their own camp when the white horsemen pursued them.

Manyow stated then, Dr. Jameson had previous to the same indaba sent a white man and a coloured boy to talk with the impi, and in the way, fortunate for them, that Manyow met them and took them under his protection, as otherwise they would have been killed, as he (Manyow) saw mischief in the eyes of the young men. Manyow took the two messengers away. There was only one sick Induna, and he was not carried. That was Umgandan, who was suffering that day from an attack of colic. He was the only one sick.

During the indaba Umgandau was very cheeky and constantly interrupted the doctor, who shut him up, saying that he did not want to talk to boys, but only with the men.

End of examination.

(Signed) CHARLES S. NORRIS NEWMAN,  
 Reuter's Special Commissioner  
 for Matabeleland.

Taken down from the oral translation by Mr. Johann Colenbrander, the Native Commissioner of Matabeleland, who interpreted.

Thirteenth Witness.—UMGENGWANE, Matabele Induna, sworn by Matabele custom.

Was with the body which was pursued by the patrol. We were some distance from the town, as far off as the big tree yonder (about 1 mile). The white men fired the first shot. There was a good many shots. We ran away to where part of our impi was and then cleared. We did not fire back, not the party that was with me, but I do not know if the others did. We were in open order, but pretty thick. I only know of two who were shot. No, I did not see them shot, or their bodies, but I was told so. When we first saw the white men some of us were moving, some sitting down, some drinking water. We were slow in starting; that is why we took so long. We did not start till late. The Majakas went to Makoombi's kraal after the indaba, and overtook us when they were pursued. I was not with Umgandan.

By *Mr. Caldicott*.—We Indunas had decided to return, but we had a row with the young fellows, who called us cowards, and said they were going to stay behind, and they went out raiding on their own account. Manyow did his best to stop these young fellows from going out, but he could not. The Majakas went straight to Makoombi's kraal to raid it. They were there in the kraal raiding when the white men came up with them. That is when the shooting began.

Manyow (recalled).—We only know of nine men shot—men killed; there are one or two still missing, but they may have run away.

#### FOURTH DAY.

25th May 1894.

Fourteenth Witness.—KENNETH GLOAG, in the employ of the Bechuanaland Trading Association.

Was at Victoria last July. Was then book-keeper in the Bechuanaland Trading Association store. Was corporal in the Victoria Rangers. Was in the fort on the 18th July on the morning of the indaba. Was on duty in the fort. I was on the wall and saw the natives. I did not hear anything that took place. After the indaba we were warned for mounted patrol after lunch. We fell in about two hours, say,

after the indaba, and we rode out in half-sections. I was the second half-section from the front. Up to a certain distance, about 2 miles, I was with the main body. Then Captain Lendy told Sergeant Kennelly to take a section as an advance party. Sergeant Kennelly, myself as corporal, a man named Campbell, Arthur Brooks, and Wienand Bezuidenhout from Mafeking. We cantered off about 500 yards, and kept that distance ahead. We went at a walk across the veldt in a south-west direction. We had gone about half a mile when I saw some natives. I said they were Matabele, and Kennelly asked me if I was sure? I said "Yes, cannot you see their shields and assegais?" They were about half a mile off. When I first saw them they were travelling. I think I saw them before they saw us. Kennelly said, "How many do you think there are." I said from what we could see there were about 65. He told me to count, we varied from 60 to 80. He told me to go back and report to Captain Lendy there were about 65 Matabele travelling in a north-westerly direction. I reported to Captain Lendy as Sergeant Kennelly told me. I rode slowly at his left side, while he had some conversation with Lieutenant Fitzgerald. He then told me to return to my post. That was all he told me. When I had gone about 250 yards, I heard him yell out to me to "Halt." I faced round immediately. I then heard Captain Lendy say distinctly, as an order to me, "Commence firing." I waited to hear the order repeated. I heard it repeated by several voices. I immediately went off as hard as I could to Kennelly and told him what the orders were. Kennelly then fired from his horse one shot. I dismounted and fired a second shot. They were some distance off. I fired immediately after Kennelly. Kennelly's was the first shot I heard. The rest of the party then came up, and the firing became general. The natives were, I should say, then about 300 yards off. We then scattered about, cantering forward, and dismounting and shooting. I went off towards the right towards Magamoli's. I got quite close to one native. I did not shoot. I was thrown from my horse who went into a game pit. I went over his head. I got up and went on. I did not see any cattle amongst the natives when we first saw them. We saw cattle afterwards when we went about with Lendy, after the retire bugle sounded. They were cattle the Matabele had stolen. They had evidently been in possession of the natives whom we attacked.

When we first saw them there was no man being carried among the lot we attacked. I never heard of it before now. It was impossible that there should have been one. I was most of the time with Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald fired at a native and rode on. The native dropped, and after we had passed him he fired from a blunderbuss. He missed Fitzgerald. We both rode on. I do not know whether he was afterwards killed. I turned round and said, "He is shooting at us." Fitzgerald said, "Oh, it is just a dying shot; it is no good firing a second time." I did not myself see any natives shooting back. There was a lot of firing going on.

(*Extract about quarter: "The Matabele—given" read.*)—I never saw a Matabele hold up his shield. I should think if he did so he was protecting himself. If he wanted to give in he would throw it down. I never saw a Matabele in the attitude described. I have had some experience of natives. The attitude described is a fighting attitude, not one of giving in. I think there were about 30 killed; I saw about 20. I did not count 20, there may have been more or less. We pursued them too fast, and we had good shots amongst us. Their idea was, I think, to get to the main body, and then turn on us. We knew where the main body was, and rode accordingly to cut them off.

(Signed) KENNETH B. GLOAG.

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Fifteenth Witness.—EDWIN AMALRIC SLATER, Auctioneer.

Was at Victoria last July. Was auctioneer and hotel-keeper then. Was in the fort on the day of the indaba. I was under arms with the rest. I heard part of the conversation. I heard the doctor say they must go away at once and not come near Victoria. I remember the old Chief saying he could not help it; he could not control his young bloods. Those Europeans that had horses had orders to saddle up and be ready. We fell in about 3, and left about 4. We rode out at a walk and an occasional canter. I was not in the line, but I was on the right side of the column close to Captain Lendy. When we got about 6 or 7 miles from camp we saw some natives. I said to Captain Lendy; "There are some natives ahead." That was

before the message came from the advance guard. Immediately after the message came in the natives I saw were moving; they appeared to be coming to a kraal on our right, which they had looted before. They (the natives) were on our left front. We came across some cattle. That was after the fighting. Ten cattle there were that belonged to Dunsterville. The natives whom we attacked were in possession of those cattle. The cattle were recovered sometime afterwards. After the message came we advanced, dismounted, and fired. We were going at a canter. We got right up to them. I was well mounted. We got right round them, and turned the left portion of them. There were about a dozen natives there where I was. I saw no native being carried. I am perfectly certain there was not one. I did not see any native shoot back, but I was told one had shot at Fitzgerald. It was considered he had had a most wonderful escape, having been fired at a few yards off. I saw the natives as soon as anybody. I was the first to point them out to Lendy. I should not say it was correct to say they were retreating; of course they retreated when they saw us coming on charging them. It was too late for them to resist; we ran them down. My idea is they were raiding about when we came upon them. They did not believe what the Doctor had said, and thought they might do as they liked. I saw a few men killed. The number killed was roughly computed at 30. I saw about nine bodies. I saw no case of a native asking for quarter and being shot.

(“*Quarter*” extract read.)—I never saw anything like that. I am sure it never occurred. The shields were not very little. I saw no sign of submission. They held up their shields, and threw an assegai or two. They most of them had guns.

By *Mr. Caldicott*.—I have been in South Africa about 15 years. I think the action of that patrol under Captain Lendy was necessary and justifiable in the interests of the country.

Seven of my servants were killed by the Matabele. Five were caught when out cutting grass, and two were taken off the wagon and stabbed and left in the road.

(Signed) E. A. SLATER.

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## FIFTH DAY.

26th May 1894.

Sixteenth Witness.—THOMAS ARTHUR CHALK, Sub-Inspector B. S. A. Company's Police.

Was in Victoria last July, was then Second Class Sergeant in the Company's Police. Before the 9th July an impi had been close to Victoria raiding. I accompanied Captain Lendy to interview the Induna of that impi. Captain Lendy spoke to him, and told him they were coming too close to Victoria. He also gave him a note to Loben. from himself. He wrote it there himself, when we met the impi. He explained to the Induna he was Loben.'s friend. Loben. had given him the road to Buluwago, and in the note he wrote words to the effect that the impi was coming too close to the town of Victoria. The Induna said he would deliver the note and would take the impi away. We left him; we did not hear of them close to Victoria again. On Sunday, the 9th, I heard that natives and cattle were rushing through the town. We (the police) saddled up immediately, rode down the Magamoli Road a little past the hospital, where we met a great crowd of them. I stayed there, while some of the other police rode among them on the commonage, close up to the Vicarage. The impi itself was besieging Magamoli's eight miles off. That week the people there were reduced to great straits for food and water, even to drinking their own urine. For that week an old Mashuna Chief, Mazibili, close to Victoria, took refuge in the fort with his people. The country all round was being raided. Natives (Mashunas), assegaid, were lying on the road within a mile of the township, and several other bodies were found further off. Magamoli's people were reduced to absolute starvation. Although Manyow, the chief of the Matabele, had a note from Loben. to Captain Lendy, he did not deliver it until we rode out to Magamoli's and got it. It was a note to the effect that his impi were going to punish the Mashunas round Victoria; and he requested that no notice should be taken of them. A herd boy belonging to a farmer called Eksteen was killed by them. All the white men's cattle were scattered over the country. Some taken by the Matabele, others lost because the herds were either killed or had run away. Previous



to that, Manyow, when he first came in, said the white men's cattle would be given up. The second time, when he came to see Captain Lendy, he saw the native women and children who had taken refuge in the fort, and asked Captain Lendy to give them up to him, saying, "I won't pollute your water, I will take them over the stream," meaning to kill them. Captain Lendy said, "No, show me any that have done any harm or wrong, and I will try them, and if guilty will hand them over." Manyow insisted on having them, saying he must have them all. Captain Lendy would not give them up. Manyow then went away in a rage. Said he would not give over the cattle. We all went into the fort then. The place had been in a state of siege for some time. When the Administrator came down I was sent out with an escort to find some Matabele to tell them that the great White Chief had come down and that their Chief must come in and have an indaba. They said something to me which Mr. Brabant translated as, "When are we to be allowed to fight the white men?" I replied that I did not know. The place was in an absolute state of siege, nothing but night and day patrols. The outside stores all had to come in, bringing their stuff with them. I was one of the escort who went out to bring the natives in to the indaba. They were coming in a large body, and four of us, under Fitzgerald, met them 300 yards from the entrance to the fort, and told the Chief and those of his people who were coming in that they must leave their arms. They laid down their arms and went up. I was present, and standing within 12 yards. I did not hear all that was said, as I am deaf. I heard towards the finish the doctor tell Manyow that he had lied several times. I heard the doctor ask Manyow if it was a fact that he had said that he was unable to control his young men, and Manyow replied, "Yes, it was so." The doctor then said, "Well, you and your old men go away quietly, and leave me to deal with your young men." The doctor said he would give them either one or two hours to clear out. The interpreter defined the time by pointing at the sun. Ungandan, a minor chief—a young man, had been interrupting during the greater part of the indaba; and he went away very cheekily. He was offensive in his manner.

We waited from two hours to two hours and a half. Some were saddled up and some got the order at the end of that time. I was in charge of the police; there were four or five of them. We left about 2.30 or 3, and rode along for about an hour. I was in the rear. We took the right of the line and Captain Lendy went out left in front. The force was composed of Victoria Rangers, burghers, and police. I heard firing in front of the line. We went in column of half-sections, when the firing began, and as we got up they extended. The bugle sounded, "commence firing." There was one shot fired before the trumpet sounded. I could not say from which direction the shot came. I am perfectly sure I heard a shot fired before the trumpet went. I could not say from which direction the shot came. I cannot locate sound, as I am deaf in one ear. The shot was certainly fired before I heard the trumpet. He might have sounded "commence firing" more than once. I do not know who was trumpeter. My impression is, it was Weal. He is probably in Victoria now. Mr. Vigers would know. We were then in an extended line. We were slightly in rear, on the right. I was riding close to Captain Lendy, when I myself first saw the Matabele. They were running away, and we were pursuing them. We got within 200 or 300 yards. That was the closest I saw at any time. We were cantering, dismounting, shooting, and so forth. I did not see any natives actually drop to a shot, but I saw them on the ground, dead. I saw about four or five. It is impossible to estimate how many there were killed. I do not think there were as many as 30. I saw nothing of a sick Induna being carried. I never heard of it, until you mentioned it now. I never saw or heard anything of natives asking for quarter, and being refused. From my knowledge of the Matabele, I should say, they are not in the habit of asking for quarter. This would not apply to the Maholes (serfs). Personally I saw no show of resistance. Captain Fitzgerald, however, told me a man jumped up, out of the grass, and shot at him. He shot him dead. I have no means of saying what the Matabele were doing when we overtook them, as I was quite in the rear. There were some cattle about. I first saw them just before the "cease firing" sounded. I believe they were driven in. I do not know whom they belonged to. It appeared to me that the cattle were driven away by the natives we attacked. The appearance of those who ran away, and those who were shot, was that of young men—Majakas. A majaka is a young unmarried warrior, a generic name for soldier. I have no means of saying, who fired the first shot. All I know is, I heard a shot fired before I heard the "commence firing" sounded.

(Signed) T. A. CHALK,

Enclosure 3.

## VICTORIA.

FIRST DAY.

11th June 1894.

Seventeenth Witness.—PETER FORRESTALL, Trooper in B. S. A. Company's Police.

Was at Victoria last July, was there farming. Had been in the Company's police before. Was farming four miles west of Victoria, the time before the impi came. First I saw of them was Sunday the 9th. My herd told me the Matabele were clearing off with my cattle. There were over 100 head, I lost 50. They were split in two lots by the Matabele. I caught up one lot and demanded them back, and said I would get the Induna to give them back, if they were not returned. They then returned about 50. The others I never saw. While I was away from the kraal, five Matabele came there and killed my Mashuna herd. The others ran away into the hills. I saw the boy lying dead, stabbed in two places. The other boy was a Swazi, and they did not touch him. I went into Victoria at once. On my way I met large parties of Matabele, close to the town, and found the town in a state of excitement. I attached myself to the Police for duty, and was with them when Dr. Jameson arrived. I was one of the five men who went out to tell the Matabele to put down their arms before coming to the indaba. They asked why they should while we were armed. We replied that white men, on going to see Lobengula, had to go unarmed. They eventually did so. About 20 to 30 followed us to the fort gates. I was present at the Indaba. I remember the doctor spoke to Manyow, as to why they came in, and Umgandan tried to interfere several times. The doctor told him he was only speaking to Manyow, as he was the Chief. The doctor told Manyow that he had heard his young men were unruly, refusing to give up cattle, &c. He told him he could leave the young men if they did not want to listen, and he (Manyow) could go home. Then he eventually told him, he would give him an hour to be on his way towards the border. Mr. Napier, the interpreter, pointed at the sun to express one hour. I am quite clear he said to be on his way towards the border. At that time the Matabele Impis were all round the town. The doctor got up then. The Chief sent in to ask him where the border was. The doctor told him they knew. That was all. We then came in the fort. We waited nearly two hours, and then went out under charge of Captain Lendy. That was sometime in the afternoon. I was in the rear. The burghers were marched out first. We went out at a walk, out amongst the hills about four miles. There was firing in front. We all went forward. When I got up there were not many Matabele to be seen. The ground was very broken Kaffir land—rice fields with deep furrows. I do not think I saw more than 10 while we were advancing. I saw two shot. I got up about 200 to 300 yards up to them. I never saw anyone (Matabele) nearer than 100 yards. My impression is when the firing began, there were a few single shots, and then the firing became general. I do not know that any turned round and showed fight. I did not see any. I was too far behind. They were armed with guns—some of them—and all that I saw had shields and assegais. In the beginning I was too far behind to tell what the Matabele were doing when we first came up with them. After the retreat sounded, we were much scattered. I was on the right flank with Mr. Napier. We went towards Makoombi's kraal. We saw a lot of Matabeles there all round the kraal, apparently attacking it. Mr. Brabant was with me. Both the Posselts, and Mr. Geer and Stead. I heard shots from the kraal, not Martini shots but blunderbuses. I suppose those shots were fired by Mashunas defending themselves against the Matabele. This was soon after the retreat sounded. There were about 10 of us. While looking at the natives about 100 Matabeles came out behind some rocks, just in front of us. We were moving towards the kraal. They then turned to the left through some bush. We had some shots at them, but did not follow, as we heard the retire sound again. We fired two long range shots at the Matabele while they were attacking Makoombi's kraal. It was almost 1,000 yards. I then rode with a message

from Captain Napier to Captain Lendy to tell him the Matabele were attacking Makoombi's. Captain Napier soon followed me and we all went to Makoombi's, but the Matabele had all gone then. The Mashunas came out of the kraal, and were very glad that we had driven the Matabele away. We rested a few minutes there, and then returned to camp. I never saw anything to give me the idea that the Matabele even asked for quarter. We came up with several head of cattle when we were advancing. They looked to me as if they had been in the possession of the Matabele, and were left behind in their retreat. I saw no Matabele resisting. Those we saw were, I think, the rearguard in charge of Umgandan, who when he left the camp, certainly gave us the idea he meant to fight.

Before the doctor came down I had been sent in charge of two men to find any stray Matabele to take a message to Manyow, to tell him the white Induna was coming down, and that he wished to see him. I came across about 50 getting grain from a kraal near here. All ring-kops and armed. They would not listen when I asked them to come down. And I galloped round the kopje to cut them off. They sat down with their rifles in their hands. I gave my message. They said I would have to go on to the Chief. I eventually persuaded them to take the message themselves. I am quite clear in my recollection as to what the Doctor said to them, about giving them an hour to be on their way. It never occurred to me that they were given an hour to cross the border as that would have been an impossibility. I never heard that construction put upon it. We thought we were going to be attacked that night.

(Signed) PETER FORRESTALL.

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## SECOND DAY.

12th June 1894.

Eighteenth Witness.—ARTHUR WOODFORD BROOK, farmer, near Victoria.

Was on my farm in Victoria last July. Three and a half miles from Victoria northwards. I remember the Matabele impi coming on the 9th July, Sunday morning. My Mangwato boy told me they were coming. About 200 came to my house. I sent boy to see where the cattle were. He did not go far when he was seized. I took him away from them. Told them he was a Mangwato, and told Chief to leave my cattle alone. The Chief was Umgandan. Shortly after I saw my cattle being driven away about a mile off across the river. I told the Chief to send after them. He sent a boy, but did not bring them back. I went after them myself with the boy, and got them back about three miles from the house. On the way I had great difficulty in preventing them from molesting my boy. I got those cattle back. About half my herd. On returning I found the Chief was gone and the remainder of the cattle I had left behind. I have never got them back, except one bull. I came into town the next day, Monday. On the way I found the body of a Mahole boy who had been working for me. That same day I went with Captain Lendy and about 20 men to try and get the cattle back. The Chief admitted he had my cattle, and would send them back, but they never came. I then stayed in camp as a volunteer. I was mounted in the fort square while the indaba was going on. I could not hear what passed. About an hour or more after, we started off under Captain Lendy. We were in half sections. I was in front, and afterwards in the advance guard. The advance guard was sent out after we had gone out about 1½ miles. There were six of us. Kennelly (the late Adjutant) was in charge. Gloag, myself, Campbell, Davis and another. I am not quite certain Davis was there.\* We went about two miles further, and saw about 50 or 60 Matabele. We all saw them about the same time, about a quarter of a mile off. We could hardly count them. There were a few stragglers and then a lump of them. The stragglers were joining the others. They were coming from the south to the north. They were not hurrying themselves. I remember two stopping and turning round. Kennelly sent back Gloag to tell Captain Lendy we had sighted 50 Matabele, as he reckoned. I heard him tell Gloag. We were out of sight of the column, about 500 or 600 yards in front. We halted. Gloag came back and told us we were to commence firing. He told that to Kennelly. Gloag was very excited. He shouted as he came along that we were to commence firing, but we waited until he got up to us. By that time the party of

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\* He was not.—F.J.N.

Matabele had rounded a small kopje in front of us, so we had to gallop some distance to sight them again. This was after the order was received to commence firing, but before any shot was fired. When we sighted them, Kennelly sent three one side of the kopje, and he, myself, and Gloag, the other side. We came in sight again, and they disappeared behind the rocks. It gave me the idea they were taking up a position. Then two showed up on a paddy field, right up against the kopje, and we all dismounted. Kennelly was the first to fire, and I was next. Kennelly fired the first shot. There was some shooting the other side, about the same time. There were three or four shots, I should think, and I do not see how they could all have been fired by our men. Some might have been fired by the Matabele. I did not see the Matabele fire any shots. I did not see the Matabele fire at all, but I was on a very bad horse, and when the main body came up, I was soon left behind. I only saw two men shot; almost immediately after we fired first. The main body came up, and we all advanced at a gallop. The Matabele retired. It would have been quite easy to have stopped and shown fight. I think if they fled, it was more to draw us on to the main body, the big impi, which was at Magamoli's. There was one Matabele who was hidden in the grass. He got up right amongst us. There were about six of us together. Harris was one, and I think Stokes. The Matabele was shot. He had a rifle, but did not shoot. He was shot at once.

(*The Extract marked B. read.*)—That is an extract from a letter I wrote. I do not think my estimate of the killed is correct. I think there were between 20 and 30 killed at the most. No doubt there were many more Matabele there than we first sighted.

(*Extract re quarter from Willoughby's letter read.*)—I saw nothing that could make me confirm that statement. I heard nothing. I was in the rest of the campaign and never heard them asking for quarter. I should say the incident described there is improbable.

I saw nothing during the day committed of a treacherous and cruel nature. As a member of that force on patrol, I do not consider that anything that was done on that day was anything to be ashamed of. I saw some cattle on our return after the "retire." There were, I think, about 20 bullocks. They were evidently being carried away by the party we had attacked. My impression at the time was that those cattle were in the possession of those men.

After the order to fire we must have ridden three or four miles. Some went much further than the others.

By *Mr. Caldicott.*—I saw four dead Matabele. I estimate the dead at about 30, from what I hear. I should not dispute the fact, as stated by Manyow, that there were only nine killed.

(*Extract read from B. re what Dr. Jameson said to Manyow about crossing the border.*)—That is only what I heard from others. I was not present at the indaba, and do not adhere to that statement.

By *Mr. Newton.*—I do not consider, from what I saw of the Matabele when we first saw the party under Umgandan, that they were making a bonâ fide attempt to leave the country as instructed previously by Dr. Jameson.

(Signed) A. W. BROOK.

June 13th.

*On previous oath:—*

I saw nothing of a sick Matabele being carried by the others. Being on the advance guard I should probably have seen him, if he had been amongst the first lot. There were several parties, but I saw no one being carried.

On our side of the kopje we were the first to fire. Kennelly fired the first shot. That was the first shot fired in the day. On the other side of the kopje, I cannot say which side fired first.

(Signed) A. W. BROOK.

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Nineteenth Witness--JOHN SOMERSET BRABANT, Native Commissioner for Victoria District.

Was in Victoria last July. Was then sergeant in the Victoria Rangers. On Sunday, 9th July, I heard the Matabele were near, and in the afternoon I saw them coming into

the town. I know that during that week they raided the Mashunas all round the town (in Zimundu's district). They took the Mashunas' cattle. They took between 50 and 60 of Forrestall's cattle. They took Bezuidenhout's post cattle, and Brook's cattle, and some of the Civil Commissioner's cattle.

On Monday, the 17th, Dr. Jameson arrived. Everybody was there in laager in the fort. Dr. Jameson sent me to warn the Chiefs, Manyow and Umgandan, that he wanted to see them the next morning. I warned the Chiefs through some of their men. The next day they came in with 200 or 300 men. The doctor then sent me to tell them he only wanted the Chiefs, not all the men. The Chiefs were rather obstinate. They eventually came in themselves. The doctor interviewed them. I was present. I was not interpreter. Napier was interpreter. I heard all that passed. I understand the language perfectly. The doctor asked Manyow who had sent him? Manyow said the King had sent him. The doctor asked him if the King had sent him to raid white men's cattle, and stab people. Manyow said, yes. The doctor said he was a liar. Umgandan tried to speak. The doctor told him to keep quiet as he was not head Chief, but was mumbling and laughing the whole time. The doctor asked Manyow, "Can you keep your young men in control?" Manyow said, "No." The Doctor said, "Well, then, leave them behind, and I will manage them." Meaning that Manyow himself was to go on, and if the young men would not go, the doctor would see after them. He then told Manyow he would give him an hour to make a move over the border; and Manyow asked him what he meant by the border; and the doctor said he knew quite well where the border was. He was to be on the move towards the border, not to be over the border. The border is about 15 or 20 miles from here where they crossed. Mr. Napier interpreted to him that he must get his men on the move within an hour. The Matabele have not got hours. Napier pointed to the sun, and when it would be an hour. Manyow understood that. It was simply impossible, and out of the question, that Manyow and his impi should be across the border in an hour. It was not taken that way by Manyow, or any of the others present. None of the Europeans put that construction on it. There were only three of us there who thoroughly understood the language—Mr. Napier, Mr. Read, and myself. Manyow went away, I am sure, clearly understanding that he and his men had to be moving in an hour.

We waited about an hour and forty minutes, and then we went out along the road. We rode about three miles out. I was riding in the third section, of which I had charge. When the advance guard went out, my section became the second. I was riding outside the line on the right. I had been flanking and just joined the main body again, when we sighted some Matabele. I saw them myself. We all saw them about the same time. We could see the advance guard moving on slowly, and the natives moving on ahead of them. When we first saw the Matabele, they were taking their time; some of them had been raiding, and were carrying grain, just coming from a kraal. Umgandan was there too. I did not see any cattle with that lot. I heard a shot fired from the Matabele. I saw it fired. It was on our right front. It was just about the time the advance guard sent the message back. I think it was Umgandan who fired the shot, because a rifle was picked up by the Makalakas afterwards, which looked very much like Umgandan's, which I had seen before. He was the only man I saw with a rifle that afternoon. It was a Martini. There were Matabele with rifles on the right, because I heard heavy firing from there. The shot was fired just as Captain Lendy's message to the advance guard was leaving. That was the first shot I heard or saw fired. After that we advanced in skirmishing order. We found the Matabele. They were running between 200 or 300 yards, dodging in the long grass. We advanced on the main body walking. We got within about 200 yards of them. The only shot I saw fired by the Matabele was the one above-mentioned. I heard some of the Matabele say, "Stand, why are we running?" They continued to retreat. On the right they stood and Captain Fitzgerald was nearly shot by one of them. The "assembly" then sounded, and we were coming back when we saw Makoombi's kraal besieged by them (the Matabele). We fired a couple of shots at 800 or 900 yards to the right of the kraal. The Matabele rushed out of the kraal. We fired a couple more at 600 or 700 yards, but none of them were hit. They ran off to the right. We went straight to Makoombi's kraal. After we fired the first two shots the Matabele left. The Matabele had been besieging that kraal for some time, and had had several fights there. They had taken all the cattle. We then came back to camp. I myself fully expected an attack on the Victoria laager that night, as Umgandan had said, as he was walking away from the doctor in the morning, "We must collect all our men and

"drive the white men out of this." I heard him say that. I do not think Napier or Reed heard him. I was mounted, standing behind him.

When we first came upon the Matebele, I do not consider they were retiring as Dr. Jameson had instructed them. From what Umgandan had said that day, and on previous occasions when I had to interpret, I think that he never meant to move at all. When I saw them, they were coming from the left side, the south, where they had been raiding; and were moving north towards the main body. There were about five or six at first, and then there were more—between 30 and 40. It is hard to say how many there were killed: I only saw two. I do not think there were as many as 30 killed that afternoon. I am quite clear on the point that I saw a Matebele fire a shot before Captain Lendy's order to commence firing reached the advance guard. I never saw anything like buck-shooting (*extract from A. read*), I do not believe it occurred. I saw one man, Umgandan, himself with two bullets in him. He was shot at about 300 yards. Sergeant Stead shot him. As he fired, he said: "I've hit him."

(*Extract from (Statement D.) letter, "Captain Lendy then ordered . . . six yards away," read*.)—That is untrue; all the shots I saw fired by any of our men were over 200 yards away. I never saw any potting at men 5 or 6 yards off.

(*Further extract, "The Matabele . . . been given," read*.)—I know nothing whatever about that. It is not a likely thing. A Zulu, especially a Matebele, will die fighting. Will never ask for quarter. I never heard of a Matebele asking for quarter. The attitude described is not natural. A Kaffir would throw his arms away in token of submission. That is my experience of what a native would do, and has done in such a case. I have known that happen in this last expedition. I have seen several throw their arms away in token of submission. I did not see it on this occasion. Had the doctor not taken the step he did on that day, the Company might as well have withdrawn. Had he not done anything, the general public would have taken it up. I consider all the acts of the patrol on that day were entirely justifiable. They could not have been more lenient. Besides driving away the Matabele as described, the patrol also relieved Makoombi's kraal, and saved the grain from being burnt.

The Matebele were not retiring at all when we went after them. They were simply dawdling about, waiting to see what would happen next. Umgandan, I am certain, wanted to fight and was hanging back.

(Signed) J. S. BRABANT,  
Native Commissioner.

Twentieth Witness.—WILLIAM EKSTEEN, Trooper in the British South Africa Company's Police.

Was in Victoria last July. I had been farming about 18 miles to the north of Victoria. Early in July, about 30 Matabele came to my farm. I asked what they wanted. They said they had come to punish some Makalakas for stealing the King's cattle. Most of the Matabele were drunk from Kaffir beer, and were very impertinent, asking for presents, looking into huts, and asking where my boys were. I pointed out my cattle, which they did not touch. They left, and went to a kraal near. There one of my boys an old Makalaka turned up. They stabbed him, and killed him. They killed another man that night, the head man of the kraal. That same night Brook and Wallace came out and warned me, and I came into camp, where I found everyone in laager. I was attached to the police and stayed in the fort. I was one of the escort who went out to stop the Matebele coming to the indaba with their arms. They left their arms behind when they were told. I was present at the indaba. I heard Dr. Jameson tell them to be on the move towards the border within an hour's time. I never heard it said that he told them to be across the border within an hour. That would be an impossibility. It is from 20 to 25 miles off.

After the indaba, about two hours, we went out. I was one of the patrol. I was almost the rear half section with the police. About four miles out, I heard a couple of shots, two or three. I just saw the smoke, just in front. I could not see who fired the shots. They were rifle shots. The smoke was almost 500 yards or more. Then the firing became general. We all raced up, and advanced. I saw no Matebele before the shots were fired. We were left in the rear. I only saw one Matebele lying down, that was Umgandan, who was shot. I saw two others running. I saw another body afterwards. When the bugle sounded, I was with Captain Lendy, and the others straggled back. Umgandan was shot in two places.

(Signed) J. W. EKSTEEN.

## THIRD DAY.

13th June 1894

Twenty-first Witness.—ROBERT MCCORMICK STROYAN, Sergeant in British South Africa Company's Police.

Was in Victoria last year. Was trooper in the police. The Matabele impi came here Sunday 9th July, was all round the town. I was one who accompanied Captain Lendy to interview Manyow, and those with him, I was one of Dr. Jameson's escort at the indaba. I heard what happened. I heard the doctor tell them he would give them an hour to be on the move towards the border. I think it was Mr. Napier who interpreted. I am certain that was what he said. He gave them an hour to leave. We remained here in the yard for an hour and forty minutes, then we went out to see where the Matabele were. The police were in the rear. I was in the last section. I did not see the start of the affair at all. I heard several single shots fired. Then the firing began generally. I was not in front to be able to see the Matabele, when they were first seen by our party. We rode out afterwards. When I saw them first, they were scattered all over the place. It is difficult to say how many there were. I should say there were 200 or 300. I got to within about 400 yards. They were moving off towards the kopjes. We did not know if they were going to fight in the kopjes or clear away. I did not see any shot. I saw some of them after they were shot. Only about three. I did not see any shoot back. I did not see any cattle. I did not see any Matabele being carried by the others. I do not know how many were killed. I do not think more than 20, not quite that either.

(Signed) ROBERT C. STROYAN.

Twenty-second Witness.—ALFRED DREW, Clerk to the Resident Magistrate, Victoria.

Was in Victoria last July in that capacity. I was here on Sunday the 9th July, and went out with Captain Lendy that afternoon. We met about 100 of them about 200 yards from the barracks and close to the hospital. They said in reply to Captain Lendy that they were following Mashunas. They stayed in the neighbourhood for the following week.

I remember Dr. Jameson coming here. I was sent out with Brabant and some others to bring in the Indunas. We told them to lay down their arms before coming in. They did not do it very willingly, but did eventually.

I was present at the indaba. I understood what took place through the interpreter.

I remember Dr. Jameson telling them they would have to make a move towards the border within an hour; I am sure he said that. The interpreter indicated by the sun what an hour was. He did not say they must be across by a certain time. Dr. Jameson said an hour. And the interpreter translated it by pointing to the sun. I never heard at the time such a construction put upon it, that they were to be across the border within an hour. I have heard of it since through the papers.

Just before the doctor told them they would have to clear out, he asked Manyow whether it was true that he had lost control of his young men. He said it was. The doctor told him he had better clear out with his old men, and he (the doctor) would look after the young ones.

Ungandan was a young man. He seemed to interrupt pretty often.

I was attached to the police. About two hours after the indaba, we rode out. I was in the rear of the column. The first shots fired were distinct and separate. There were two or three shots fired before the bugle sounded. I do not know who fired the first shot. It was said at the time it was Ungandan. I did not see it. When I got up to the front there were only two or three Matabele to be seen. They were about 500 yards off. I got to where Captain Lendy was and heard him give the order to "cease fire" and "assembly." That was about five minutes after the first shot was fired. I do not know how many men were killed. I thought at the time about 20. I only saw about four or five lying dead. I only saw about a dozen Matabele scattered about during the pursuit.

No horsemen hardly to be seen. We were in the rear of the column, on bad horses. I think Eksteen and Chalk were with me.

(Signed)

ALFRED DREW.

Twenty-third Witness.—MAKOOMBI, Mashuna Chief.

We were at our kraals, perfectly satisfied with the white men, who told us to plough, &c., when the Matebele came down and attacked us saying: "We don't want you to be mixed up with the white men, or to plough anywhere near them." They came down and surrounded my kraal, taking my cattle and women and children. This was in July. On the day the white men went out, the Matebele had surrounded my kraal. There were between 30 and 40. It is hard to tell the number. We could not see them all. They retired from the kraal as soon as the white men fired the shots. That was about 3 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The Matebele then cleared out and ran away. No, they never came back again. They had come from Magamoli's, where they had their scherms built. They had been to Mazibibis kraal as well. The Matebele killed three of my people, and wounded three. There were nine females, women and girls, taken away.

The Matebele were at my kraal on that afternoon, saying: "Come out, we want to kill you."

The killing of men and carrying off of women took place the day they arrived in the country. The women have never come back. They are in Madlodhli's district, near the Insinda.

My kraal is on a stone kopje, and the Matebele were besieging it on the day the white men went out. My kraal is close to the place where the white men pursued the Matebele. We could see the white men from my kopje.

There were only three proper Matebele shot, Umgandan and two others. The others were dogs. I heard there were about 20 of them killed. I saw four dead bodies.

MAKOOMBI                   his  
  +  
  mark.

Witness,  
J. S. BRABANT.

Enclosure No. 4.

**PALAPYE.**

18th June 1894.

Twenty-fourth Witness.—WILLIAM CHARLES WILLOUGHBY, Missionary of the London Missionary Society, at Palapye.

I do not know the actual writer of the letter, and have never known his name. And I cannot honourably furnish the name of the man who showed it me. I saw part of the original letter, and am absolutely certain it was a genuine letter. I am under the impression it was a family letter, certain portions of which probably were passages which it was undesirable for an outsider to see.

(*Extract read from the Rev. W. Willoughby's letter, re Dr. Jameson ordering impi across border.*)—I have no doubt that was the expression in the letter; although the distance to the frontier was probably not mentioned. The whole of the account in my letter is taken down from memory, after hearing the letter read. I listened with the object of making notes. I read parts of it myself. Very much of the language probably closely resembles that of the letter.



(*Extract about "quarter" read.*)—That remark is taken from the letter, and I made it the more readily because of other information received from other sources, for instance, the plea of the Chiefs to Lobengula, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, when he charged them with allowing their men to be shot down without offering resistance. I have lived much amongst natives worse than the Matebele. I have no experience as to giving quarter by natives in war; except that I heard that when Khama's fought Selika's, he gave quarter. The attitude described of the Matebele warrior is taken from the letter. If there is a passage which closely resembles the language of the letter, it is that one.

*Re statement from Matebeleland (previous paragraph of Willoughby's letter).* I think—I am sure, I heard that from Natives, or from white men from Matebeleland. I took a great deal of trouble to verify all I said. No one writing from here on that date (16th October) could have sent more carefully—acquired information than I did. Had I been seeking to send sensational news there was plenty here I could have forwarded; but it was not sufficiently authenticated. I could not give the name of the Chief in command, but I heard it at the time. I heard nothing more than what is said there as to the shooting of the sick Induna.

I know nothing more of the Victoria affair than what I have said on the 16th October. Now I can reconcile two contradictory statements about the entrance of the impi into the town. They entered the township according to map, but not according to actual buildings. The information I had about their not entering the town was from Native sources. The Europeans probably meant within the boundaries of the township according to a map.

(Signed) W. C. WILLOUGHBY.

Twenty-fifth Witness.—JOHN SMITH MOFFAT.

(*Extract, re quarter, read.*)—I think a Matebele might ask for quarter. In dealing with white men, it is likely. I cannot say they would adopt that attitude as described. I think they would put up their hands. I have seen a Matebele, when pursued, turn round and hold up his hands, to show he had nothing. I do not think a Matebele would give quarter. I think he would ask for it from a white man; he would believe in a white man's willingness to spare him.

The capture of cattle, as between two tribes, is certainly a declaration of war. The capture of white men's cattle and keeping it by Matebele would also be so. The Matebele would think himself liable to be fired upon, and open to reprisals.

(Signed) J. S. MOFFAT.

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Enclosure 5.

From NEWTON, Special Commissioner, Victoria Inquiry, to W. S. BASTARD, c/o Ch. Southey (to be forwarded), Culmstock, Middleburg Road.

23rd. Have just returned from Victoria. Am still getting evidence where possible on Victoria incident. I should be much obliged if you could give me your evidence, either personally or by affidavit sworn before a magistrate. I should be glad, if you would state what you know as to what passed at indaba on 18th July before patrol went out, when Doctor Jameson warned Manyow, and also the full account of the patrol under Captain Lendy, especially on following points: What were Matabele doing when hostilities actually commenced? Who fired the first shot? Did Matabele resist? Did you see them fire back? Was quarter asked by any Matabele to your knowledge and refused. Did you see anything of a sick Induna being carried, and alleged to have been shot? I think an affidavit dealing with these points would be sufficient. Will you post it to me at Vryburg?

F. J. NEWTON.

E 3

Before me, CHARLES SOUTHEY, Justice of Peace, appeared WILLIAM S. BASTARD, who being duly sworn says:—

On July 18th, 1893, the Matebele impi, about 2,000 in number, were encamped about nine miles from Victoria, and were besieging a Mashuna kraal, called Makoombi's. Dr. Jameson had the previous day sent out to them, to request the leading Indunas to come in and interview him. At about 10 a.m. on the 18th July, the Indunas and about 20 followers were seen approaching; they were escorted by the police just outside Fort Victoria, the Matebele having left their arms in the veldt. Dr. Jameson asked them what they were doing in the white men's country. They replied that they knew of no border between the countries, and that they had been sent out by their King, Lobengula, in order to punish the Mashunas for stealing the King's cattle, but that their King had instructed them, not to harm the white men. Dr. Jameson replied, that they were liars; the King had not sent them, and they were to leave the country at once, and if they did not leave, his young men would drive them; and finally gave them one hour to leave the country. Dr. Jameson then got up and the indaba was over. As the Matebele were dispersing, Mr. Brabant heard the Induna, second in rank, Umgandan, say, "We must drive them." Orders were shortly afterwards given for all available mounted men to get ready for active service. Thirty-eight men in all were mustered. And one hour and forty minutes after notice was given, the party rode off, in the direction of Makoombi's kraal, under the leadership of Captain Lendy. The column proceeded at a walk by half sections, and proceeded for about one hour and a half, when Sergeant Kennelly with a section of four men was sent forward as an advance guard, keeping in front of the main body about 500 yards. The Matebele when first seen, about 60 in number, were in small parties, some were sitting down at the foot of a kopjie, and others were driving on towards Makocombi's 10 oxen branded D, belonging to a transport rider, called Dunscombe. Immediately they were sighted, Captain Lendy gave the order to commence firing, which was sounded on the bugle. The main body commenced to charge, and the advance party commenced firing. I was riding near Sergeant Fitzgerald, and saw a Matabele fire steadily at him, at 50 yards, giving him a narrow escape. The men were at this time very much scattered, and a dropping fire was going on in different directions, when Captain Lendy caused the "cease firing" and "assembly" to sound, and the affair was over.

I neither saw nor heard of a Matebele asking for quarter. Nor did I see or hear, any report of a sick Induna having been shot, which report I believe to be wholly false.

(Signed) W. S. BASTARD.

Before me,  
CHARLES SOUTHEY, J.P.

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Enclosure No. 6.

From NEWTON to SPRECKLEY, Victoria.

27th.—Many thanks for sending on things, and all your trouble. I am anxious to get evidence of Weil, employed at Mashonaland Agency. He was trumpeter to patrol at Victoria on 18th. Will you ask him to make a statement by affidavit before you as to what he saw, heard, and did on that occasion, and particularly on following questions:—Who fired first shot? Did he hear shot fired before "Commence firing" was sounded? Did he sound "Commence firing" more than once? Who was with Captain Lendy when he gave the order? Please send copy of this telegram and of Weil's statement to Galdicott. I have informed him I am asking you to do this.

F. J. NEWTON.

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From ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, Salisbury, to NEWTON, Vryburg.


10th.—Your wire received. Weil's statement as follows:—

I, Mansel Edge Weil, of Victoria, in the territory of Mashonaland, make oath and say as follows: (1) I am at present in the employ of the Victoria District Gold Mining Company at Fern Spruit. (2) On the 18th July last year, when the Matebele were raiding in the

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MOCOMOLE'S KRAAL  
(Mashona)

— SKETCH —  
SHEWING MEETING  
OF  
EUROPEANS AND MATABELE  
NEAR  
**VICTORIA-**  
18<sup>TH</sup> JULY 1893.



T.N.

KAKOOMB'S KRAAL  
(Mashona)

PATROL OF  
WHITES  
AFTER  
FIGHT

FINAL HALT  
OF WHITES

POSITION OF BLACKS WHEN  
FIRING COMMENCED

CULTIVATED  
KOPJE

POSITION OF WHITES WHEN  
FIRING COMMENCED

LANDS

ADVANCE

Patrol

Tuli to Charter

VICTORIA

TOWNSHIP

From

MATABILI'S KRAAL  
(Mashona)

neighbourhood of Victoria, I was in the service of the British South Africa Company as forester, and was present at the interview Dr. Jameson had with the Indunas on that date. (3) I have a fair knowledge of the Matebele language. I heard Manyow asked by Dr. Jameson if it was true that he had lost control of his young men. Manyow replied that such was the case. Dr. Jameson then told him, he had better clear with his old men and he (Dr. Jameson) would look after the young ones. Dr. Jameson finally told them that he would give them one hour to make a move in the direction of the border, the interpreter indicating by the sun what an hour was. The Indunas then left, Umgandan, who had been insolent throughout the interview assuming a threatening attitude as he went away. (4) It was fully two hours after the departure of the Indunas that the patrol under Captain Lendy left to see that Dr. Jameson's orders had been obeyed. I was with the patrol as trumpeter. About three miles from camp I heard shots fired ahead, and immediately two or three of the advance guard returned and reported having seen a number of Matebele and having been fired upon. The patrol at once cantered up to the advance guard and firing then commenced on both sides, our men becoming scattered in all directions. I did not hear Captain Lendy give the order to "commence firing," nor did I sound it. Captain Lendy and myself, with two or three of the police who were in the rear of the patrol, remained near the spot where the firing commenced. As far as I can remember the police were Drew, Stroyan, and Chalk. I remember receiving the order to sound the "Cease fire" and "Assembly" from Captain Lendy, two or three minutes after the firing commenced. I sounded continuously for about five minutes; in that time the men assembled, and we returned to camp. (5) I did not think at the time that more than a dozen Matebele were shot.

(Signed) M. E. WEALE.

Sworn before me at Victoria this 30th day of June 1894.

(Signed) J. A. SPRECKLEY,  
Acting Resident Magistrate.

Enclosure No. 7.

LIST OF PATROL.

Dead.	Witnesses.	Absent.
Lendy, Captain R.A. (in command).	Brabant, J. S., Sergeant, Victoria Rangers.	Behan.
Dillon, B. S. A. Co. Police.	Brook, Volunteer.	Bezuidenhout.
Fitzgerald, Sergeant and Acting Adjutant B. S. A. Co. Police.	Chalk, T. A., Colour-Sergeant B. S. A. Co. Police.	Brown.
Judd, Volunteer.	Drew, A., attached to Police, clerk.	Campbell.
Kirton "	Eckstein, J. W., Volunteer farmer.	Clark.
Robertson "	Forestall, P., Volunteer, farmer.	Davis.
Welby "	Gloag, K, Corporal, Victoria Rangers.	Dreyer.
	Kennelly, W. P., Sergeant, Victoria Rangers, contractor.	Dunn.
	Lloyd, H. K., Corporal, Victoria Rangers, hotel-keeper.	Durden, B. S. A. Police.
	Napier, W., Captain, Volunteer, merchant.	Everard.
	Neal, Volunteer, prospector.	Harris.
	Posselt, H., Volunteer, farmer.	Harrell.
	Slater J. A., Volunteer, auctioneer.	Long.
	Stokes, H. L., Volunteer, Manager Mashonaland Agency.	Long, H.
	Stroyan, R Mc., Inspector, B. S. A. Co. Police.	Nochans.
	Weir, P. W., Volunteer, merchant.	Omatra.
	Evidence on Affidavit.	Stead.
	Bastard, J. S., Volunteer.	Stoddart.
	Weale, M. E., Volunteer, Trumpeter, forester, B. S. A. Co.	Swan.
		Wallace.
		Ware.
		Wilhams.
		Doubtful.
		Viljoen.
		McGeer.

Enclosure No. 8.

MAP.

## Enclosure No. 9.

SPECIAL ISSUE of the MASHONALAND TIMES containing full Particulars of the latest  
MATABELE RAID.

Price 1s.

Victoria, Thursday, July 20th, 1893.

Price 1s.

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*Topic of the Week.*

Space forbids any lengthy statement as to the present aspect of the Matabele question. Our opinions, fully expressed as far back as September last, have, from then until now, been repeatedly ridiculed by our Salisbury contemporary. Eight months ago, we stated what is now proved true, namely, that the Matabele would daily become more and more impertinent, with the result that during the last week they have taken some hundreds of cattle from the white man, first, in many instances, killing the Makalanga herds that were in charge. The presence of such a large body of natives as has recently been in the vicinity naturally causes alarm, while the loss of Makalanga servants, who promptly leave at the first prospect of trouble, means, at the least, mines shut down, and business at a standstill. From a statement made by the Administrator and published on another page, it will be seen that our opinions are now shared by both the Chartered Company as well as the public. Events have proved whether the credence placed in our statements by down-country journals has been "misplaced." To quote a favourite expression of the Editor of the Herald, he has certainly this time completed "the reductio ad absurdum," of the whole question.

## VICTORIA UNDER ARMS.

From the time when the British South Africa Company's force first entered Mashonaland, Matabele "scares," have been of frequent occurrence. Within the last 10 days, Victoria has been in a state which, to a stranger, would appear to imply that there was something more in the air than the usual rumour. On Sunday the 9th instant, there appeared in the neighbourhood of Victoria, an impi of Matabele, the numbers of which are variously reported at anything between three and six thousand. To commence the story at the beginning, about a month ago, a small party of Matabele made a raid on Bara's kraal, situated about 14 or 15 miles to the North-west. Captain Lendy, R.M. of the district, immediately left with a party of police, and interviewed the marauders, who then informed him that it was Lo Bengula's intention to send a large impi to thoroughly wipe out the Makalangas, whom the King accuses of crossing the Matabeleland border about 25 miles west of Victoria, and stealing cattle from outlying Matabele posts. Captain Lendy gave the leader of this party a letter to Lo Bengula, and on the 8th instant, received a reply, forwarded from Bulawayo by runners to Palapye, and thence by telegraph, stating that although a strong party was to be despatched to punish these Makalangas, the Induna in charge had strict instructions not in any way to molest the white man or to touch his property.

On Saturday, farmers in the neighbourhood saw the Makalangas running in all directions driving their cattle to the mountains. On Sunday afternoon, Victoria was disturbed from its accustomed sleepy condition by the arrival of Natives seeking protection from their enemies the Matabele. In the vicinity, within a mile of camp, might be seen small wandering parties on the watch for the fleeing Makalanga, while, in the distance, the rising smoke proclaimed that the raiders had adopted their usual course of wholesale destruction, burning kraals, crops, and all else that came in their way. But a few minutes had elapsed before the Resident Magistrate with a party of police had interviewed the parties near the camp. One and all told the same tale, that their

\* Not printed.

Induna would come in next morning with a letter from the King which would explain all. Under the circumstances, it seemed that something more than mere explanation was wanted. Taking into consideration the proximity of the Matabele and their large numbers, as learnt from the reports of the fugitives, Captain Lendy wisely determined to have everything in readiness in case of attack. Gatling and Maxim guns were mounted, and everything that could be done. Messrs. Forrestall, Dunstable, Brooks, and many others reported loss of cattle. Volunteers in readiness all night.

*Monday.*—Kraals burning all round during night. Captain Lendy with 26 men rode out to Matabele; about nine miles away fell in with a party of some hundreds; leaders stated that their "boss" Induna had gone into camp with letter. On return Lendy saw Induna, who produced letter from Lo Bengula, requesting resident magistrate to give up Makalaka who had stolen cattle. Lendy said would do so after proper trial. Induna left promising to send back white men's cattle. Fugitive Makalaka clearing through camp, a good number found assegai'd around camp.

*Tuesday.*—Patrols and guards all day and night. Kraals still burning. Burghers held meeting and elected officers (see page 44).

*Wednesday, Thursday, Friday.*—Prospectors and farmers come in from all parts. On parade Lendy states that men are turning out smarter on sound of alarm. Everyone sleeps at his post.

*Saturday.*—Various rumours afloat. Everyone wants to fight, and anxiously waiting for Dr. Jameson.

*Sunday.*—Rev. Sylvester, as military chaplain, holds service after parade for inspection of arms. The rev. gentleman stood on ammunition cases, and said that the sons of Ham would all be cleared out. He considered the Chartered Company had not quite forgotten its duty, it had left us four walls to get behind. Cricket match in afternoon.

*Monday.*—Dr. Jameson and Lieutenant Napier arrived. Everybody surprised and pleased at the doctor's attitude. Sergeant Chalk left with escort to inform the Matabele that "the great White Chief ordered their Indunas to come to an indaba." Fellows cheer the Officer Commanding every opportunity. Everyone full of military ardour. Mounted troop of 50 men inspected.

*Tuesday.*—The Administrator's action successful. Matabele indunas arrive. Dr. Jameson asks no question, simply tells them to clear within an hour or he will make them. One Induna remarkably impertinent. Two hours later mounted party under Lendy ride after Matabele; fall in with about 150 of the enemy who promptly clear, 30 being killed, including the impertinent Induna; no white man killed or wounded.

*Wednesday.*—Mounted troop report Matabeles cleared from neighbourhood.

#### THE COMPANY'S POLICY.

Dr. Jameson informs us that, although no details of the Company's intended action can yet be published, he is now in communication with Lo Bengula, and that the strongest measures will be taken to make Lo Bengula understand that these impis must now cease to come over our border. Great satisfaction is felt at Dr. Jameson's action.

#### GARRISON ORDERS.

By Captain G. F. LENDY, Officer Commanding.

Orderly Officer, Lieutenant DAIRS.

Orderly Sergeant, Sergeant SUMMERS.

Victoria, 11th July, 1893.

- (1.) All guards to fall in inside the Barrack Square at 11 p.m. daily.
- (2.) The volunteers will furnish a mounted patrol to-night, to leave camp at 3 a.m., and patrol from east to west north of the hospital, returning 6.30 a.m.
- (3.) The burghers still furnish a guard of eight men to be stationed at the Umchekwe Drift, double sentries to be posted and relieved every two hours, also eight men to be stationed at Umshagashi Drift.

(4.) In case of any unusual occurrence the non-commissioned officer in charge of guards will send one man to the Court House to report. Should the alarm sound, men will at once take up positions allotted to them.

(Signed) F. FITZGERALD,  
Acting Adjutant.

Victoria, 12th July 1893.

Orderly Officer, Lieutenant BRETT.

Orderly Non-commissioned Officer, Sergeant SMITH.

(1.) The police will find a mounted patrol to leave Camp at 11 p.m. and return at 2 a.m.

(2.) The Volunteers will find patrol of four mounted men; parade 2 a.m.

(3.) The burghers will find gate guard of six men.

(4.) Reveille will be sounded at 6.30 a.m. unless the assembly and alarm be previously sounded, in which case all will double to the fort and take up allotted positions.

(5.) In case of alarm men will take up positions without unnecessary noise or delay.

(6.) All duties to parade inside the Barrack Square.

(7.) After the sounding of the alarm no man will be allowed to leave the Barrack Square without permission.

(8.) Parade for inspection of arms daily at 5 p.m., everyone to attend.

(Signed) F. FITZGERALD,  
Acting Adjutant.

Victoria, 13th July, 1893.

Orderly Officer, Lieutenant DAIRS.

Orderly Non-commissioned Officer, Sergeant E. A. SLATER.

(1.) Caution is hereby given to all under arms that on no account are their rifles to be loaded unless in face of the enemy, or by order of the officer commanding.

(2.) The burghers will furnish for to-night a gate guard, consisting of one non-commissioned officer and six men.

(3.) The Victoria Rangers will furnish a mounted patrol consisting of four men to leave Camp at 3 a.m. and return at 6 a.m.

(Signed) T. A. CHALK,  
Acting Adjutant.

Victoria, 14th July 1893.

Orderly Officer, Sergeant KENNELLY.

Orderly Non-commissioned Officer, Sergeant J. V. WILLIAMS.

(1.) The police will furnish a mounted patrol of four men to parade at 11 p.m.

(2.) The burghers will furnish a mounted patrol of four men to leave Camp at 2 a.m. and return at 6.30 a.m.

(3.) The Victoria Rangers will furnish a main guard of one non-commissioned officer and six men to parade at 11 p.m.

(4.) Until further orders everybody will sleep within the precincts of the Barracks.

(5.) The burghers will furnish a picquet of one non-commissioned officer and six men to parade at 9 p.m.

(6.) Last post will sound at 11 p.m. by which time every inhabitant must be within the precincts of the barrack square.



(7.) There will be the usual parade for the inspection of arms and accoutrements to-morrow at 5 p.m.

(Signed) F. FITZGERALD,  
Acting-Adjutant.

*After Order.*

(1.) Any persons going sick will report themselves to their troop orderly non-commissioned officer who will report to the military surgeon (Dr. Lichfield) who will attend.

Victoria, 15th July 1893.

Orderly Officer, Captain NESBITT.

Orderly Sergeant, Sergeant P. H. BROWN.

(1.) The Victoria Rangers will furnish a mounted patrol of four men to parade at 11 p.m. and return at 2.30 p.m.\*

(2.) The burghers will furnish a mounted patrol of four men to parade at 2.30 a.m. and return at 6.30 a.m.

(3.) The burghers will furnish a main guard for the night consisting of one non-commissioned officer and six men, and a picket consisting of one non-commissioned officer and six men. Picket to parade at 9 p.m.

(4.) The police will furnish a patrol (mounted) to leave camp at 7 a.m.

(5.) Gunner Rixon is promoted to lance-sergeant from this date.

(6.) Captain Lord Henry Paulet having arrived, is taken on the strength, and assumes command of the Volunteers.

(7.) The T.O. non-commissioned officers will see that all prisoners get blankets and rations.

(8.) The O. non-commissioned officers will attend orderly room at 10 a.m. daily.

(9.) Any man wishing to draw rations will parade in front of the orderly room daily.

(10.) No man will be allowed to leave camp without permission from the officer commanding.

(11.) Troopers Forrestall, Campbell, and Collyer, are detailed to assist Sergeant Brabant in Native Contingent.

(12.) Until further orders first post will be sounded at 9.30 p.m. and last post at 10 p.m.

(Signed) F. FITZGERALD,  
Acting Adjutant.

By Captain F. C. LENDY, Officer Commanding.

Victoria, 16th July 1893.

Captain of the day, Captain NESBITT.

Orderly Sergeant, Sergeant FIRMIN.

(1.) The burghers will furnish a mounted patrol of four men to parade at 11 p.m. and return at 2.30 a.m., and a mounted patrol of four men to parade at 2.30 a.m. and return at 6.30 a.m.

(2.) The Victoria Rangers will furnish a main guard of one non-commissioned officer and nine men to parade at 11 p.m.

(Signed) F. FITZGERALD,  
Acting Adjutant.

Victoria, 17th July 1893.

Orderly Officer, Lieutenant BASTARD.

Orderly Sergeant, Sergeant KENNELLY.

(1.) The Victoria Rangers will furnish a mounted patrol of four men to parade at 11 p.m. and return at 2.30 a.m.

\* Sic. qy. "a.m."

(2.) The burghers will furnish a mounted patrol to parade at 2.30 a.m. and to return at 6.30 a.m.

(3.) The burghers will furnish a main guard of one non-commissioned officer and nine men to parade at 11 p.m.

(4.) Men who have been told off to horses are to hold themselves and horses in readiness to leave at a moment's notice.

(Signed) F. FITZGERALD,  
Acting Adjutant.

Victoria, 18th July 1893.

Orderly Officer, Lieutenant NAPIER.

Orderly Sergeant, Sergeant McPHERSON.

(1.) The burghers will furnish a mounted patrol of four men to parade at 11 p.m. and to return at 2.30 a.m.

(2.) The Victoria Rangers will furnish a mounted patrol of four men to parade at 2.30 a.m. and to return at 6.30 a.m.

(3.) The Victoria Rangers will furnish a main guard of one non-commissioned officer and nine men to parade at 11 p.m.

(4.) The Victoria Rangers will furnish a gate guard to parade at 7 p.m. until 9 p.m.

(5.) Men desiring to receive rations are to give in their names to Trooper Pease at the orderly room at 10.30 a.m. to-morrow.

(Signed) F. FITZGERALD,  
Acting Adjutant.

Victoria, 19th July 1893.

Orderly Officer, Lieutenant DAIRS.

Orderly Sergeant, Sergeant H. SMITH.

(1.) The Victoria Rangers will furnish a mounted patrol of four men to parade at 11 p.m. and to return at 2.30 a.m.

(2.) The burghers will furnish a mounted patrol of four men to parade at 2.30 and to return at 6.30 a.m.

(3.) Sergeant Kenelly is promoted to be Acting Lieutenant of the right wing Victoria Rangers from date. Corporal Hurrell is promoted to be Acting Lieutenant of the left wing of Victoria Rangers from date. Dr. Lichfield is appointed Surgeon Major of the garrison from this date.

(4.) No fires will be permitted within the compound, except in the camp kitchens. No slops will be allowed to be emptied within the compound, except in the pails provided for that purpose. No water is to be used from the tanks or barrels after 5 p.m.

(5.) Corporals McPherson and Wynnstanley are promoted to sergeants from this date.

(6.) Fort Quartermaster Sergeant McHattie is appointed Garrison Fort Quartermaster Sergeant and will attend stables.

(Signed) NEIL A. SWAN,  
G.F.S.-M., for Acting Adjutant.

#### PUBLIC MEETING.

A public meeting of the inhabitants of Victoria and district, was held on Saturday the 15th instant, in the Market Square.

Mr. E. A. Slater, speaking from a waggon, said that the meeting had been called to ask Dr. Jameson what protection farmers, prospectors, traders, and others might expect from the Company. The speaker said, that had not Captain Lendy acted as he had, we might all have been killed in a moment. (Here three cheers were given for Captain Lendy.) He trusted that on the arrival of Dr. Jameson all would support Captain Lendy. They should ask for proper protection, and see that they got it. He asked anyone who

had lost cattle to come to the committee which would be formed, and prove their loss. They must not be afraid to speak up. He also referred to the fact of certain Makalangas being killed under our very eyes.

At this point it was proposed by Mr. Whiteman, and duly carried, that Mr. E. A. Slater be chairman, which post he accepted.

Mr. J. Stoddart was called for to speak on behalf of the mining industry. On rising, he said it was impossible for them to lose their time at this, the dry season of the year. He maintained that the volunteers should be properly equipped, that the Company should see that their cattle were returned, and that the standing police force should be greatly increased. Mr. Dunsterville, in course of a speech in which he occasionally wandered from the subject, said that he believed the Company, under their Charter, was obliged to keep up an efficient police force. He asked where they were. If this present state of affairs was allowed to blow over, where would they get food for their boys, or where would they get their boys to work the mines. The fact of the Matebele passing through the camp was simply a challenge to the white man. They dared not do it, unless they had permission from Lo Bengula. Dr. Jameson must settle the Matebele question at once, now and for ever.

At the conclusion of meeting, three cheers were again given for Captain Lendy.

The following comprise the committee elected :—

- E. A. Slater, Chairman.
- J. Clarke (representing Traders).
- Dunsterville (Transport Riders).
- Reed (Farmers).
- Swift (Mechanics).
- Hamilton (Secretary).

THE FIGHTING STATE OF VICTORIA.

Commanding Officer, Captain C. F. Lendy, Resident Magistrate.

The Victoria Rangers.

- Captain Lord Henry Paulet.
- Lieutenant Napier.
- „ Bastard.
- „ Kennelly.
- „ Hurrall.
- Paymaster, C. R. Vigers (Captain).
- Surgeon-Major, J. W. Lichfield.
- Chaplain, Rev. A. D. Sylvester.
- Acting Adjutant, F. Fitzgerald (Captain).
- R.S.-M., Neil A. Swan.
- 94 non-commissioned officers and men.

The Victoria Burgher Force.

- Commandant Judd.
- A. Troop.—Captain Nesbitt.
- „ Lieutenant Weir, P. V.
- „ Slater, E. A.
- B. Troop.—Captain Sampson.
- „ Lieutenant Wynstanley.
- „ Harrison.
- C. Troop.—Captain O. Dairs.
- „ Lieutenant.
- „ Pursell.
- 223 non-commissioned officers and men.

In addition to the above, arms have been served out to about 75 men, who are not on the roster of either the volunteers or burghers. There are therefore about 400 white men properly armed in camp. All trustworthy Cape Boys and Indians have also been armed and placed under the command of Sergeant Brabant, the Court Interpreter. The artillery troop, under Sergeant-Major Reid, who has had experience through the Zulu War, is in charge of one Gatling and two Maxim guns. The horses in camp number 82. A barbed wire entanglement has been made all round the fort, platforms built from which men can fire over the walls, a hospital, attended by the three Victoria Sisters and Mother Clare, established; all arrangements made for a proper food and water supply, and the distances marked off in all directions round the fort by white flags. The police, numbering seven men under Sergeant Chalk, have not had a whole night, or even half, in bed during the last 10 days; and, while all have, we think, done their duty willingly, the Officer Commanding, the Police, and the Adjutant, have certainly done the hardest work.



## PART II.

## CORRESPONDENCE

IN CONNEXION WITH

MR. F. J. NEWTON'S REPORT.

No. 1.

SIR H. B. LOCH to the MARQUESS OF RIPON.\*  
(Received August 1, 1893.)Government House, Cape Town,  
July 12, 1893.

MY LORD MARQUESS,

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a telegram from Dr. Jameson to Dr. Harris, on the subject of a raid by the Matabele near Victoria.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HENRY B. LOCH,  
Governor and High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 1.

COPY of TELEGRAM from DR. JAMESON, Salisbury, to DR. HARRIS, Charter, Cape Town,  
dated July 10th, 1893.

Exaggerated reports about Matabele, near Victoria, sure to reach Colony; so that you may contradict, give you full text. To-day a large Impi sent by Lobengula to punish Mashonas for theft, some came near Victoria, and while Lendy wiring me about it, I received the following telegram from Colenbrander, *begins*:—"As you will, no doubt, have heard from Captain Lendy, the King had some of his cattle stolen by Béres people near Victoria. The King now wishes me to let you know that he is sending a large force to punish Béres and others for various reasons, and to tell you that he has had special messengers despatched yesterday to Lendy telling him of his intentions, and asking Lendy and the people there not to be scared, as the expedition was not against the white to whom he is friendly and has had no cause of complaint, and that he has told his people not to molest any white man they might meet. I may add that whilst I was away yesterday at Hope Fountain to engage runners, the King in the meantime had secured them himself, and, I being away, would not wait, and asked Dawson to write for me, and I trust this will reach Lendy in time; my private opinion is that the king intends to punish the recent wire cutters, as a fairly large force has been sent to punish the offenders."—*Ends*. I wired the following answer, *begins*:—"Thank the King for his friendly message and tell him I have nothing to do with his punishing his own Maholis, but must insist that his Impis are not allowed to cross the border agreed on between us. He not being there, they are not under control, and Captain Lendy informs me that some of them have actually been in the town of Victoria, burning kraals within a few miles, and killing Mashonas who are servants of the white men; also that they have captured some cattle of the Government and of other white men. I am now instructing Captain Lendy to see the head Induna, tell him that those cattle must all be returned at once, and his Impi must retire beyond our agreed border, otherwise Captain Lendy is to take his police and at once expel them, however many they are. The King will see the necessity of this, otherwise, the white men getting irritated, the expedition may never return to Buluwayo."—*Ends*. Now the Victoria people naturally have got the jumps, volunteers called out, rifles distributed, &c. I have told Lendy to repeat King's message and my answer to the Induna, and use his tact to get rid of them without any collision, which I feel sure he can do, as the Impi is only too glad to run away from the whites; at the same time

\* Reprinted from C.—7171, p. 50,

to give confidence to the Victorians, last night it was necessary to give Lendy power to carry out my message to the King, if absolutely necessary. Lendy's description of burning kraals, and Mashonas killed, of course, very harrowing, but that was at first blush and after sundown. Will wire you this morning when I hear from Lendy that they have all cleared; have told Lendy to prevent exaggerated press telegrams.

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No. 2.

SIR H. B. LOCH to the MARQUESS OF RIPON.\*  
(Received August 7, 1893.)

(Extract.)

Government House, Cape Town,  
July 19, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, with reference to my despatch of the 12th instant,† a copy of correspondence on the subject of the Matabele raid near Victoria.

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Enclosure in No. 2.

FROM JAMESON, Victoria, to HIGH COMMISSIONER, Cape Town.

TELEGRAM.

18th July.—I thank you for your telegram and feel sure your Excellency's message to Lobengula will prevent any general disturbance. The Indunas arrived after my last telegram; after some conversation, during which they would not consent to return beyond the border, I told them I would give them an hour to retire, and if they did not would send my men to drive them out as I had informed the King. At the stated time, Captain Lendy, with thirty-eight mounted men, rode out, found about 300 still on commonage; these fired on Lendy's party, Lendy then fired and pursued for about nine miles; a few men were killed, including two head men. Lendy has now returned; no casualties; I believe the whole lot will now return to Matabeleland and further raiding cease. We are taking all due precautions in case of any returns, which I do not anticipate.

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No. 3.

Dr. JAMESON, Victoria, to BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY,  
Cape Town.‡

(Dated July 22, 1893.)

TELEGRAPHIC.

You ask for details of Matabele troubles. I will now give them for the last two years, that you may understand how we have done our utmost to avoid collision. Early last year, a Matabele impi raided Lomagunda, killing Chief and large numbers of men, and taking women and children to slavery. Being far away, our police were too late to prevent, but I sent warning message to Lobengula; later last year, when I was here, some fugitive Makalaka came to me, asking protection against a large Matabele impi who were killing and raiding Chibi and other kraals across our Tuli road. I sent police, who interviewed impi, and sent them away again; I sent severe message to Lobengula; always the same answer, that some cattle had been stolen, and his impi was not to interfere with white men. A month ago Mashona reported to Captain Lendy raiding Matabele across our border; Captain Lendy with police went out, and impi retired. Lendy sent letter by them to Lobengula, reminding him of my messages, that

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\* Reprinted from C.—7171, p. 52.

† No. 1.

‡ Enclosure in Sir H. Loch's Despatch of July 26, 1893 (received August 14, 1893), No. 62 in C.—7171.

his men must keep beyond border. Loben's answer was that he was sending a large impi to punish Mashonas, but again that they were not to interfere with white; this is the impi which has given the present trouble, and which is still encamped just beyond the border. Last Sunday week, its presence was first announced by a number of Makalakas from a kraal on the commonage rushing into Victoria for protection. Two of these were killed between the hospital and the church, and several others in the streets of Victoria before the police got out to drive the Matabele off. The garden boy of the English clergyman, Sylvester, ran away; Sylvester, looking for him, found him assegaied about a mile out of town. Altogether about 20 were killed in Victoria. Captain Lendy informs me, in every kraal for miles around Victoria, men, women, and children have been murdered, cattle and grain taken away, and what could not be carried off burnt. When Lendy with mounted party drove off the impi the other day they found them encamped round a kraal on a kopje, cutting off the water supply. It seems this is their method; not to attack a dangerous place, but to starve them out for water, and then butcher. As a specimen of the abject condition they have reduced these natives to, on my way down here, when outspanned, some Mashonas came down from a kraal to talk, then Matabele reported from neighbouring kopjes a sudden rush to their kopje, and placed a woman on a rock at some distance, hoping the Matabele would take her, and be content to leave them alone. Captain Lendy naturally had great difficulty in preventing the people from firing on the Matabeles. At the first outrage, he went out with his men and interviewed the indunas; these gave the usual tale, King's orders to punish Mashonas, and not to interfere with white men; also to give up men, women, and children refugees. I instructed him to give up no women and children, but tell indunas he, as magistrate, would try men if they made accusations. Indunas were impertinent, and refused to remove impi. In meantime, I at once sent message to Lobengula that his impi was killing white men's servants and stealing Government cattle, and that I had told Lendy to order them across the border, and, if they did not go, drive them; then I came down, and found raiding and burning going on in all directions, even on the commonage, in the kraals where the whites principally get their servants; also passed large party of Matabele carrying away loot. I at once sent for indunas, who arrived next morning, ordered them to cross border at once, giving a short time to obey, and telling them I would drive them out if they did not; the rest you know.

I think the High Commissioner and Mr. Rhodes will agree that we have gone as far as possible to prevent a collision, and that further negotiating would rather have precipitated than averted trouble. Three years of negotiations has only induced them to encroach more. Work is absolutely stopped, many waggons have off-loaded machinery at Matipis and gone back to Middle Drift; people and Government have lost large number of cattle, and I feel sure work will not be recommenced, or even transport carried along the roads till some definite action on our part is taken of going into Matabeleland to settle the question finally, which can easily be done by (*sic*) in Mashonaland alone. The clergy, whom I have talked to freely, agree with me on every point. I may add that, though the people throughout Mashonaland are now determined that something decisive must be done, they behaved with great restraint in the beginning. In two instances, vouched for by Captain Lendy, prospectors had their small boys butchered beside them on their way into Victoria, and yet not a Matabele was fired at till after my arrival here.

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No. 4.

The MARQUESS OF RIPON to SIR H. B. LOCH.\*  
 [*Answered by No. 6.*]

SIR,

Downing Street, November 2, 1893.

IN the telegram from the Administrator of Mashonaland, dated the 18th of July, a transcript of which accompanied your Despatch of the 19th of July† last, it is stated that, after the Matabeles who had visited Victoria on the 18th July had been warned to retire, Captain Lendy, with 38 mounted men, had, under Dr. Jameson's orders, ridden out after them; that Captain Lendy found about 300 still on the commonage, and that these fired upon his party, and that Captain Lendy thereupon fired and pursued them.

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\* Despatch reprinted from C. [7290], p. 7.

† No. 2.

In the telegram from Dr. Jameson to Lobengula of which a transcript, dated the 24th July, is enclosed in your Despatch of the 26th July,\* the Administrator states that the police found the Matabele encamped on the commonage, and that they actually fired on the police.

It appears that the Matabele, on their return to Buluwayo, reported to Lobengula that they had been fired into as they were retreating, and had not themselves fired.

Since these occurrences, several letters and extracts of letters, purporting to have been written by eye-witnesses who accompanied the party under Captain Lendy, have been published in various newspapers in this country and South Africa. I transmit to you, herewith, press cuttings with some of these extracts.

These statements agree in an account of the incident in question materially different from that adopted by Dr. Jameson, as it would appear from them that the Matabele, to the number of about 60 or 70 men, were overtaken by Captain Lendy's party six or seven miles from Victoria in full retreat, and that they had not fired, or attempted resistance, when the police opened fire upon them.

I shall be glad if you will investigate the matter as soon as the conclusion of the present operations enables you to do so.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) RIPON.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

EXTRACT from the "TIMES," 16th October.

The following are extracts from a private letter just received by a Swansea gentleman from his brother, who has a farm about three miles from Fort Victoria. It gives, as will be seen, the writer's experiences of the recent Matabele raid, which was the cause of the present disturbance in Mashonaland:—

"Fort Victoria, Aug. 10, 1893.—On the morning of July 9, the Mahlahas, Mashonaland people, came to my farm and told me that the Matabele were within six miles. They, the Mahlahas, were all flying to the mountains. I did not think much of it at the time, as they have never come so close to Victoria before. Three boys whom I had working in the garden ran away, so I went out to see if the cattle were all right. I found the herders had run away also and the cattle had strayed. I collected all I could and took them home. I had not been half an hour at the house, when my Manquatoo boy told me the Matabele were in sight. It was not long before about 150 of them were round my house. They were very civil and said they had strict orders from Lobengula not to touch the white man's cattle or to interfere at all. While I was talking to them, my boy told me he thought he recognised some of my cattle amongst a large herd which was being taken away. I told the chief to send some boys to bring them back, but I thought it best to go myself. I caught them up at a point where the Head Chief had made his camp. He gave me up the cattle. On my way back, I had great difficulty in keeping the Matabele I met from killing my Manquatoo boy. They tried to make out he was a Makalaka. When I got back, I found that the cattle I had left at the house had been jumped. It was then getting dark, so I counted what I had left and found that I was 20 cows short, besides calves. I had bought all the cattle, 30 cows, two bulls, a few yearlings, and calves, just a week before this happened. The next morning I started for camp with everything. I found the camp in a state of fortification. All the farmers had lost cattle and were in to report their losses. After breakfast Captain Lendy and about 20 men, of whom I was one, rode out to demand the cattle. The Chief promised they should be returned the following morning. Next morning there were no signs of them, so we waited all day, and in the evening Dr. Jameson, the administrator, arrived. The next morning he sent five police to tell the head induna to come to an indaba about midday. He came, and refused to give up the cattle until we had given up the refugees who were in the town (*i.e.*, Makalaka women and children), adding that he would not kill them in front of us, nor would he kill them in our river, but he would take them out of sight. The end of it was, Jameson told him he gave him an hour to give up the cattle and get over the border, and if they were not across by then we should help them. At the end of the hour Captain Lendy with 50 mounted men, started after them. I was riding an old crock that could hardly stand on its legs. We caught them up about six miles from camp, making for the main body. As soon as we got within 300 yards of them, the word was given to open fire. We followed them for about three miles. There were between 40 and 50 killed. We only just

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\* See No. 3.



retired in time, as we were nearly on the top of the main body, which was 5,000 strong, when the bugle sounded. We are now doing all we can to strengthen our position. All the cattle have been sent to the mountains. The Company will have to give us full compensation for what we have lost. A border police has been formed; I have joined for two months. All the people are called out to man the fort. The general opinion is that the Company want to fight, as Matabeleland is a magnificent country, healthy, and also very rich in minerals. A free farm will be given those who go into fight. I have just come in from a ten days' patrol over the border."

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Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

EXTRACT from the "TIMES," 24th October.

THE POSITION IN MASHONALAND.

The following are extracts from private letters received from a young Englishman who has been located a few miles from Fort Victoria:—"Some people will argue that there is no reasonable excuse for fighting the Matabele, and will sum up by saying, 'Lobengula sent an impi with strict injunctions not to interfere with the white men, but to raid the Makalakas and Mashonas. They obeyed those injunctions and never injured a single white, and when requested by the Great White Chief to return over the border were on their way there when they were fired upon and chased.' From that view, many would sympathise with Lobengula. But, looking at it from a looker-on's view, it is plain the impi did as much as they dared. Had they broken the King's order in any one respect they knew it meant death on their return; but they also knew that, if they could provoke the whites to attack them first, the King could only justify them in retaliating; therefore they tried their hand at that game. The only kraals attacked were those all round Victoria (with which Victoria trades for meal, &c.) The white men's Makalaka servants were murdered in the camp before our eyes, and in one case a Makalaka was assegaied through the back while on his knees requesting his boss to protect him. The boss himself had an assegai put on his breast in a defiant manner. They openly called the whites 'dogs,' they killed the parson's Kaffir a short distance from the church, they snapped their fingers in contempt at the indaba with the doctor when he ordered them to quit, and, instead of hurrying away, they went towards the body of the impi by the koppies. About two hours after, they were overtaken by Captain Lendy and some horsemen, and the captain, seeing they had not obeyed orders by hastening off, fired on them and chased them."

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Enclosure 3 in No. 4.

EXTRACT from "TRUTH," 19th October.

Durban, 15th (Special).

A private letter received in Durban from Victoria contains the following:—"Last Tuesday Matabele come into camp. The alarm was sounded and every one was shut in the fort. Dr. Jameson held an indaba, and gave them one hour to get out of Mashonaland (30 miles). An hour and a half afterwards, fifty of us mounted and were sent to see if they had cleared, when we came across about sixty of them about seven miles from camp. Captain Lendy gave us the order to charge and fire, which we did, killing between 25 and 30. The others got into a kopje among the rocks, so we had to leave them. It was like buck-shooting, for the poor devils took to their heels and we galloped up and almost shot them point blank. I don't suppose any of them got less than four or five bullets in him. Two days ago, a mounted party (12) went out as far as the border to see if any more Matabeles were about, and news came in this morning that they had had another brush with them, killing several."

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No. 5.

The MARQUESS OF RIPON to SIR H. B. LOCH.\*

[Answered by No. 7.]

SIR, Downing Street, November 20, 1893.  
I TRANSMIT to you a copy of a letter which appeared in the "Daily Chronicle" of yesterday, from the Rev. R. Wardlaw Thompson, Foreign Secretary of the London

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\* Despatch reprinted from [C. 7290], p. 17.

Missionary Society, concerning a letter received from a friend of his at Palapye, Mr. W. C. Willoughby, relating to the origin of the recent hostilities with the Matabele.

Without going into the general questions of policy discussed in these two letters, I would draw your attention to those parts of the second letter which bear on the conduct of Captain Lendy, and to point out to you that the statements which Mr. Willoughby makes appear to have a material bearing on the question raised in my Despatch of the 2nd instant,\* whether the information supplied correctly described the circumstances under which Captain Lendy and his men fired on the retiring Matabele. You will observe that one of Mr. Willoughby's correspondents alleges that quarter was refused to the Matabele, even when they went on their knees and begged for it. The whole subject needs the most searching investigation. No satisfactory inquiry can, of course, take place before the close of the present operations, and meanwhile I should be glad if you would let me know which, in your opinion, would be the best mode of securing a full, impartial, and independent investigation into all the circumstances of the case.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) RIPON.

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Enclosure in No. 5.

The "DAILY CHRONICLE," 16th November 1893.

*The Editor of the Daily Chronicle.*

14, Blomfield Street, E.C.,

November 14, 1893.

SIR,

I HAVE read with interest the information you have given to the public about the war which is at present being waged against the Matabele. I have not been able entirely to agree with you in some of your opinions, but none the less I have been grateful to you and others for ventilating the subject, and enabling the British public to know something of the real state of the case. Complaints have been made that the missionary interest has all gone in favour of the Chartered Company of British South Africa, and no small criticism has been passed upon the missionaries for their belligerent attitude. I confess, the utterances, as reported, of the Bishop of Derry and the chaplain at Fort Victoria have seemed to me to warrant all the criticism that has been passed upon them. I am conscious also that there is good reason for saying that the missionary interest has been on the side of the Chartered Company. The fact is, some of us who have been pretty closely connected with work in Matabeleland for many years past have been sorely troubled as to the attitude we ought to take. I, myself, visited that country 10 years ago, and came home with a strong conviction that sooner or later there would inevitably be a war with the Matabele, and that nothing but a strong hand would suffice to break up a power which was a standing menace to peace, and which lived by the cruel oppression of its weaker neighbours. A visit to Palapye last year, and all I heard then from men long resident in the country, confirmed the opinion I had formed 10 years ago, and led me to expect that the crisis could not be very long delayed. The Matabele themselves are fine specimens of the savage, and would be likely, under a different government, to develop quite as rapidly as any uncivilised native race with which I am acquainted. But the government under which they have lived has rendered advancement utterly impossible. This society has had a mission in Matabeleland for 30 years, but the effort to get children to school, or permanently to influence the adults for good, has been so constantly frustrated by the fear in which the people live that visible results have been almost nil, and we have again and again discussed the expediency of withdrawing our missionaries and sending them to some field where they would be able to work under different conditions.

I cannot, therefore, in the least sympathise with much that has been said and written in favour of the Matabele, as if they were an ill-used and innocent people. I never came across any tribe whose manner of life and mode of dealing with their neighbours excited such universal indignation and dislike, even among peace-loving and native-loving men. Yet, having said this, I have felt that the utterances of the men who have talked freely about "wiping out" the Matabele, and driving them beyond the Zambesi, were as barbarous as the habits of the tribe whom they sought to punish. There is no need to

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\* No. 4.

wipe out the Matabele people. Indeed, it would be great folly, on economic grounds, to think of such a thing. All that is needed is that the tyranny under which they live should be broken, and a different government substituted for it. I have also been much troubled by the story of the way in which the present war has been commenced. It has seemed to me that the official accounts left much to be desired, and that it would have been well for our credit had the war, which seemed to be a stern necessity sooner or later, been commenced under different conditions. I was confirmed in this feeling by a letter from a friend who has been many years in Matabeleland, and who, writing before hostilities actually broke out, said, "You know what I have long thought about the Matabele, but I wish we had gone into the war with cleaner hands."

I have now received from another friend at Palapye the enclosed letter, which he asks me to send to the editor of some influential newspaper. The report he gives fully justifies the expression of the wish of my previous correspondent. I send it to you in the hope that it may find publicity through your column. Now that the war has been commenced, and the Matabele have learned the power of the white man, I can only hope that it will be speedily terminated, and that Her Majesty's Government will insist upon having the country brought under Imperial rule, instead of leaving it to be managed by a great trading corporation, whose control necessarily must be largely affected by considerations of self-interest, and of the accounts which must sooner or later be rendered to their shareholders.

I am, &c.  
R. WARDLAW THOMPSON,  
Foreign Secretary London Missionary Society.

The following is the letter which the Rev. R. Wardlaw Thompson asks us to publish:—

Palapye, Bamangwato, British Bechuanaland Protectorate,  
October 16, 1893.

It is, perhaps, inevitable that the British race should be continually extending its sway. The genius of our people, our history, and our present necessities, all combine to bring this about. And it is doubtful how much of praise or blame for this we justly deserve. He would be a rash man, and short-sighted withal, who should venture to draw a permanent frontier to all our dominions. But I submit that the methods by which we extend our dominions are surely matters of first-rate importance, calling for the scrutiny of all who love our nation. And it is to some of these methods that I desire to draw the attention of your readers. English papers are always a month old before they reach us at this remote place, and, thanks to the sweet waywardness of our Bechuanaland postal arrangements, they are sometimes permitted to mellow at Vryburg, or some other place. Mine went astray last week. So I am five weeks in arrears with newspaper information. I see, however, that many papers have already referred to the troubles in Matabeleland, and it is probable that during the last five weeks the references have been more numerous and more lengthy. All the references that I have seen are evidently based upon official reports or down-country rumours. And the officials of the Chartered Company are possibly not encouraged to put both sides of the question before the public. All information from Mashonaland or Matabeleland passes through Palapye—if it passes at all; some of it probably goes no farther. So it is not presumptuous to say that we are well posted with the latest information from this quarter.

The official report of the conflict at Fort Victoria told how an impi of Matabele soldiers had raided the district around that fort; killed a large number of Mashonas, many of them being slain in close proximity to the fort; raided one English farmstead; and caused general alarm and apprehension among the white settlers within the sphere of the Company's influence. Of the raiding of the English farmstead, no other report has yet reached here. But there can be no doubt that the other statements are well founded, and that the Matabele behaved in their usual bloodthirsty and savage manner toward their unfortunate serfs. Nor is there any doubt that trade, mining, and agriculture in Mashonaland were more or less paralysed by the flight of servants and workmen who, being for the most part Mashona or Makalanga, sought safety in the hills. It is not my business to apologise for the cruelties of the heartless Matabele; nor do I intend by any word in this letter to attempt the task. It is the general opinion here—even among those who know the Matabele best and have the most genuine and unselfish interest in the welfare of the tribe—that a thorough military castigation would be for the benefit of this people and for the peace and progress of their neighbours. And if Great

Britain feels inclined to enter upon a border war from purely philanthropic motives, there is scope in Matabeleland for the enterprise. But, Sir, if we undertake the work of chastisement, let us at least abstain from copying the treachery and cruelty of the savages that we chastise.

Now, to come back to that official report. The report went on to say that Dr. Jameson ordered the indunas of the Matabele impi to come into the fort for an "Indaba"; that he gave them a certain time to clear off "the commonage" (whatever that may mean), and that after that time Captain Lendy went out with a handful of men and routed the Matabele, killing many, and without loss on our side. Now the Matabele are not cowards in the sense that they are afraid to fight, though they may be cowards in the sense that they take every advantage of a man's weakness when he is in their power. And this seemed like a great achievement for the Chartered Company's forces. There is, however, a small paper published at Victoria and called the "Mashonaland Times," and a copy of its "special issue," dated "Victoria, Thursday, July 20, 1893," fell into my hands not long after the above date. It appears to be produced by some stylographic process, but, modest as it is in appearance, it seems to aim at independence of statement. This paper predicted some eight months ago that the Matabele would continue to grow more impertinent, and upon the whole it seems pleased that its prophecy has been fulfilled, and that there is a prospect of war between the English and Matabele. It avers also, in a paragraph headed "Saturday," that "Everyone wants to fight." And taking it altogether it is more than evident that this paper would not minimise any grand victory over the Matabele. You shall hear what it says. The quotation is from page 3, and runs as follows:—

"*Monday.* Dr. Jameson and Lieut. Napier arrived. Everybody surprised and pleased at the doctor's attitude. Sergeant Chark left with escort to inform the Matabele that 'the Great White Chief *ordered* their indunas to come to an indaba.' Fellows cheer the O.C. every opportunity. Everyone full of military ardour."

"*Tuesday.*—The administrator's action successful. Matabele indunas arrive, Dr. Jameson asks no questions: simply tells them to clear within an hour, or he will make them. One induna remarkably impertinent. Two hours later mounted party under Lendy rode after Matabele, fell in with about 150 of the enemy, who promptly clear, 30 being killed, including the impertinent induna, no white man killed or wounded."

Now in this report there are some remarkable omissions if the official statement is entirely correct, and not only omissions, but even variations from the official statement, and some of its readers here began to wonder what there was behind it all. We knew the truth would come if we waited for it, because there is constant communication between Palapye and Victoria. It was not long before reports began to come in from Matabeleland, which were still more out of harmony with the official report. Lobengula had sent his impis to punish his vassals, the Mashona and Makalanga, for various offences against his authority, one offence being that of cutting the Chartered Company's telegraph wire, of which the Company had complained to him. There has been no dispute between him and the Company as to the sovereignty of Mashonaland. This the Company does not claim. They pay him indeed about 100*l.* a month for the right to carry on certain trading, mining, and agricultural operations in this portion of his country. The "frontier," referred to in connexion with this affair, is the line beyond which the Chartered Company has no right to carry its operations. It has nothing to do with sovereignty. Lobengula warned his indunas before he sent them away that they were not to interfere with the white man or his property, and he claims to have sent information to this effect to the officers of the Government, and when his indunas returned with the story of their disaster, and were sharply censured for allowing their men to be shot down by the white men without attempting resistance, they quietly replied to Lobengula's wrathful words, "You told us, Chief, not to touch the white men, and we did as we were told." And his great complaint to a friend of mine, who passed through his capital a day or two later, was that the white men had fired upon his soldiers *when they were retiring*. We further heard from Matabeleland that the Matabele warriors who were attacked were the rear-guard of the impi; that they were carrying a sick induna, and that both the sick induna and the induna in charge of the party were shot.

Since then, I have been favoured with the sight of a private letter from a gentleman at Fort Victoria, and the letter, while giving an ampler account of what transpired, is in strict accord with the non-official accounts to which I have referred. The letter says that Dr. Jameson ordered the indunas across the frontier, which was 30 miles away, within two hours. The doctor must have had a high opinion of the physical powers of

the Matabele. About one hour later, however, Captain Lendy rode out with about 40 men and overtook a party of Matabele about two or three miles away, who were making for the so-called "frontier." The number of Matabele is variously estimated at 50 and 150 men. Captain Lendy then ordered his men to charge and fire, which they did. The impi took no notice, but quietly went on. Lendy's horsemen pursued them, each picking out his man and firing at him, sometimes when not more than five or six yards away. The Matabele hid, and tried to escape, but they uttered no sound and showed no fight. Not even a groan was heard. When a Matabele warrior found that he could not escape, he turned towards his pursuer, fell on one knee, and held up his little shield in token of submission. But no quarter seems to have been given. The number of the slain can only be guessed at, for there was no attempt to count them. It was probably not far from the number stated in the official report. Now, whatever one may think of the necessity for a war with the Matabele, it is surely a disgrace to the British nation to have these things done in its name. And it seems about time that the healthy air of public opinion were allowed free play among the forces of the Chartered Company. He must be a strong man who can live among those who are ever thirsting to be at the throats of the "niggers," and who can yet preserve a high standard of justice towards offending natives; and it seems only fair that men who have thus become enervated should be reminded at this crisis that the eyes of healthier men in the British Empire are upon them, and that the British public will know how to deal with the cruelty and treachery of white men, as well as with the same qualities in the black.

Now, my letter is already long, but I must add a few lines more. Since this conflict at Fort Victoria, correspondence has been passing freely between the High Commissioner and Lobengula. All this correspondence, whether telegraphic or postal, has to be forwarded between Palapye and Buluwayo by special messengers. Khama, Chief of the Bamangwato, furnishes the Assistant Commissioner, who resides here, with men for this purpose. It is not easy to know what is contained in a Government Despatch; we shall see that when the Blue Book is published. But I fancy it will then be seen that no definite demand for compensation has been made, nor for apology, and that no declaration of war, or even ultimatum, has ever been sent to Lobengula. His tone has been pacific, things have been going as peaceably and orderly in Buluwayo as they usually do. His messenger, who went to England some years ago, passed through here on his way to the Cape, as a special envoy to the High Commissioner. He seems to be at the Cape still, as far as we can hear, and Lobengula is still awaiting a message from him. The mail from Buluwayo reached Palapye last Monday in the usual way, and saw nothing unusual on the road, and yet we are now at war with the Matabele. Three columns from Salisbury, Victoria, and Macloutsie, are closing in on the country. Two Matabele boys reached Palapye last Saturday with some men belonging to a friend of mine. They brought these men out of Matabeleland without hindrance or difficulty, and on the way they met Khama and his men marching to join the British forces. "What does it mean?" they asked. "Our people do not expect this. We left them sowing their gardens, and not preparing to fight the English." Is this worthy of a great and strong nation, which should be an example of honesty and justice to the loyal natives of Bechuanaland, and even to our troublesome neighbours across the northern border? Our Chief here, Khama—a true man, a just and firm ruler of his people, and a loyal servant of our Government, was asked to send his regiments to the Macloutsie drift to co-operate with the B.B.P. force from the Macloutsie camp, and he left last Monday with four regiments. He has done everything that he could do to aid the Government. The most reliable information that has reached Palapye has come by his scouts. And now he has gone with his regiments. But these are methods that he would never have descended to, and they are not likely to increase his respect for the Government.

My only plea for troubling you with this letter is the fact that I can vouch for all I have said in it, and the still more important fact, that the righteousness of a nation is the rightful business of every one of its citizens. And I beg to subscribe myself, yours faithfully,

W. C. WILLOUGHBY.

## No. 6.

SIR H. B. LOCH to the MARQUESS OF RIPON.\*  
(Received December 22, 1893.)

MY LORD MARQUESS,

Government House, Cape Town,  
December 5, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, with reference to your despatch of the 2nd ultimo,† a copy of correspondence on the subject of Captain Lendy's collision with the Matabele at Victoria.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HENRY B. LOCH,  
Governor and High Commissioner.

## Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

FROM THE IMPERIAL SECRETARY, Cape Town, to SECRETARY, BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY, Cape Town.

Government House, Cape Town,  
November 29, 1893.

SIR,

I AM directed by his Excellency the High Commissioner to enclose, for your information, a copy of a Despatch which he has received from the Secretary of State, covering newspaper cuttings, giving accounts of what took place in the collision between Captain Lendy's force and the Matabele.

His Excellency has no doubt the British South Africa Company will be as anxious as he is himself to have this matter fully investigated, and he will be glad if Mr. Rhodes will, on his return, confer with him as to the best means of arriving at the facts.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRAHAM BOWER,  
Imperial Secretary.

To Secretary, British South Africa Company,  
Cape Town.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

FROM SECRETARY, BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY, Cape Town, to the IMPERIAL SECRETARY, Cape Town.

SIR,

Cape Town, December 2, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, covering a Despatch which his Excellency the High Commissioner has received from the Secretary of State, relative to the collision which took place at Victoria between the forces under Captain Lendy and the Matabele.

The British South Africa Company are equally anxious to have the matter fully investigated, and upon Mr. Rhodes's return I will communicate his Excellency's wish to confer with him as to the best means of arriving at the facts; though I have little doubt that the results of such investigation will corroborate the information already reported by the Administrator upon the matter.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) F. RUTHERFOORD HARRIS,  
Secretary.

To the Imperial Secretary, Cape Town.

## No. 7.

SIR H. B. LOCH to the MARQUESS OF RIPON.\*  
(Received January 8, 1894.)

[Answered by No. 8.]

MY LORD MARQUESS,

Government House, Cape Town,  
December 15, 1893.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Despatch of the 20th ultimo,‡ covering a copy of a letter published in the "Daily Chronicle," reflecting on the conduct of Captain Lendy.

\* Reprinted from [C. 7290], pp. 34 and 39,

† No. 4.

‡ No. 5.

The charges made in this letter will be investigated as soon as the present hostilities are over, and it has occurred to me that either Mr. Newton, the Colonial Secretary of Bechuanaland, or Major Sawyer, my military secretary, might be entrusted with the inquiry.

In the meanwhile, and until the investigation takes place, I think it only right that charges against officers and men who are not in a position to defend themselves should be received with some reserve.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HENRY B. LOCH,  
Governor and High Commissioner.

## No. 8.

The MARQUESS OF RIPON to SIR H. B. LOCH.\*

SIR,

Downing Street, February 15, 1894.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch of the 15th December,† respecting the selection of an officer to inquire into the circumstances in which fire was opened on the Matabele impi when retiring from the vicinity of Fort Victoria on the 18th July last.

If the sole object of the proposed inquiry had been merely to inquire into the personal conduct of Captain Lendy, as the officer in command on that occasion, I should, on receiving the sad intelligence of his death, have considered it only proper to direct that the inquiry should not be proceeded with. But Dr. Jameson and the Directors of the British South Africa Company have taken upon themselves the full responsibility for the proceedings in this matter, and, consequently, as the orders given by Dr. Jameson on the occasion, and the action of the Company generally, would have formed principal subjects of investigation, and as, moreover, a promise has been given to Parliament that the inquiry would be held, I have, upon full consideration, come to the conclusion that it should still take place.

I am of opinion that the investigation of the circumstances will most fitly be entrusted to some officer of the necessary professional training, but wholly unconnected with the political aspects of the question. I would observe that in the instructions with which the officer selected will be furnished it will be pointed out, that, while ascertaining all the facts of the case, he should abstain from countenancing reflections on Captain Lendy's personal character.

I still have the question of the person who had best be selected to conduct the investigation under my consideration, and will telegraph you my decision.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) RIPON.

## No. 9.

SIR W. G. CAMERON to the MARQUESS OF RIPON.  
(Received May 21, 1894.)

(Extract.)

Government House, Cape Town,  
May 1, 1894.

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, with reference to previous correspondence, a copy of correspondence and other documents on the subject of the inquiry into the occurrences at Fort Victoria in July last.

\* Reprinted from C.—7290, p. 85.

† No. 7.

## Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

FROM SECRETARY, BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY, CAPE TOWN, TO THE IMPERIAL SECRETARY, CAPE TOWN.

SIR,

Cape Town, April 25, 1894.

REFERRING to your letter of the 14th instant, I beg to state that the British South Africa Company is of opinion that Victoria and Buluwayo would be convenient localities for the Commissioner to visit for the purpose of instituting inquiries into the occurrences at Victoria in July last, because at these two centres evidence would no doubt be more readily obtained than in other portions of the country.

The Company can have no objection to an investigation into the occurrences, and they trust that his Excellency the High Commissioner may be pleased to make provision for their being represented by Counsel or some other officer authorised to cross-examine witnesses who may be called to give evidence at the inquiry.

The Imperial Secretary,  
Cape Town.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) F. RUTHERFOORD HARRIS,  
Secretary.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

FROM THE IMPERIAL SECRETARY, CAPE TOWN, TO SECRETARY, BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY, CAPE TOWN.

(Extract.)

Government House, Cape Town,  
April 27, 1894.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the incidents that took place at or near Fort Victoria in the month of July last, I am directed by his Excellency the High Commissioner to acquaint you that the Secretary of State has directed that Mr. Newton be appointed to hold the inquiry.

## Enclosure 3 in No. 9.

FROM THE IMPERIAL SECRETARY, CAPE TOWN, TO THE SECRETARY, BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY, CAPE TOWN.

Government House, Cape Town,  
April 27, 1894.

SIR,

I AM directed by his Excellency the High Commissioner to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, relative to the localities at which the inquiry into the Victoria incident is to be held, and asking that the British South Africa Company may make provision for their being represented by Counsel or by some other officer.

His Excellency has no instructions relative to the representation of the British South Africa Company, but as he is satisfied that it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government to give every facility for eliciting the truth, he will take on himself the responsibility of instructing Mr. Newton to admit Counsel or some officer appointed by the British South Africa Company to cross-examine witnesses, &c.

The Secretary, British South Africa Company,  
Cape Town.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) GRAHAM BOWER,  
Imperial Secretary.

## Enclosure 4 in No. 9.

COMMISSION.

TO FRANCIS JAMES NEWTON, Esq., C.M.G.

GREETING :

I, William Gordon Cameron, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Senior Officer in command of Her Majesty's Troops in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, Administering the Government of the said Colony and the territories and dependencies thereof, Governor of the territory of British Bechuanaland,



and Her Majesty's High Commissioner, &c., &c., &c., confiding in your knowledge and ability, hereby nominate and appoint you as a Commissioner for and on behalf of Her Majesty's Government for the purpose of inquiring into and reporting upon the circumstances and occurrences which took place at or near Fort Victoria in Mashonaland in or about the month of July 1893, precedent to, and leading up to, the outbreak of hostilities in Mashonaland and Matabeleland, in which the forces enrolled by the British South Africa Company were engaged, with full power and authority for the above purposes to proceed to any portion of the territories defined by Her Majesty's Order in Council of May 9th, 1891, to hold sittings therein, and at the said sittings to take evidence touching the matters referred to, to reduce the same to writing and transmit the same, together with your written report thereon, under your seal, together with this Commission, to me, and to do all other matters and things necessary for, and incidental to, the above purposes, subject to all the provisions of my Proclamation of 30th day April 1894, and for all matters and things so done in the exercise of the powers hereunder conferred this Commission shall be sufficient authority.

Given under my hand and seal at Cape Town this 1st day of May 1894.

(Signed) W. G. CAMERON, General,  
High Commissioner.

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Enclosure 5 in No. 9.

FROM SECRETARY, BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY, Cape Town, to the IMPERIAL SECRETARY, Cape Town.

SIR, Cape Town, April 30, 1894.  
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, relative to the inquiry to be held into the occurrences at Victoria in July last, and I beg to thank his Excellency the High Commissioner for making provision for the British South Africa Company to be represented at the inquiry by Counsel or some other officer to cross-examine witnesses, &c.

The Imperial Secretary,  
Cape Town.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) F. RUTHERFOORD HARRIS,  
Secretary.

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Enclosure 6 in No. 9.

From His Excellency the HIGH COMMISSIONER, Cape Town, to F. J. NEWTON, Esq., C.M.G.

Government House, Cape Town,  
May 1, 1894.

SIR,  
I HAVE the honour to enclose the following documents :—  
1. A Proclamation constituting a Commission to inquire into events that took place at Fort Victoria in July last.  
2. A Commission appointing you the Commissioner for the above purpose.  
3. A Government notice notifying your appointment.

I enclose also copies of correspondence that has taken place on this subject. You will, on receipt of this Despatch, proceed to Matabeleland, and, after communicating with Dr. Jameson, arrange to hold inquiries at such places as you may think fit.

As it is of importance that you should not be any longer than is absolutely necessary, it will be convenient that you should travel by the post-cart whenever practicable.

In case you should find it desirable to do so, you have authority to requisition from the police now stationed at Matabeleland, any horses or waggons that you may require, and you will show this Despatch to Colonel Gould-Adams, as your authority for the requisition.

F. J. Newton, Esq., C.M.G.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. G. CAMERON, General,  
Administrator and High Commissioner.

## Enclosure 7 in No. 9.

From His Excellency the HIGH COMMISSIONER, Cape Town, to His Honour the Administrator, Vryburg.

Government House, Cape Town,  
May 1, 1894.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your perusal, and for transmission to Mr. F. J. Newton, by the earliest opportunity, a letter addressed to him on the subject of the inquiry to be held into the events that took place at Fort Victoria in July last.

His Honour the Administrator,  
Vryburg.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) W. G. CAMERON, General,  
Administrator and High Commissioner.

## Enclosure 8 in No. 9.

PROCLAMATION by His Excellency General Sir WILLIAM GORDON CAMERON, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Senior Officer in command of Her Majesty's Troops in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, Administering the Government of the said Colony, and the Territories and Dependencies thereof, Governor of the Territory of British Bechuanaland, and Her Majesty's High Commissioner, &c., &c., &c.

Whereas it is expedient that all necessary powers should be conferred upon a Commissioner to be appointed to inquire into and report upon the circumstances and occurrences at or near Fort Victoria in Mashonaland, in or about July 1893, precedent to the outbreak of hostilities in Mashonaland and Matabeleland.

Now, therefore, under and by virtue of the powers, jurisdictions and authorities vested in and conferred upon me, I do hereby proclaim, declare and make known as follows:—

1. A Commissioner shall be appointed with the powers herein-after referred to, to inquire into and report upon the circumstances and occurrences at or near Fort Victoria, in Mashonaland, in or about July 1893, precedent and leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in Mashonaland and Matabeleland: the said Commissioner shall be appointed by the High Commissioner, by notice in the "Government Gazette" of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.

2. For the above purposes, the Commissioner shall have power to hold sittings at such places within the territories comprised within the limits of Her Majesty's Order in Council of May 9th, 1891, as may be most suitable and convenient; and to issue subpoenas or summonses, calling upon any persons within the said territories to appear and give evidence before him concerning the subject matters of the said inquiry, at such places and at such time as may be mentioned in the said subpoenas or summonses, and all persons shall be bound and obliged to obey all summonses or orders under the Commissioner's hand.

3. The penalty for wilful default in complying with any such summons or order as aforesaid shall be by way of summary fine in any sum which the Commissioner may assess, or by way of summary attachment and imprisonment for contempt for any period not exceeding 12 months, or by way of both such fine and imprisonment.

4. For the purposes of the last preceding section the Commissioner shall be clothed with all powers conferred by the law of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope upon the Supreme Court.

5. The powers and authorities conferred upon the Commissioner by this Proclamation shall be exercised, such inquiry as aforesaid shall be pursued, and such report as aforesaid shall be made, subject to such conditions and in accordance with such directions and instructions as may be defined by law, or by the terms of his commission.

6. All proceedings by or before the Commissioner shall be subject to such rules of procedure or practice as the Commissioner may lay down and prescribe: the said rules shall be as far as possible, and save as herein otherwise provided, not inconsistent with the laws of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.

7. The Commissioner shall have power to take the oral evidence of witnesses on oath, and to administer an oath for that purpose, but he may, at his discretion, admit affidavits and receive all such evidence, whether upon oath or not, as may appear to him best calculated to elucidate the truth in respect of the matters forming the subject of the

inquiry; provided that he shall record the manner in which all evidence taken or received by him is given, so that it shall appear from the record of the proceedings whether such is given orally, on oath, or otherwise.

8. All witnesses, whether testifying on oath or not, shall be liable for false testimony to prosecution before any court having jurisdiction, and on conviction to the punishment provided for the crime of perjury.

9. The Commissioner shall take down the oral evidence in writing, and shall attach to the said record all documents which may be put in and admitted by him, and shall transmit the record of the proceedings together with his written report thereon to the High Commissioner at the conclusion of the inquiry.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN.

Given under my hand and seal this 30th day of April 1894.

(Signed) W. G. CAMERON, General,  
High Commissioner.

By command of his Excellency the High Commissioner.

(Signed) GRAHAM BOWER,  
Imperial Secretary.

No. 1, 1894.

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Enclosure 9 in No. 9.

HIGH COMMISSIONER'S NOTICE.

No. 11, 1894.

His Excellency the High Commissioner has been pleased, in accordance with section 1 of his Proclamation of the 30th day of April 1894, to appoint Francis James Newton, Esquire, C.M.G., to be Commissioner under the said Proclamation.

By command of his Excellency the High Commissioner.

(Signed) GRAHAM BOWER,  
Imperial Secretary.

Government House, Cape Town,  
30th April 1894.

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No. 10.

SIR W. G. CAMERON to the MARQUESS OF RIPON.  
(Received June 2, 1894.)

(Extract.)

Government House, Cape Town,  
May 16, 1894.

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, with reference to previous correspondence, a copy of telegraphic correspondence on the subject of the inquiry into the incidents at Victoria, Mashonaland.

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Enclosure in No. 10.

TELEGRAM.

From His Excellency the HIGH COMMISSIONER, Cape Town, to His Honour the ADMINISTRATOR, Vryburg.

May 10.—Yours of 9th *re* Mr. Newton. Kindly telegraph to Mr. Newton and make it clear to him that his mission is merely to inquire into the events at Victoria that preceded the Matabele war in July last. He has nothing to do with the conduct of the Matabele war itself or other extraneous subjects. As he is proceeding to take evidence in anticipation of the receipt of his instructions, it is desirable that he should understand clearly that the inquiry is limited in character, and that he should not be led into an inquiry into all the various debateable subjects which have been discussed in newspapers, and on which the witnesses may feel strongly.



# Overview and Scrutiny Committee



19 January 2021

<b>Please Enter Title</b>	Treasury Management Half Yearly Report 2020/21
<b>Purpose of the report</b>	To note
<b>Report Author</b>	Anna Russell, Deputy Chief Accountant
<b>Cabinet Member</b>	Councillor Sati Buttar
<b>Confidential</b>	No
<b>Corporate Priority</b>	Financial Sustainability
<b>Recommendations</b>	<p><b>Overview and Scrutiny is asked to:</b></p> <p><b>Note the treasury position achieved during the first six months of 2020/21 and the financial environment in global markets.</b></p>
<b>Reason for Recommendation</b>	<b>Not applicable</b>

## 1. Key issues

- 1.1 Treasury Management is the management of the Council's cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.
- 1.2 The Council adopted the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice (the CIPFA Code), which requires the Council to report on performance of the treasury management function at least twice yearly (mid-year and at year end).
- 1.3 The Council's Treasury Management Strategy for 2020/21 was reviewed and approved by Cabinet on 29 January 2020, and approved by Council on 27 February 2020, and has been consistently applied since the beginning of the financial year.
- 1.4 This report is an interim statement of treasury activities for the first six months of the financial year, to the end of September 2020. The Council has borrowed and invested substantial sums of money and is therefore exposed to financial risks including the loss of invested funds and the revenue effect of changing interest rates. This report covers treasury activity and the associated monitoring and control of risks.

- 1.5 The 2017 Prudential Code includes a requirement for local authorities to provide a Capital Strategy, a summary document approved by full Council covering capital expenditure and financing, treasury management and non-treasury investments. The Council's Capital Strategy, complying with CIPFA's requirement, was approved by Council on 27 February 2020 and will be refreshed in February 2021 for financial year 2021-22.

### **External Context - Economic background**

- 1.6 The spread of the coronavirus pandemic dominated during the period as countries around the world tried to manage the delicate balancing act of containing transmission of the virus while easing lockdown measures and getting their populations and economies working again. After a relatively quiet few months of Brexit news it was back in the headlines towards the end of the period as agreement between the UK and EU on a trade deal was looking difficult and the government came under fire, both at home and abroad, as it tried to pass the Internal Market Bill which could override the agreed Brexit deal, potentially breaking international law.
- 1.7 The Bank of England (BoE) maintained Bank Rate at 0.1% and its Quantitative Easing programme at £745 billion. The potential use of negative interest rates was not ruled in or out by BoE policymakers, but then a comment in the September Monetary Policy Committee meeting minutes that the central bank was having a harder look at its potential impact than was previously suggested took financial markets by surprise.
- 1.8 Government initiatives continued to support the economy, with the furlough (Coronavirus Job Retention) scheme keeping almost 10 million workers in jobs, grants and loans to businesses and 100 million discounted meals being claimed during the 'Eat Out to Help Out' (EOHO) offer.
- 1.9 GDP growth contracted by a massive 19.8% (revised from first estimate - 20.4%) in Q2 2020 (Apr-Jun) according to the Office for National Statistics, pushing the annual growth rate down to -21.5% (first estimate -21.7%). Construction output fell by 35% over the quarter, services output by almost 20% and production by 16%. Recent monthly estimates of GDP have shown growth recovering, with the latest rise of almost 7% in July, but even with the two previous monthly gains this still only makes up half of the lost output.
- 1.10 The headline rate of UK Consumer Price Inflation (CPI) fell to 0.2% year on year in August before rising to 0.5% in September, further below the Bank of England's 2% target, with the largest downward contribution coming from restaurants and hotels influenced by the EOHO scheme. The Office for National Statistics' preferred measure of CPIH which includes owner-occupied housing was 0.5% year on year.
- 1.11 In the three months to July, labour market data showed the unemployment rate increased from 3.9% to 4.1% while wages fell 1% for total pay in nominal terms (0.2% regular pay) and was down 1.8% in real terms (-0.7% regular pay). On the back of this, the BoE has forecast unemployment could hit a peak of between 8% and 9%.
- 1.12 The US economy contracted at an annualised rate of 31.7% in Q2 2020 (Apr-Jun). The Federal Reserve maintained the Fed Funds rate at between 0% and 0.25% but announced a change to its inflation targeting regime. The move is to a more flexible form of average targeting which will allow the

central bank to maintain interest rates at low levels for an extended period to support the economy even when inflation is 'moderately' above the 2% average target, particularly given it has been below target for most of the last decade.

- 1.13 The European Central Bank maintained its base rate at 0% and deposit rate at -0.5%.

#### **External Context – Financial markets**

- 1.14 Equity markets continued their recovery, with the Dow Jones climbing to not far off its pre-crisis peak, albeit that performance being driven by a handful of technology stocks including Apple and Microsoft, with the former up 75% in 2020. The FTSE 100 and 250 have made up around half of their losses at the height of the pandemic in March. Central bank and government stimulus packages continue to support asset prices, but volatility remains.
- 1.15 Ultra-low interest rates and the flight to quality continued, keeping gilts yields low but volatile over the period with the yield on some short-dated UK government bonds remaining negative. The 5-year UK benchmark gilt yield started and ended the June–September period at -0.06% (with much volatility in between). The 10-year gilt yield also bounced around, starting at 0.21% and ending at 0.23% over the same period, while the 20-year rose from 0.56% to 0.74%. 1-month, 3-month and 12-month bid rates averaged 0.02%, 0.06% and 0.23% respectively over the period.
- 1.16 At the end of September, the yield on 2-year US treasuries was around 0.13% while that on 10-year treasuries was 0.69%. German bund yields remain negative across most maturities.

#### **External Context – Credit Review**

Credit default swap spreads eased over most of the period but then started to tick up again through September. In the UK, the spreads between ringfenced and non-ringfenced entities remains, except for retail bank Santander UK whose CDS spread remained elevated and the highest of those we monitor at 85bps while Standard Chartered was the lowest at 41bps. The ringfenced banks are currently trading between 45 and 50bps.

- 1.17 After a busy second quarter of the calendar year, the subsequent period has been relatively quiet for credit changes for the names on our counterparty list. Fitch assigned a AA- deposit rating to Netherlands lender Rabobank with a negative outlook and prior to that, while not related to our counterparty list but quite significant, revised the outlook on the US economy to Negative from Stable while also affirming its AAA rating.
- 1.18 There continues to remain much uncertainty around the extent of the losses banks and building societies will suffer due to the impact from the coronavirus pandemic and for the UK institutions on our list there is the added complication of the end of the Brexit transition period on 31st December and what a trade deal may or may not look like. The institutions on Arlingclose's counterparty list and recommended duration remain under constant review, but at the end of the period no changes had been made to the names on the list or the recommended maximum duration of 35 days.

## Local Context

- 1.19 With the purchase of properties starting with the BP international campus site in Sunbury during 2016/17, the Council now has significant levels of long-term borrowing, secured to fund historic property acquisitions.
- 1.20 The Council's current strategy for funding capital developments is to take advantage of the cheap borrowing rates available when needed, while maintaining the investment portfolio that has been built up.
- 1.21 For the year ended 31st March 2020, the Council had: capital expenditure of £78m, including £14.6m (18.7%) on investment properties; and net borrowing of £1,030m arising from its revenue and capital income and expenditure. The underlying need to borrow for capital purposes is measured by the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), while usable reserves and working capital are the underlying resources available for investment. These are summarised at Tables 1 and 2 below.

**Table 1: CFR Summary as at 31st March 2020**

	2019/20 £'000
<b>Opening Capital Financing Requirement</b>	<b>1,051,120</b>
<i>Capital investment</i>	
Property, Plant and Equipment	62,507
Investment Properties	14,640
Intangible Assets	19
Revenue Spend Funded from Capital under Statute	964
<b>Total Capital Investment</b>	<b>78,130</b>
<i>Sources of Finance</i>	
Capital Receipts	(565)
Government Grants and Contributions	(784)
Revenue contributions	(750)
Repayment of debt	(11,052)
<b>Total Sources of Finance</b>	<b>(13,151)</b>
<b>Closing Capital Financing Requirement</b>	<b>1,116,100</b>

- 1.22 As this shows, the CFR represents the cost of capital expenditure that remains to be financed, after applying sources of finance. This therefore is the underlying need to borrowing. The opening CFR (1 April 2019) of £1.05m was increased by £78.13m capital expenditure during 2020/21 and decreased by £13.15m of funds applied, leaving a closing CFR of £1,12m.
- 1.23 Lower official interest rates have decreased the cost of short-term, temporary loans and investment returns from cash assets that can be used instead of borrowing. The Council pursued its strategy of keeping borrowing and investments below their underlying levels, sometimes known as internal borrowing, in order to reduce risk.
- 1.24 The treasury management position on 30th September 2020 and the change over the six months is shown in Table 2 next.



**Table 2: Treasury Management Summary**

	31/03/2020		30/09/2020
	Balance £m	Movement £m	Balance £m
Long-term borrowing	(1,068)	8	(1,060)
Short-term borrowing	(45)	(48)	(93)
<b>Total borrowing</b>	<b>(1,113)</b>	<b>(40)</b>	<b>(1,153)</b>
Long-term investments	31	6	37
Short-term investments	35	45	80
Cash and cash equivalents	17	(12)	5
<b>Total investments</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>122</b>
<b>Net borrowing</b>	<b>(1,030)</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(1,031)</b>

1.25 Short-term investments total £80m, and cash balances £5m, reflecting the increases in income generation. These cash funds are being kept liquid to ensure that funding is readily available for development project costs expected over the coming months.

## 2. Borrowing Update

2.1 The Chancellor's March 2020 Budget statement included significant changes to Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) policy and launched a wide-ranging consultation on the PWLB's future direction. Additional £1.15bn "infrastructure rate" funding at gilt yields plus 0.60% has been made available to support specific local authority infrastructure projects for England, Scotland and Wales, for which there is a bidding process.

2.2 In November, HM Treasury published the consultation results, and announced changes to PWLB lending terms: reduction by 1% on certainty rate loans (which had been increased by 1% in October 2019) that councils can access; but access only if an authority has no intention over three years to buy investment assets primarily for yield.

2.3 Municipal Bonds Agency (MBA): The MBA revised its standard loan terms and framework agreement. Guarantees for the debt of other borrowers are now proportional and limited and a requirement to make contribution loans in the event of a default by a borrower has been introduced. The agency has issued 5-year floating rate and 40-year fixed rate bonds in 2020, in both instances Lancashire County Council is the sole borrower and guarantor.

2.4 If the Council considers future borrowing through the MBA, it will first ensure that it has thoroughly scrutinised the legal terms and conditions of the arrangement and is satisfied with them.

## 3. Borrowing Strategy during the period

3.1 On 30th September 2020, the Council held £1,153m of loans, an increase of £40m from 31st March 2020, as part of its strategy for funding previous and current years' capital programmes. Outstanding loans on 30th September are summarised in Table 3 next.

**Table 3: Borrowing Position**

	31/03/2020		30/09/2020
	Balance	Movement	Balance
	£m	£m	£m
Public Works Loan Board	1,057	(5)	1,052
Local authorities - long-term	11	(3)	8
Local authorities - short-term	45	48	93
<b>Total Borrowing</b>	<b>1,113</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>1,153</b>

- 3.2 On 30th September 2020, the Council also had short-term borrowing totalling £93m. This reflected the cash-flow impact of some of the costs associated with development capital projects. These funds were borrowed from other local authorities because of the affordable rates on offer.
- 3.3 The Council will also consider borrowing additional funds on both a long- and short-term basis for future development projects. Work is ongoing with Arlingclose and the portfolio holder to ensure that the cheapest and most appropriate duration and source are secured
- 3.4 The Council's chief objective when borrowing has been to strike an appropriately low risk balance between securing low interest costs and achieving cost certainty over the period for which funds are required, with flexibility to renegotiate loans should the Council's long-term funding and asset management plans change.

### **Treasury Investment Activity**

- 3.5 Both the CIPFA Code and Government guidance require the Council to invest funds prudently, and to have regard to the security and liquidity of its treasury investments before seeking the optimum rate of return, or yield. The Council's objective when investing money is to strike an appropriate balance between risk and return, minimising the risk of incurring losses from defaults and the risk of receiving unsuitably low investment income.
- 3.6 Continued downward pressure on short-dated cash rate brought net returns on sterling low volatility net asset value money market funds (LVNAV MMFs) close to zero even after some managers temporarily lowered their fees. Net negative returns are not the central case of most MMF managers over the short-term, and fee waivers should maintain positive net yields, but the possibility of net negative returns cannot be ruled out.
- 3.7 On 25th September the overnight, 1- and 2-week deposit rates on Debt Management Account Deposit Facility (DMADF) deposits dropped below zero percent to -0.03%, the rate was 0% for 3-week deposits and 0.01% for longer maturities.
- 3.8 The return on Money Market Funds net of fees also fell over the six months and for many funds net returns range between 0% and 0.1%. In many instances, the fund management companies have temporarily lowered or waived fees to maintain a positive net return.
- 3.9 In the light of the pandemic crisis and the likelihood of unexpected calls on cash flow, the Council has kept more cash available at very short notice than

is normal. Liquid cash was diversified over several counterparties and Money Market Funds to manage both credit and liquidity risks.

- 3.10 As at 30th September 2020, the Council's investment portfolio totalled £123.5m, with £46.0m of this being short-term and cash funds. A breakdown of investments is given in **Appendix A**.

### **Externally Managed Strategic Funds**

- 3.11 Funds totalling £32.5m of the Council's investments are held in externally managed strategic (bond, equity, multi-asset and property) funds, where short-term security and liquidity are lesser considerations, and the objectives instead are regular revenue income and long-term price stability. These funds generated a return of £0.39m to end September 2020 (October £0.56m, annualised 3.61%). A full list of these and their current performance is detailed in **Appendix B**.
- 3.12 In a relatively short period since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March and the ensuing enforced lockdown in many jurisdictions, the global economic fallout has been sharp and large. Market reaction was extreme with large falls in equities, corporate bond markets and, to some extent, real estate, reflecting lockdown-induced paralysis and the uncharted challenges for governments, businesses and individuals.
- 3.13 The Council is invested in bond, equity, multi-asset and property funds. The falls in the capital values of the underlying assets, in particular bonds and equities, were reflected in the 31st March 2020 fund valuations, with most funds registering negative capital returns over a 12-month period. Since March, there has been improvement in market sentiment which is reflected in partial recovery in capital values of funds in the Council's portfolio.
- 3.14 Similar to many other property funds, dealing (i.e. buying or selling units) in the CCLA Local Authorities Property Fund and the Columbia Threadneedle Property Fund was suspended by the funds in March 2020. The relative infrequency of property transactions in March as the pandemic intensified meant that it was not possible for valuers to be confident that their valuations correctly reflected prevailing conditions. To avoid material risk of disadvantage to buyers, sellers and holders of units in the property fund, the management company was obliged to suspend transactions until the required level of certainty is re-established. The dealing suspension was lifted in September 2020. There has also been a change to redemption terms for the CCLA Local Authorities Property Fund; from September 2020 investors are required to give at least 90 calendar days' notice for redemptions.
- 3.15 The Council's investment in externally managed funds has been maintained on the basis that such funds are expected to yield returns over the long-term. Such funds have no defined maturity date but are available for withdrawal after a notice period. Consequently, fund performance and continued suitability in meeting the Council's investment objectives are regularly reviewed. Strategic fund investments are made in the knowledge that capital values will fluctuate, up and down, over months, quarters and even years; but with confidence that, over a three- to five-year period, total returns will exceed cash interest rates.

- 3.16 In 2020/21, the Council expects to receive significantly lower income from its cash and short-dated money market investments and from its externally managed funds than it did in 2019/20 and earlier years. Dividends and income paid will ultimately depend on many factors including but not limited to the duration of COVID-19 and the extent of its economic impact, the fund's sectoral asset allocation, securities held/bought/sold and, in the case of equities, the enforced or voluntary dividend cuts or deferral. The budget for income from investments, has been decreased from £1.34m (2020/21) to £1.25m (2021/22).

### **Non-Treasury Investments**

- 3.17 The definition of investments in CIPFA's revised Treasury Management Code now covers all the financial assets of the Council as well as other non-financial assets which the Council holds primarily for financial return. This is replicated in the Investment Guidance issued by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), in which the definition of investments is further broadened to also include all such assets held partially for financial return.
- 3.18 The Council held such investments in directly owned property valued at £985m at the end of March 2020, as well as shareholding in Knowle Green Estates Limited, with investment property of £4.7m. A new company delivering commercial waste services, Spelthorne Direct Services Limited, was set up during 2020/21.
- 3.19 These investments are expected to generate £50m of investment income for the Council, representing a rate of return of 4.8%.

### **Investment Performance Monitoring**

- 3.20 Security of capital has remained the Council's main investment objective. This has been maintained by following the Council's counterparty policy as set out in its Treasury Management Strategy Statement for 2020/21.
- 3.21 The Council seeks professional advice from Arlingclose and closely adheres to the advice set out in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) guidance. Given Spelthorne's dependency on investment returns to balance the budget, the Council's investment strategy is also kept under constant review and quarterly review meetings are held with Arlingclose, the Council's treasury advisor.

### **Estimates for income 2020/21**

- 3.22 The corporate world is still adjusting to the economic shock, with probably more to come, and it is still too early to tell which companies will withstand the economic damage in the short- to medium-term or which will choose to conserve cash in very difficult economic conditions simply to survive.
- 3.23 Investment income in 2020/21 was set against a very different economic backdrop. Bank Rate, which was 0.75% in February 2020, now stands at 0.1%. Interest earned from short-dated money market investments will be significantly lower. In relation to income from the Council's externally managed strategic funds, dividends and income distributions will ultimately

depend on many factors including but not limited to the duration of COVID-19 and the extent of its economic impact, the fund's sectoral asset allocation, securities held/bought/sold and, in the case of equities, the enforced or voluntary dividend cuts or deferral.

### **Compliance**

- 3.24 The Chief Finance Officer reports that treasury management activities undertaken during the first half year complied with the CIPFA Code of Practice and the Authority's approved Treasury Management Strategy, although noting that limits on the bank account were exceeded on three occasions.
- 3.25 On one occasion, the current bank balance exceeded limits by end of day; on two occasions the bank account was overdrawn over the facility limit. The underlying reason for these instances was limited staff availability in the context of increasing treasury management activities, with the COVID-19 crisis resulting in a sudden and unexpected increase in the volume of work and frequency of Government returns that the Finance Team had to deal with. In response to these breaches, the Treasury Management team has tightened up on processes with particular regard to in-day progress checks.
- 3.26 The CS Lucas TM system has been implemented, and the team will continue to integrate that system into the Treasury Management function and reporting during 2020/21. This system includes reporting on upcoming loans and borrowing, which has helped strengthen related processes.

### **4. Other**

- 4.1 **IFRS 16:** The implementation of the new IFRS 16 Leases accounting standard has been delayed until 2021/22.

### **5. Financial implications**

- 5.1 The financial implications are as set out in this report. The ability to maximise interest returns is paramount to generate sufficient funds to support the General Fund and even a small decline in interest rates can mean a significant reduction in cash returns. Therefore, it is our aim to continue to maintain flexibility commensurate with the high level of security and liquidity and minimal risk when making investment decisions.

### **6. Other considerations**

- 6.1 The Council fully complies with best practice as set out in CIPFA's 2019 Treasury Management and Prudential Codes and in MHCLG's Guidance on Investments effective from April 2018. As issues arise, as when limits were breached noted at section 3, measures are taken to address the underlying reasons.
- 6.2 Nothing in the Council's current strategy is intended to preclude or inhibit capital investment in local projects deemed beneficial to the local community and which have been approved by the Council.

### **7. Sustainability/Climate Change Implications**

- 7.1 None.

**8. Timetable for implementation**

8.1 Not applicable.

**Background papers:** None.

**Appendices:** TMHY20-21 Appendix A - Details of Investments  
TMHY20-21 Appendix B - Strategic Funds

## Details of investments held as at 30 September 2020

Investment Type	Valuation £m	Yield %	Start Date	Maturity Date
<b><u>Pooled Investment Funds</u></b>				
<i>(see Appendix B for details)</i>				
Charteris Elite Premium Income Fund	0.6	2.33%	11-May-12	N/A
Schroders UK Corporate Bond Fund	1.9	1.16%	11-May-12	N/A
Schroders Income Maximiser Fund	0.7	4.70%	06-Jul-12	N/A
Schroders Income Maximiser Fund	0.6	3.82%	24-Jul-15	N/A
Schroders Income Maximiser Fund	0.6	4.06%	26-Aug-16	N/A
Schroders Income Maximiser Fund	1.9	3.97%	25-Feb-19	N/A
M&G Global Dividend Fund	1.7	5.43%	27-Jun-12	N/A
M&G Global Dividend Fund	2.9	3.21%	20-Feb-19	N/A
M&G Optimal Income Sterling	1.7	2.76%	13-Apr-15	N/A
M&G UK Income Distribution Sterling	1.6	3.42%	15-Aug-16	N/A
Investec Diversified Income	2.8	3.71%	25-Aug-16	N/A
Investec Diversified Income	1.4	3.86%	20-Feb-19	N/A
Threadneedle Inv Services - UK Equity	1.7	2.94%	08-Sep-16	N/A
Threadneedle Inv Services - UK Equity	1.3	2.90%	21-Feb-19	N/A
Threadneedle Global Equity Fund	1.5	2.96%	21-Feb-19	N/A
CCLA - The LAs Property Fund	1.9	5.24%	31-Mar-13	N/A
CCLA - The LAs Property Fund	1.1	4.49%	30-Apr-14	N/A
UBS Multi- Asset Income Fund	1.4	4.24%	22-Feb-19	N/A
Kames Diversified Monthly Income Fund	2.8	4.08%	21-Feb-19	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>3.61%</b>		
<b><u>Fixed Rate Deposits</u></b>				
Network Housing Group	2.0	3.60%	28-Apr-16	27-Apr-21
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3.60%</b>		
<b>Total - Core Inv. Portfolio</b>	<b>32.1</b>	<b>3.61%</b>	<b>Average</b>	
<b><u>Cash Flow Investments</u></b>				
Aberdeen Liquidity Fund	5.0	0.08%	N/A	Instant Access
Aviva (ICD Portal)	5.0	0.06%	N/A	Instant Access
CCLA (ICD Portal)	5.0	0.12%	N/A	Instant Access
Federated - Class 4 (ICD Portal)	5.0	0.05%	N/A	Instant Access
Fidelity (ICD Portal)	5.0	0.05%	N/A	Instant Access
Goldman SLR (ICD portal)	1.0	0.01%	N/A	Instant Access
Insight (ICD Portal)	5.0	0.01%	N/A	Instant Access
Invesco (ICD Portal)	5.0	0.04%	N/A	Instant Access
JP Morgan (ICD Portal)	5.0	0.01%	N/A	Instant Access
LGIM - Class 4 (ICD Portal)	5.0	0.04%	N/A	Instant Access
<b>Total</b>	<b>46.0</b>	<b>0.04%</b>		
<b>Local Authorities</b>	35.0	0.44%	N/A	Short term
<b>Bank Deposits</b>	5.0	0.02%	N/A	Short term
<b>Close Brothers</b>	5.0	1.20%	N/A	20-Dec-19
<b><u>Funding Circle</u></b>				
Loans to small businesses *	0.4	1.29%	N/A	N/A
<b>Total Investments at 30/09/19</b>	<b>123.5</b>	<b>1.17%</b>	<b>Overall Av.</b>	

\* Valuation as at 31 March 2020

Note that the Yield on Pooled Funds is based on the initial investment as given at Appendix B.

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## Strategic Investment Funds as at 30 September 2020

Fund	Date of Purchase	Initial Investment £	Value as at 30/03/20 £	Value as at 30/09/20 £	Dividends Received to 30/09/20 £	Annualised Dividend Yield %	Capital Gain(+)/ Loss(-) as at 30/09/20 £	Total Return as at 30/09/20 £	Total Return %
DMS Charteris Premium Income Fund	11/05/12	800,120	573,549	649,165	-	3.99%	-150,955	-150,955	-18.9%
Schroders UK Corporate Bond Fund	11/05/12	1,500,000	1,663,380	1,878,873	17,342	3.60%	+378,873	+396,215	26.4%
Schroders Income Maximiser Fund	06/07/12	1,000,000	771,474	739,150	14,751	5.89%	-260,850	-246,099	-24.6%
Schroders Income Maximiser Fund	24/07/15	1,000,000	627,159	600,882	11,992	4.79%	-399,118	-387,126	-38.7%
Schroders Income Maximiser Fund	26/08/16	1,000,000	666,341	638,422	12,741	5.09%	-361,578	-348,837	-34.9%
Schroders Income Maximiser Fund	25/02/19	3,000,000	1,953,262	1,871,423	37,348	4.97%	-1,128,577	-1,091,229	-36.4%
M&G Global Dividend Fund	27/06/12	1,000,000	1,378,729	1,656,996	12,519	3.66%	+656,996	+669,515	67.0%
M&G Global Dividend Fund	20/02/19	3,000,000	2,443,084	2,936,167	22,183	1.48%	-63,833	-41,650	-1.4%
M&G Optimal Income Sterling	13/04/15	1,690,636	1,560,599	1,696,313	444	2.71%	+5,677	+6,121	0.4%
M&G UK Income Distribution Sterling	15/08/16	2,000,000	1,584,287	1,597,861	34,117	3.18%	-402,139	-368,022	-18.4%
Ninety One Diversified Income	25/08/16	3,000,000	2,613,812	2,780,835	39,712	2.95%	-219,165	-179,453	-6.0%
Ninety One Diversified Income	20/02/19	1,500,000	1,360,391	1,447,320	20,669	3.08%	-52,680	-32,011	-2.1%
Threadneedle Inv Services - UK Equity	08/09/16	2,000,000	1,619,055	1,736,480	11,091	2.62%	-263,520	-252,429	-12.6%
Threadneedle Inv Services - UK Equity	21/02/19	1,500,000	1,198,499	1,285,423	8,210	2.59%	-214,577	-206,367	-13.8%
Threadneedle Global Equity Fund	21/02/19	1,500,000	1,305,138	1,464,561	26,294	2.63%	-35,439	-9,145	-0.6%
CCLA - The LAs Property Fund	31/03/13	1,500,000	1,954,202	1,872,919	18,834	3.97%	+372,919	+391,753	26.1%
CCLA - The LAs Property Fund	30/04/14	1,000,000	1,115,818	1,069,407	10,754	3.40%	+69,407	+80,161	8.0%
UBS Multi- Asset Income Fund	22/02/19	1,500,000	1,288,907	1,390,108	19,247	3.60%	-109,892	-90,645	-6.0%
Aegon Diversified Monthly Income Fund	21/02/19	3,000,000	2,545,539	2,762,793	74,007	4.48%	-237,207	-163,200	-5.4%
<b>Value at 30/09/2020</b>		<b>32,490,756</b>	<b>28,223,225</b>	<b>30,075,098</b>	<b>392,255</b>	<b>3.61%</b>	<b>-2,415,658</b>	<b>-2,023,403</b>	<b>-6.2%</b>

## Strategic Fund Performance to 30 September 2020

Capital depreciation of these investments was -7.4% as at 30/09/20. However, capital gains and losses may fluctuate throughout the period the investments are held. Any gains would only be realised when the funds are sold and losses would impact on the General Fund. Dividends are received at various times during the year, generally month, quarterly or half yearly.

The income yield for 2020/21 as at 30/09/20 is 1.2% and the estimated annualised income yield on these funds is expected to be in the region of 3.6%.

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Date of Meeting	ISSUE	Lead Officer	Objectives
19 January 2021	1. Minutes	Chairman	To agree the minutes of the previous meeting.
	2. Lendy Lion Petition	Deborah Ashman/Cllr Barratt	To consider a recommendation to Cabinet on the Council's response to the petition
	3. Draft Budget proposals	Terry Collier/Cllr Buttar	To consider draft Budget proposals for 2021/2022.
	4. Treasury Management half-yearly report	Paul Taylor / Cllr Buttar	To note the Treasury Management situation.
	5. Treasury Management Statement	Paul Taylor/Cllr Buttar	To note the TM Statement for 2021
	6. Project Management and Commercial Property update	Sandy Muirhead/Heather Morgan/Cllr Noble/Cllr McIlroy	To receive an update on the status of current Council projects.
	7. Task Group updates	Lead Councillors	To receive updates on the work of the O&S and Leader's Task Groups
	8. Work Programme and Cabinet Forward Plan	Chairman / Terry Collier	To note the proposed work programme and consider issues of interest for the future work programme from the Cabinet Forward Plan.

Extraordinary Meeting	ISSUE	Lead Officer	Objectives
2 February 2021	Review of the Eco Park	Tracey Willmott-French/ Cllr Noble/ Surrey County Council/Environment Agency	To review the operation of the Eco Park with the relevant responsible agencies.

Agenda Item 11

Overview and Scrutiny Committee Work Programme 2020-2021

<b>Extraordinary Meeting</b>	<b>ISSUE</b>	<b>Lead Officer</b>	<b>Objectives</b>
9 February 2021	Draft Budget proposals	Terry Collier/Cllr Buttar	To consider draft Budget proposals for 2021/2022.
	Capital Strategy	Heather Morgan/Cllr Boughtflower	To consider an update of the Capital Strategy and agree recommendations to Cabinet as required.

<b>Date of Meeting</b>	<b>ISSUE</b>	<b>Lead Officer</b>	<b>Objectives</b>
23 March 2021	1. Minutes	Chairman	To agree the minutes of the previous meeting.
	2. Any other items previously identified by the Committee		
	3. Capital Monitoring Report Q3	Paul Taylor / Cllr Buttar	To receive and note the current Capital spend position.
	4. Revenue Monitoring Report Q3	Paul Taylor / Cllr Buttar	To receive and note the current Revenue spend position.
	5. Project Management and Commercial Property update	Sandy Muirhead/Heather Morgan/ Cllrs Noble and McIlroy	To receive an update on the status of current Council projects.
	6. Task Group updates	Lead Councillors	To receive updates on the work of the O&S and Leader's Task Groups
	7. Work Programme and Cabinet Forward Plan	Chairman / Terry Collier	To note the proposed work programme and consider issues of interest for the future work programme from the Cabinet Forward Plan.